[cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

Moudrick M. Dadashov md at ssc.lt
Fri Jan 3 20:40:18 UTC 2014


On 1/3/2014 8:09 PM, Rick Andrews wrote:
> Mads, Moudrick,
> Are CAs that issue QCs audited by some ETSI audit equivalent to BRs, 
> in which the auditors check that the CA verified any domain names that 
> appear in QCs?
Yes, according to ETSI SR 003 091 V1.1.1 (2012-04) "Recommendations on 
Governance and Audit Regime for CAB Forum Extended Validation and 
Baseline Certificates", CAs in order to comply with BRs have to be 
audited against ETSI TS 102 042. And this is irrelevant to whether you 
are issuing QCs or not.

> Also, to respond to Mads' earlier question about the id-kp-clientAuth 
> EKU bit: Symantec generally sets both clientAuth and serverAuth EKU 
> bits, because we have many customers who use the certificate for 
> server-to-server communication. Each endpoint has an SSL cert, and one 
> acts as the client while one acts as the server, and they use their 
> certs to authenticate each other.
> -Rick
> *From:*public-bounces at cabforum.org 
> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] *On Behalf Of *Mads Egil Henriksveen
> *Sent:* Friday, January 03, 2014 3:52 AM
> *To:* Moudrick M. Dadashov; Jeremy Rowley; public at cabforum.org
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate
> Hi Moudrick
> There might not be a real use case for including a domain name in a 
> QC, but as a trusted CA we take the responsibility for the accuracy of 
> information in all certs we issue. And that was my point and why I am 
> not very concerned about the described attack scenario.
> Regards
> Mads
> *From:*public-bounces at cabforum.org 
> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] *On Behalf Of *Moudrick M. Dadashov
> *Sent:* 3. januar 2014 11:51
> *To:* Mads Egil Henriksveen; Jeremy Rowley; public at cabforum.org
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate
> Mads,
> On 1/3/2014 11:49 AM, Mads Egil Henriksveen wrote:
>     The attack scenario assumes that the QC can be chained to a root
>     cert in a trusted CA root store. This means that the CA should
>     know the root store requirements and should be aware of the risk
>     issuing any cert that could be used as an SSL certificate.
>     Buypass do issue both QC and SSL certificates and with the
>     DigiNotar attack back in 2011 we realized that the browsers do
>     accept a lot of certificates as SSL certificates. Since then we
>     have had strict controls to ensure that no certificate is issued
>     with an unverified domain name. I guess most of the trusted QC
>     issuers who also issue SSL certificates are aware of this, I would
>     not be very concerned about this attack scenario.
> What is the use case when in a QC we'd need a [any/unverified] domain 
> name? (aren't CAs responsible for the accuracy of information in the 
> QCs they issue?).
> However, I do support the idea of a technical definition of an SSL 
> certificate and I like the proposal from Ryan Hurst requiring the 
> Under ETSI framework compliance assumes two things: compliance with 
> the corresponding requirements plus certificate profile compliance. 
> These two categories exist as separate documents (under their own ETSI 
> IDs).
> Ryan's proposal is definitely a  good step forward, I'd vote with my 
> both hands if we go even further, and like ETSI, have separate BR/EV 
> profile specifications.
> Thanks,
> M.D.

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