[cabfpub] Difference between CA issued DV and DANE certs

[Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)]

On 10/19/2012 04:46 AM, From Jeremy Rowley:
> 3) As has been pointed out thoroughly in a variety of forums, including most
> notably the revocation working group, that in practice, revocation as
> implemented today by Every Major Browser is not a security mechanism.
>
> [JR] This is primarily a result of browsers refusing to use the information
> provided, not the CAs providing the information.

I think we should consider this a bit differently - revocation works to 
the extend to make a certificate unusable for broad (bad) purpose and 
commercially uninteresting.

It doesn't work for very specific situations where a considerable effort 
must be invested and certain control of the networks in questions is a 
must. This could be a state actor for example.

But all the naysayers of revocation mechanisms should carefully point 
out when and for which specific situations it doesn't work and where it 
does work. I think the claim in this respect is execrated.


Regards
Signer: 	Eddy Nigg, COO/CTO
	StartCom Ltd. <http://www.startcom.org>
XMPP: 	startcom at startcom.org <xmpp:startcom at startcom.org>
Blog: 	Join the Revolution! <http://blog.startcom.org>
Twitter: 	Follow Me <http://twitter.com/eddy_nigg>

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