[cabfpub] [cabfman] Ballot [93] - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)

i-barreira at izenpe.net i-barreira at izenpe.net
Fri Oct 26 07:22:48 UTC 2012


Izenpe votes yes


Iñigo Barreira
Responsable del Área técnica
i-barreira at izenpe.net
945067705


ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada (helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ!
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-----Mensaje original-----
De: management-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:management-bounces at cabforum.org] En nombre de Yngve N. Pettersen (Developer Opera Software ASA)
Enviado el: miércoles, 24 de octubre de 2012 20:23
Para: CABFMAN; Ben Wilson
CC: public at cabforum.org
Asunto: Re: [cabfman] [cabfpub] Ballot [93] - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)


Apologies for the delay

We forgot to set the effective <DTBD> in the ballot. I think it should be "immediately".


On Thu, 18 Oct 2012 01:16:36 +0200, Ben Wilson <ben at digicert.com> wrote:

> Ballot 93 - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)
>
> Yngve N. Pettersen (Opera) made the following motion, endorsed by 
> Jeremy Rowley, Digicert and Robin Alden, Comodo:
>
> --- Motion begins ---
>
> Effective <DTBD>
>
> Erratum begins:
>
> A. (Issue #8)
>
> Add the following as 10.2.5:
>
> "10.2.5 Subordinate CA Private Key
>
> Parties other than the Subordinate CA SHALL NOT archive the 
> Subordinate CA Private Keys. If the Issuing CA generated the Private 
> Key on behalf of the Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL encrypt 
> the Private Key for transport to the Subordinate CA. If the Issuing CA 
> becomes aware that a Subordinate CA's Private Key has been 
> communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not 
> affiliated with the Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL revoke 
> all certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the 
> communicated Private Key."
>
> B. (Issue #8)
>
> . Replace the heading of section 13.1.5 with "Reasons for Revoking a 
> Subscriber Certificate"
>
> . Add the following as section 13.1.6:
>
> "13.1.6 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate
>
> The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven 
> (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:
>
> 1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
>
> 2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original 
> certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively 
> grant authorization;
>
> 3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private 
> Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key 
> Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Appendix A,
>
> 4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
>
> 5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in 
> accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with these 
> Baseline Requirements or the applicable Certificate Policy or 
> Certification Practice Statement;
>
> 6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in 
> the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
>
> 7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason 
> and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation 
> support for the Certificate;
>
> 8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates 
> under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless 
> the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the 
> CRL/OCSP Repository;
>
> 9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy 
> and/or Certification Practice Statement; or
>
> 10. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an 
> unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties 
> (e.g.
> the CA/Browser Forum might determine that a deprecated 
> cryptographic/signature algorithm or key size presents an unacceptable 
> risk and that such Certificates should be revoked and replaced by CAs 
> within a given period of time)."
>
> C. (Issue #6)
>
> .Replace Section 13.1.5(3) with: "(3) The CA obtains evidence that the 
> Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the 
> Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (also see Section 10.2.4) or no 
> longer complies with the requirements of Appendix A,"
>
> .Add the following as a new Section 13.1.5(4) and renumber the 
> remaining bullet points:
>
> "(4) The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;"
>
> .Replace the definition of Key Compromise with the following:
>
> "Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value 
> has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, an unauthorized person 
> has had access to it, or there exists a practical technique by which 
> an unauthorized person may discover its value. A Private Key is also 
> considered compromised if methods have been developed that can easily 
> calculate it based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see
> http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys)
> or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to 
> generate the Private Key was flawed."
>
> D. (Issue #21)
>
> Add new section 13.2.7: "13.2.7 Certificate Suspension.
>
> The Repository MUST NOT include entries that indicate that a 
> Certificate is suspended."
>
> E. (Issue #10)
>
> Add the following after Appendix A, table (3):
>
> "(4) General requirements for public keys: Public keys SHOULD follow 
> the recommendations of NIST SP 800-73-3 
> <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-78-3/sp800-78-3.pdf
> <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-78-3/sp800-78-3.pdf%3E
> > >
>
> RSA: The value of the public exponent MUST be an odd number equal to 3 
> or more, it SHOULD be in the range 65537 (216+1) to 2256-1."
>
> Erratum ends
>
> ... Motion ends ...
>
> The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 17 
> October
> 2012 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 24 October 2012. Unless the motion 
> is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start 
> immediately thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 31 October 2012. 
> Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.
>
> ... Motions ends ...
>
> A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the 
> response.
>
> A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to 
> abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear 
> responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any 
> representative of a voting member before the close of the voting 
> period will be counted.
>
> Voting members are listed here: http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html
>
> In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes 
> cast by members in the CA category and one half or more of the votes 
> cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at 
> least six members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in 
> favor, voting against or abstaining.
>
>


--
Sincerely,
Yngve N. Pettersen
********************************************************************
Senior Developer		     Email: yngve at opera.com
Opera Software ASA                   http://www.opera.com/
Phone:  +47 96 90 41 51              Fax:    +47 23 69 24 01
********************************************************************
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