[cabfpub] Proposal for modified Google SHA-1 deprecation policy

Adriano Santoni - Actalis S.p.A. adriano.santoni at staff.aruba.it
Thu Aug 28 23:57:13 MST 2014


apart from the discussion, it would be a good thing if you published 
your plan on some Google's web site (like e.g. 

It would be easier for CAs to show their customers in a more convincing 
way what Google is going to do.
In other words, publishing your intent on a web site would have a little 
bit more officiality -- that would help CAs.

How about that?

Thank you

Il 29/08/2014 04:13, Ryan Sleevi ha scritto:
> Hi Kirk,
> I feel like I have sufficiently explained our concerns and motivations 
> throughout this thread, with both you and other CAs, that it should be 
> readily apparent that this neither meets our goals nor helps our users.
> I appreciate your thoughtful consideration in writing it.
> Best,
> Ryan
> On Aug 28, 2014 7:04 PM, "kirk_hall at trendmicro.com 
> <mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>" <kirk_hall at trendmicro.com 
> <mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>> wrote:
>     Ryan and Chris – here is a serious proposal for a modified Google
>     SHA-1 policy.  It meets all of your stated goals.  Please give it
>     some consideration.
>     1. SHA-1 certs issued on or after [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or
>     after January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google upon
>     issuance – red slash and nasty click-throughs.  (This will stop
>     issuance of 2017 SHA-1 certs this fall.)
>     2. SHA-1 certs issued before [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or
>     after January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google
>     starting [March 1, 2015] – red slash only and nasty
>     click-throughs.   (This will force existing websites with 2017
>     SHA-1 certs to change them within the next six months).
>     Result: All 2017 SHA-1 certs will be gone by next March 2015 –
>     which certainly meets your goals.  Customers with existing 2017
>     certs can get through this holiday season, CAs can get the message
>     out.
>     Advantages:
>     1. CAs that have never issued 2017 certs, and never will (like
>     Trend Micro) and their customers are not affected – that’s
>     appropriate, as we have never been a part of this problem.
>     2. CAs that have issued three year SHA-1 certs expiring in 2017
>     will stop by this fall.
>     3. CAs that have issued 2017 certs in the past (and their
>     customers) will be affected, but will have six months to adjust. 
>     That will be a much smaller number of customers affected than if
>     those with 2016 certs are forced to change their certs twice (in
>     2014 and again in 2015).
>     4. All SHA-1 certs will likely be gone by next spring.
>     I don’t think Google should spend much time worrying about how CAs
>     communicate with their customers about the need to move to SHA-256
>     before 2017 – that’s for us to worry about, and we are all
>     strongly incentivized to get the message out (selling a 2017 cert
>     that doesn’t work creates legal problems, and none of us wants to
>     be dealing with angry SHA-1 customers in late 2016 who have to
>     switch to SHA-256).  We may also be able to get behind Google’s
>     policy if it is revised – something that isn’t the case today.
>     You mentioned somewhere that you worried that simply deprecating
>     SHA-1 certs as of 2017 could create a big customer service burden
>     on Google as of late 2016 or early 2017.  I don’t think that’s the
>     case with this new proposed policy, as all the negative UI effects
>     will happen in 2014-15.  Plus, I predict Google will be deluged
>     with customer service complaints under your current policy, when
>     thousands of websites start showing as “untrusted” in the next
>     6-12 weeks.  Why not make life easier for Google with a revised
>     policy?
>     So what do you think?  Can we make a change to the policy that is
>     focused on the real problem (2017 certs)?
>     Thanks for your consideration.
>     */Kirk R. Hall/*
>     Operations Director, Trust Services
>     Trend Micro
>     The information contained in this email and any attachments is confidential
>     and may be subject to copyright or other intellectual property protection.
>     If you are not the intended recipient, you are not authorized to use or
>     disclose this information, and we request that you notify us by reply mail or
>     telephone and delete the original message from your mail system.
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public

More information about the Public mailing list