[cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

Thu Aug 1 14:08:46 UTC 2013

Ideally, only certificates that explicitly contain an EKU with serverauth would be considered SSL certs. All other certs should be dismissed. That would be in line with the RFC, but I realize this proposal might even be more impractical.

I would suggest though to add to the current definition that only certificates that contain a KeyUsage with the digitalsignature and keyEncipherment and / or keyAgreement bits set, would be considered SSL certificates.  It just does not make sense to mandate that a personal certificate on a SSCD with KeyUsage non-repudation and no EKU would be considered an SSL certificate. That is not how I have interpreted RFC 5280.

If the proposed definition is accepted all certificates with noEKU or anyEKU bits set will be governed by the BR. That means that all client certificates with those bits set, SSL or otherwise, will be governed by the rules of the BR. This in turn means that a client certificate must contain a FQDN, which it obviously cannot. In my view, adopting the proposed definition would lead to a situation where no client certificates can be issued under the roots present in the root programs, unless the burden of change is placed on those CAs issuing client certificates, forcing them to add keyusage bits to their certificates that are not compulsory through the RFCs. Furthermore, in many cases the anyEKU is relied on by software using client certificates.

Regards,
Robert

Van: Jeremy Rowley [mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com]
Verzonden: donderdag 1 augustus 2013 14:06
Aan: 'Steve Roylance'; Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius
CC: 'CABFPub'
Onderwerp: RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

That is likely the way forward.  Mozilla can enable roots for “Web, code, or client” .  I assume the other browsers probably have a similar designation. If the root is disabled for “web” then the cert could not perform SSL and would not be considered enabled in the browser’s trust store (for SSL/TLS).  The tweak to the proposed language would be nominal.

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Steve Roylance
Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2013 5:25 AM
To: Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius
Cc: CABFPub
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

Hi Robert.

Root program's have the ability to mark specific roots for specific uses therefore  you can still offer public trust but for a specific need. Maybe that's a way forward? As with Name Constraints it makes roots (or Subordinate CAs) less attractive as targets as their value to an attacker is decreased.

Regards Steve

Sent from my iPhone

On 1 Aug 2013, at 12:04, "Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius" <robert.vande.rijt at logius.nl<mailto:robert.vande.rijt at logius.nl>> wrote:
For qualified certificates under ETSI that need to be publicly trusted, a private root would not be an option. Moreover, developing a private, not-publicly trusted root and rolling out end-entity certificates takes time. I am talking about a year at least.

I wonder if everyone else is realizing the impact on “non-SSL” certificates. Especially the CA’s not participating in the CABforum because they do not issue SSL certs (or thought they did not), but do have a publicly trusted root.

Robert

Van: Jeremy Rowley [mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com]
Verzonden: donderdag 1 augustus 2013 12:56
Aan: Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius; 'Ryan Hurst'
CC: 'CABFPub'
Onderwerp: RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

Which is why you will now have to issue these off a root not trusted by a participating browser. The safetynet is the problem since makes them an SSL cert.  I don’t think you can both have a safetynet like this and issue the cert from a trusted root.

Jeremy

From: Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius [mailto:robert.vande.rijt at logius.nl]
Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2013 4:53 AM
To: Ryan Hurst; jeremy.rowley at digicert.com<mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
Cc: CABFPub
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

Thanks for your reply, Jeremy. I conclude that with this new definition:

1. We are forcing everyone with public certificates to use the EKU;
2. We are forcing everyone with public certificates not to use the anyExtendedKeyUsage unless it is a SSL certificate;
3. thereby forcing everyone to spell out all the applicable EKUs one–by-one. My experience is that a lot of software cannot handle this, so the certificate cannot be used for the function intended. That is why the anyExtendedKeyUsage is often used as a safetynet.

Robert

Van: Ryan Hurst [mailto:ryan.hurst at globalsign.com]
Verzonden: donderdag 1 augustus 2013 12:45
Aan: jeremy.rowley at digicert.com<mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
CC: Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius; CABFPub
Onderwerp: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

I concur with Jeremy's analysis.

Ryan Hurst
Chief Technology Officer
GMO Globalsign

twitter: @rmhrisk
email: ryan.hurst at globalsign.com<mailto:ryan.hurst at globalsign.com>
phone: 206-650-7926

Sent from my phone, please forgive the brevity.

On Aug 1, 2013, at 1:12 PM, "Jeremy Rowley" <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com<mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>> wrote:
HI Rijt,

I think the certificates you mentioned will (and should) qualify under the BRs if are issued from a root that is included in one of the adopting browser’s trust stores.

Here’s my logic:

1)      Certs that don’t have an EKU or that include the anyEKU can be used as SSL certs, regardless of their intended purposes and should (arguably) be under the BRs.

2)      However, as you mentioned, many certificates assert the anyEKU, have noEKU, or even contain the server authentication EKU that are never intended to be used on a server.

