[cabfpub] [therightkey] Thoughts on reducing SCT sizes (was Re: Updated Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan)

Ben Laurie benl at google.com
Tue Feb 18 18:27:57 UTC 2014

On 18 February 2014 17:07, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> On 02/18/2014 11:58 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>> On 18 February 2014 15:37, Tim Moses <tim.moses at entrust.com> wrote:
>>> Ben - Will Chrome deny EV  status to a certificate with too few SCTs, or will it grant EV status as long as at least one of its SCTs is from a log that remains in the program?
>> It will deny.
> Doesn't this reintroduce the perverse incentive to avoid killing a
> known-misbehaving log?
> one of the nice things about requiring corroborative SCTs on new certs
> is that we can kill any log that is misbehaving without any pushback
> from certificate-holders concerned that their site will "go dark" (or
> "lose the fancy green label", in this EV case).
> If we make it so that the EV label goes away when either of the
> corroborators dies, then certificate holders have incentive to support a
> failed log, even though this goes against the best interests of their users.

That's not the rule. The rule is you need one SCT from a live log, and
N SCTs from logs that were valid at the time of issue.

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