[cabfpub] Ballot 97 - Prevention of Unknown Certificate Contents

[michal.proszkiewicz at unizeto.pl]

CERTUM abstains





"Jeremy Rowley" <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> 
Wysłane przez: public-bounces at cabforum.org
2013-02-07 05:45
Odpowiedz użytkownikowi
jeremy.rowley at digicert.com


Do
<public at cabforum.org>
DW

Temat
[cabfpub] Ballot 97 - Prevention of Unknown Certificate Contents






If passed, the motion will restrict CAs from issuing Certificates with 
extensions and other contents that the CA doesn?t understand or have a 
purpose of including in the certificate.
----- 
Jeremy Rowley made the following motion, and Ryan Hurst and Robin Alden 
endorsed it: 
... Motion Begins ... 
... Erratum Begins ... 
A. In Section 10.2.3, after the first paragraph, insert: ?The CA SHALL 
establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data 
requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant.? 
B. In Appendix B, add paragraph numbers to the headings: ?(1) Root CA 
Certificate?, ?(2) Subordinate CA Certificate?, and ?(3) Subscriber 
Certificate?. 
C. In three places in Appendix B, delete: ?All other fields and extensions 
MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280.? 
D. In Appendix B, insert paragraph 4, as follows 
?(4) All Certificates 
All other fields and extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280. 
The CA SHALL NOT issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage flag, 
extendedKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not specified 
in this Appendix B unless the CA is aware of a reason for including the 
data in the Certificate. 
CAs SHALL NOT issue a Certificate with: 
a) Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet 
(such as an extendedKeyUsage value for a service that is only valid in the 
context of a privately managed network), unless: 
i. such value falls within an OID arc for which the Applicant demonstrates 
ownership; or 
ii. the Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data 
in a public context; or 
b) semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party about the 
certificate information verified by the CA (such as including 
extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to 
verify that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due 
to remote issuance). 
... Erratum ends ... 
The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 7 
February 2013 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 14 February 2013. Unless the 
motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start 
immediately thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 21 February 2013. 
Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread. 
... Motions ends ... 
A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the response. 

A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to 
abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses 
will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a 
voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted. 
Voting members are listed here: http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html 
In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes 
cast by members in the CA category and one half or more of the votes cast 
by members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at least six 
members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting 
against or abstaining. 
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