[cabfpub] Name Constraints, Auditing and EKU
rob.stradling at comodo.com
Tue Apr 23 21:13:00 UTC 2013
If a Root CA issues a Name-Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate that
contains the OCSP Signing EKU, then surely that Subordinate CA
Certificate can also function as a "2. CA delegated" OCSP Response
Signer _for the Root CA_?
Or are you perhaps implying that Windows will spot
basicConstraints:CA=TRUE and/or keyUsage:keyCertSign in the Subordinate
CA Certificate and therefore refuse to let the cert be used as a
Delegated OCSP Response Signer cert?
On 23/04/13 21:50, Ryan Hurst wrote:
> I am just catching up on my CAB Forum mail, I see this conversation
> regarding the OCSP signing EKU and it seems there may be a miss
> There are four trust models for OCSP:
> 1. CA Signed; the same key/certificate that signed the certificate was used
> to sign the OCSP status.
> 2. CA delegated; the same key/certificate that signed the certificate was
> used to sign a certificate that contains the OCSP Signing EKU that was used
> to sign a OCSP response.
> 3. VA Signed; the relying party has been configured out of band to trust
> this specific key/certificate to sign OCSP responses for a given set
> (usually all) of certificates.
> 4. VA delegated; the relying party has been configured out of band to trust
> a specific key/certificate to sign OCSP responses for a given set of
> certificates, that entity has signed a certificate/key that contains the
> OCSP Signing EKU.
> It is only possible to trust do 1 & 2 automatically in that they are in
> essence leverage the policy expressed in the certificate and not out of band
> configuration. In other words even if clients support 2 & 3 (which most
> don't in my testing) the only thing the browsers do is #1 and #2.
> Additionally notice the logic is gated by the signing key; even in CA
> delegated the delegated responder can not sign for any other CA in the
> hierarchy -- only those within its scope.
> I am confident Windows behaves this way, I am also confident what was once
> the ValiCert (now Axway) client behaved this way.
> As such I don't see a need to exclude name constrained CAs from using OCSP.
> -----Original Message-----
>> 12. Appendix B(2)G:
>> "id-kp-OCSPSigning MUST be present"
>> Disagree. The OCSP Signing trust purpose is not supposed to be passed
>> down from the Root, and AFAIK there is no way to prevent a Subordinate
>> CA from issuing delegated OCSP Signing Certificates! (If you have
>> evidence to the contrary, please say).
> I think the requirement is really a "id-kp-OCSPSigning MUST NOT be present".
> If CA A issues a certificate to CA B with id-kp-OCSPSigning in the EKU,
> then CA B has now a valid OCSP responder for certificates issued by CA
> A; which is certainly NOT something wanted by CA A.
> There are limits to using an extension for something it wasn't designed
> for... I'm not a fan of "EKU constraints".
>> 13. Appendix B(2)G:
>> "** Extended Key Usage within Subordinate CAs is an exception to
>> RFC 5280 that MAY be used to further protect relying parties until
>> the Name Constraints extension is supported by Application
>> Software Suppliers whose software is used by a substantial portion
>> of Relying Parties worldwide."
>> I agree that we should note that this is "an exception to RFC 5280".
>> However, I don't think Mozilla have any plans to stop requiring EKU once
>> Name Constraints are supported more widely, since EKU and Name
>> Constraints achieve different things.
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