[cabfpub] Ballot 97 - Prevention of Unknown Certificate Contents
ryan.hurst at globalsign.com
Fri Feb 15 19:40:45 UTC 2013
Globalsign votes yes.
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On
Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley
Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 8:45 PM
To: public at cabforum.org
Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot 97 - Prevention of Unknown Certificate Contents
If passed, the motion will restrict CAs from issuing Certificates with
extensions and other contents that the CA doesn't understand or have a
purpose of including in the certificate.
Jeremy Rowley made the following motion, and Ryan Hurst and Robin Alden
... Motion Begins ...
... Erratum Begins ...
A. In Section 10.2.3, after the first paragraph, insert: "The CA SHALL
establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data requested
for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant."
B. In Appendix B, add paragraph numbers to the headings: "(1) Root CA
Certificate", "(2) Subordinate CA Certificate", and "(3) Subscriber
C. In three places in Appendix B, delete: "All other fields and extensions
MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280."
D. In Appendix B, insert paragraph 4, as follows
"(4) All Certificates
All other fields and extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280. The
CA SHALL NOT issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage flag,
extendedKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not specified
in this Appendix B unless the CA is aware of a reason for including the data
in the Certificate.
CAs SHALL NOT issue a Certificate with:
a) Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet (such
as an extendedKeyUsage value for a service that is only valid in the context
of a privately managed network), unless:
i. such value falls within an OID arc for which the Applicant demonstrates
ii. the Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data in
a public context; or
b) semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party about the
certificate information verified by the CA (such as including
extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to verify
that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due to
... Erratum ends ...
The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 7 February
2013 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 14 February 2013. Unless the motion is
withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately
thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 21 February 2013. Votes must be
cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.
... Motions ends ...
A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the response.
A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to abstain
must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will not
be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting
member before the close of the voting period will be counted.
Voting members are listed here: http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html
In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast
by members in the CA category and one half or more of the votes cast by
members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at least six members
must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting against or
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