[cabfpub] Question on CT: Monitoring

Ben Laurie benl at google.com
Mon Jan 6 06:48:37 MST 2014


On 6 January 2014 13:39, Stephen Davidson <S.Davidson at quovadisglobal.com>wrote:

> I met recently with a representative of Google working on this project (am
> I allowed to publish that?) and I believe there is a way forward with CT.
> Slightly different than it started, but in my opinion better and the most
> sever problems affecting CAs in respect to the CT proposal can be
> apparently easily solved with achieving the same end-result which is the
> most important thing here. But I don't want to speak for them or put
> anything into their mouth.
>
> If the spec for CT is changing, it would be helpful if that information
> would be shared with all CAs.
>

As you may be aware, we're currently in the process of trying to set up an
IETF Working Group for a Standards Track version of CT. Undoubtedly this
will result in an updated spec, but there are no current plans to change CT
in any way that has not been discussed.

As indicated in an earlier email, I am not sure what Eddy is referring to
here, so a little hard to comment specifically.



> Thanks, Stephen
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] *On
> Behalf Of *Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
> *Sent:* Friday, January 03, 2014 7:58 PM
> *To:* CABFPub
>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Question on CT: Monitoring
>
>
>
>
> On 01/03/2014 06:25 PM, From Rob Stradling:
>
>
>
> - just
> see http://www.netcraft.com/internet-data-mining/ssl-survey/ as an
> example:
>
>     The distribution of key lengths, however, varies significantly
>     between different CAs. For example, in May 2013, StartCom had issued
>     no certificates with an RSA public key shorter than 2048-bits and
>     almost 20% are 4096-bits long, more than any other major CA.
>
>
> How does your customers' choice of key length reduce the chances of
> StartCom misissuing certs in the future?
>
>
> A lot - first of all it's not always the choice of the subscribers, but
> it's an example of diligence by the CA. And I can give you a couple of more
> such examples if you want, setting the bar clearly higher.
>
> Even though nothing is perfect as mentioned earlier, one can at least
> strive for that....
>
>
> Do you have a better idea (than CT) for solving the problem of detecting
> misissuances?  If so, please write it up as an Internet Draft.
>
>
> I met recently with a representative of Google working on this project (am
> I allowed to publish that?) and I believe there is a way forward with CT.
> Slightly different than it started, but in my opinion better and the most
> sever problems affecting CAs in respect to the CT proposal can be
> apparently easily solved with achieving the same end-result which is the
> most important thing here. But I don't want to speak for them or put
> anything into their mouth.
>
> Regards
>
>
>
> Signer:
>
> Eddy Nigg, COO/CTO
>
>
>
> StartCom Ltd. <http://www.startcom.org>
>
> XMPP:
>
> startcom at startcom.org
>
> Blog:
>
> Join the Revolution! <http://blog.startcom.org>
>
> Twitter:
>
> Follow Me <http://twitter.com/eddy_nigg>
>
>
>
>
>
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