[cabfpub] Proposed motion to modify EV domain verification section
Rich Smith
richard.smith at comodo.com
Tue May 7 19:54:35 UTC 2013
My responses inline below:
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On
Behalf Of Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2013 3:13 PM
On 05/07/2013 07:19 PM, From Rich Smith:
I think we are waaay over complicating this. Our role as CAs is two-fold:
1) Verify domain ownership/control
2) For OV and EV certs, verify the identity of the individual or organization
to be named in the certificate Subject details to the degree prescribed by the
BR or EV Guidelines respectively.
If that is true, could be please perhaps help me understand what the
differences between BR OV and EV effectively are? Or in other words, what
would we have to adjust besides your proposal to make OV and EV exactly the
same thing?
[RWS] The difference lies in #2, the level of identity checking, not in #1,
the domain verification. IMO, unless and until ICANN and their registrars get
their respective acts together the ONLY piece of information contained in
WHOIS that should come into consideration for a CA are the contact email
addresses and possibly the phone numbers, and those ONLY to establish a way to
contact the domain owner via phone or email to verify the certificate request.
The other details in WHOIS info are completely unverified and therefore
unreliable and irrelevant.
If your suggestion and proposal will be acceptable to the CABF members
including the browser vendors, we might want to align BR OV and EV further to
the point so that OV could be basically relinquished. Considering that browser
don't make any effort for BR IV/OV anyway, we might pursue such an effort.
[RWS] I'm completely open to that possibility, but currently there are
individuals and still some organization types which don't qualify for EV, but
do value some level of identity checking even though the browsers won't
differentiate it. If we can revise the EV requirements sufficiently to allow
those to obtain them then I would love to discuss deprecating IV/OV.
It might reduce the quality of EV slightly, but with the benefit for higher
adoption. I was always under the impression that EV means EXTENDED
validation - and one of the goals is to clearly identify the entity to a
visitor that he would expect to see at the site/certificate. E.g. somebody
visiting paypal.com expects to see PayPal, Inc. (US) and not SomeISP, LLC
(US).
[RWS] To a point you're right, but we can't DEFINITIVELY do that. There is
nothing in the EV Guidelines which prevents PayPal from sub-letting a
sub-domain to a third party for instance, and the EV Guidelines allow for
that, but currently both the Applicant and PayPal have to jump through what I
see as unnecessary hoops to do it. There is also nothing, not even the
aforementioned hoops, to stop PayPal from obtaining an EV cert for a
sub-domain of paypal.com in their own name and then allowing some third party
to use that sub-domain and it's certificate to do some other unrestricted and
unrelated business on that sub-domain. The domain is PayPal's property. What
they do with that property in this regard is completely outside the scope of
what we do as CAs. We can't control it, we can't police it, and IMO it is
outside our scope legally, and ethically to try. It's their property. Our
job is simply to verify the details in the certificate and to verify that both
the domain owner, and whatever entity is named in the certificate, whether the
same or different, approve the issuance of the certificate. Anything beyond
that is, of necessity, between the domain owner, the site operator, and the
end user. IMO we go too far if we are trying to insert ourselves into that,
and there is no practical way to do so reliably even if you think we should,
which I do not.
Regards
Signer:
Eddy Nigg, COO/CTO
StartCom Ltd. <http://www.startcom.org>
XMPP:
startcom at startcom.org
Blog:
Join the Revolution! <http://blog.startcom.org>
Twitter:
Follow Me <http://twitter.com/eddy_nigg>
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