3)      I believe the certificates referenced typically lack an FQDN. Including these certificates under the BR umbrella is problematic because the certificates can’t function in the intended manner and comply with the BRs.  The CN is an identifier for the equipment, which violates Section 9.2.2 of the BRs.

4)      Requiring an FQDN for inclusion in the BRs is not a way forward since that would make the sections on internal server names out of scope of the BRs. In fact, the identifier in these certificates is indistinguishable from and qualifies as an internal name, meaning the certificate presents all of the concerns previously expressed by PayPal.   Continuing to trust these certificates would be the same as not deprecating internal server name certificates

5)      Therefore, these certificates must either be included in the BRs, and include an FQDN, or need to be issued off of a non-publicly trusted root certificate.

The position you expressed is why I wanted to raise the issue and why I think we need to resolve what the BRs actually cover.

Jeremy

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius
Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2013 3:05 AM
To: 'CABFPub'
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

Although I understand the need for tightening the definition and I can follow the reasoning below to a certain point I feel that, instead of tightening it, the new definition seems to have broadened the scope. The vast majority of certificates issued under the Logius PKIoverheid root are not intended for the identification of SSL servers. However, roughly 90% of these certificates will now fall under this new definition. In the present version, the scope made clear that the BR only addressed certificates meant for servers.

What about personal certificates on a SSCD that have no EKU or have an anyExtendedKeyUsage as a safetynet? Would these certificates suddenly by seen as SSL certificates although they are obviously not intended for servers? What about certificates issued to autonomous devices such as onboard computers in taxicabs or domestic gas meters, to name but two? Would these be considered SSL certificates if they have no EKU or the clientauth EKU in combination with anyExtendedKeyUsage?

Regards,
Robert

Van: public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] Namens Ryan Sleevi
Verzonden: maandag 29 juli 2013 22:57
Aan: Kelvin Yiu
CC: CABFPub
Onderwerp: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

They're still respected (for better or worse) by Apple, NSS, and Android.

Even if that changed tomorrow, the fact that a significant portion of the deployed user base for those products may not upgrade immediately suggests it would be wise to keep them in scope - especially given that even few products implement Microsoft's EKU chaining behaviour for intermediates.
On Jul 29, 2013 1:52 PM, "Kelvin Yiu" <kelviny at exchange.microsoft.com<mailto:kelviny at exchange.microsoft.com>> wrote:
I prefer to drop any mention of the MS or Netscape SGC OIDs. These OIDs have been obsolete for over a decade and have ceased to have any meaning on MS platforms since Windows 2000.

Kelvin

-----Original Message-----
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi
Sent: Friday, July 26, 2013 12:35 PM
To: jeremy rowley
Cc: CABFPub
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

Jeremy,

If I might suggest a slight modification to the wording, which still leaves things a little ambiguous. "All root and intermediate certificates included in a browser's trust store" - AIUI, none of the browsers are really accepting intermediates to the trust store at this point.

This was a sticky point when working on Mozilla's wording on this policy to. Luckily, the terminology for "Root CA" and "Subordinate CA"
may be sufficient here to help clarify.

"All root certificates included in a browser's trust store, all subordinate CA certificates signed by one of these root certificates, and all end-entity certificates that either lack any Extended Key Usage extension or contain an Extended Key Usage extension that contains one of the following:
- Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
- anyExtendedKeyUsage (2.5.29.37.0)
- Netscape Server Gated Cryptography (2.16.840.1.113730.4.1)
- Microsoft Server Gated Cryptography (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.3) are expressly covered by these requirements."

Note that Appendix B, 3.F lists other values as SHOULD NOT. However, that presumably only applies when a certificate is 'in scope' of the BRs, hence the restatement of potential EKUs that are relevant.

On Fri, Jul 26, 2013 at 12:22 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com<mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>> wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
>
>
> As mentioned on the phone call last week, CAs have claimed exemption
> from the BRs because the definition of a publicly-trusted SSL certificate is not
> clear.   I would like to clarify the scope of the BRs to avoid confusion on
> what particular certificate contents are necessary to require
> compliance.  I am looking for on endorser (Stephen Davidson has already endorsed).
>
>
>
> The third paragraph of Section 1 of the baseline requirements is:
>
> "This version of the Requirements only addresses Certificates intended
> to be used for authenticating servers  accessible through the
> Internet. Similar requirements for code signing, S/MIME,
> time-stamping, VoIP, IM, Web services, etc. may be covered in future versions."
>
>
>
> I'd like to replace the above text with the following:
>
> "This version of the Baseline Requirements addresses all root,
> intermediate, and end entity certificates that can be used in
> publicly-trusted SSL handshakes.  All root and intermediate
> certificates included in a browser's trust store and all end entity
> certificates containing an extended key usage extension of Server
> Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) are expressly covered by these
> requirements. Similar requirements for code signing, S/MIME,
> time-stamping, VoIP, IM, Web services, etc. may be covered in future versions."
>
>
>
> I look forward to your comments.
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org<mailto:Public at cabforum.org>
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
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