[cabfpub] Ballot [93] - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)

Ben Wilson ben at digicert.com
Thu Oct 25 11:21:54 MST 2012


Digicert votes "yes" based on Yngve's clarification that the effective date
would be "Immediate" and that for the RSA public exponent there was a typo
and that part of the motion should read, "The value of the public exponent
MUST be an odd number equal to 3 or more, it SHOULD be in the range between
65,537 (= (2^16)+1) and (2^256)-1." 

-----Original Message-----
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On
Behalf Of Yngve N. Pettersen (Developer Opera Software ASA)
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 9:33 AM
To: CABFMAN; Ben Wilson
Cc: public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot [93] - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8,
10, 21)


Opera Software votes Yes.

On Thu, 18 Oct 2012 01:16:36 +0200, Ben Wilson <ben at digicert.com> wrote:

> Ballot 93 - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)
>
> Yngve N. Pettersen (Opera) made the following motion, endorsed by 
> Jeremy Rowley, Digicert and Robin Alden, Comodo:
>
> --- Motion begins ---
>
> Effective <DTBD>
>
> Erratum begins:
>
> A. (Issue #8)
>
> Add the following as 10.2.5:
>
> "10.2.5 Subordinate CA Private Key
>
> Parties other than the Subordinate CA SHALL NOT archive the 
> Subordinate CA Private Keys. If the Issuing CA generated the Private 
> Key on behalf of the Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL encrypt 
> the Private Key for transport to the Subordinate CA. If the Issuing CA 
> becomes aware that a Subordinate CA's Private Key has been 
> communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not 
> affiliated with the Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL revoke 
> all certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the 
> communicated Private Key."
>
> B. (Issue #8)
>
> . Replace the heading of section 13.1.5 with "Reasons for Revoking a 
> Subscriber Certificate"
>
> . Add the following as section 13.1.6:
>
> "13.1.6 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate
>
> The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven 
> (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:
>
> 1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
>
> 2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original 
> certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively 
> grant authorization;
>
> 3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private 
> Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key 
> Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Appendix A,
>
> 4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
>
> 5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in 
> accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with these 
> Baseline Requirements or the applicable Certificate Policy or 
> Certification Practice Statement;
>
> 6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in 
> the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
>
> 7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason 
> and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation 
> support for the Certificate;
>
> 8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates 
> under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless 
> the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the 
> CRL/OCSP Repository;
>
> 9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy 
> and/or Certification Practice Statement; or
>
> 10. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an 
> unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties 
> (e.g.
> the CA/Browser Forum might determine that a deprecated 
> cryptographic/signature algorithm or key size presents an unacceptable 
> risk and that such Certificates should be revoked and replaced by CAs 
> within a given period of time)."
>
> C. (Issue #6)
>
> .Replace Section 13.1.5(3) with: "(3) The CA obtains evidence that the 
> Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the 
> Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (also see Section 10.2.4) or no 
> longer complies with the requirements of Appendix A,"
>
> .Add the following as a new Section 13.1.5(4) and renumber the 
> remaining bullet points:
>
> "(4) The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;"
>
> .Replace the definition of Key Compromise with the following:
>
> "Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value 
> has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, an unauthorized person 
> has had access to it, or there exists a practical technique by which 
> an unauthorized person may discover its value. A Private Key is also 
> considered compromised if methods have been developed that can easily 
> calculate it based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see
> http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys)
> or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to 
> generate the Private Key was flawed."
>
> D. (Issue #21)
>
> Add new section 13.2.7: "13.2.7 Certificate Suspension.
>
> The Repository MUST NOT include entries that indicate that a 
> Certificate is suspended."
>
> E. (Issue #10)
>
> Add the following after Appendix A, table (3):
>
> "(4) General requirements for public keys: Public keys SHOULD follow 
> the recommendations of NIST SP 800-73-3 
> <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-78-3/sp800-78-3.pdf
> <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-78-3/sp800-78-3.pdf%3E
> > >
>
> RSA: The value of the public exponent MUST be an odd number equal to 3 
> or more, it SHOULD be in the range 65537 (216+1) to 2256-1."
>
> Erratum ends
>
> ... Motion ends ...
>
> The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 17 
> October
> 2012 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 24 October 2012. Unless the motion 
> is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start 
> immediately thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 31 October 2012. 
> Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.
>
> ... Motions ends ...
>
> A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the 
> response.
>
> A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to 
> abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear 
> responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any 
> representative of a voting member before the close of the voting 
> period will be counted.
>
> Voting members are listed here: http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html
>
> In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes 
> cast by members in the CA category and one half or more of the votes 
> cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at 
> least six members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in 
> favor, voting against or abstaining.
>
>


--
Sincerely,
Yngve N. Pettersen
********************************************************************
Senior Developer		     Email: yngve at opera.com
Opera Software ASA                   http://www.opera.com/
Phone:  +47 96 90 41 51              Fax:    +47 23 69 24 01
********************************************************************
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