[cabfpub] Ballot [93] - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)

Fri Nov 2 20:42:09 UTC 2012

Opera Software votes Yes


On Fri, 02 Nov 2012 20:53:47 +0100, Ben Wilson <ben at digicert.com> wrote:

> All,
>
>
> Here is a revised Ballot 93.  The voting period starts again in one hour  
> and
> will close at 21:00 UTC on Wednesday, 7 November 2012.
>
>
> Ballot 93 - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)
>
>
> Yngve N. Pettersen (Opera) made the following motion, endorsed by Jeremy
> Rowley, Digicert and Robin Alden, Comodo:
>
>
> --- Motion begins ---
>
>
> Effective immediately (except as noted in Part E.2. below)
>
>
> Erratum begins:
>
>
> A. (Issue #8)
>
>
> Add the following as 10.2.5:
>
>
> "10.2.5 Subordinate CA Private Key
>
>
> Parties other than the Subordinate CA SHALL NOT archive the Subordinate  
> CA
> Private Keys. If the Issuing CA generated the Private Key on behalf of  
> the
> Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL encrypt the Private Key for
> transport to the Subordinate CA. If the Issuing CA becomes aware that a
> Subordinate CA's Private Key has been communicated to an unauthorized  
> person
> or an organization not affiliated with the Subordinate CA, then the  
> Issuing
> CA SHALL revoke all certificates that include the Public Key  
> corresponding
> to the communicated Private Key."
>
>
> B. (Issue #8)
>
>
> . Replace the heading of section 13.1.5 with "Reasons for Revoking a
> Subscriber Certificate"
>
>
> . Add the following as section 13.1.6:
>
>
> "13.1.6 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate
>
>
> The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7)
> days if one or more of the following occurs:
>
>
> 1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
>
>
> 2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original  
> certificate
> request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant  
> authorization;
>
>
> 3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key
> corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key  
> Compromise
> or no longer complies with the requirements of Appendix A,
>
>
> 4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
>
>
> 5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in
> accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with these  
> Baseline
> Requirements or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification  
> Practice
> Statement;
>
>
> 6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in the
> Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
>
>
> 7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and  
> has
> not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for  
> the
> Certificate;
>
>
> 8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under
> these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the  
> Issuing
> CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;
>
>
> 9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy and/or
> Certification Practice Statement; or
>
>
> 10. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an
> unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties  
> (e.g.
> the CA/Browser Forum might determine that a deprecated
> cryptographic/signature algorithm or key size presents an unacceptable  
> risk
> and that such Certificates should be revoked and replaced by CAs within a
> given period of time)."
>
>
> C. (Issue #6)
>
>
> .Replace Section 13.1.5(3) with: "(3) The CA obtains evidence that the
> Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the  
> Certificate
> suffered a Key Compromise (also see Section 10.2.4) or no longer complies
> with the requirements of Appendix A,"
>
>
> .Add the following as a new Section 13.1.5(4) and renumber the remaining
> bullet points:
>
>
> "(4) The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;"
>
>
> .Replace the definition of Key Compromise with the following:
>
>
> "Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has
> been disclosed to an unauthorized person, an unauthorized person has had
> access to it, or there exists a practical technique by which an  
> unauthorized
> person may discover its value. A Private Key is also considered  
> compromised
> if methods have been developed that can easily calculate it based on the
> Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see  
> http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys)
> or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate  
> the
> Private Key was flawed."
>
>
> D. (Issue #21)
>
>
> Add new section 13.2.7: "13.2.7 Certificate Suspension.
>
>
> The Repository MUST NOT include entries that indicate that a Certificate  
> is
> suspended."
>
>
> E. (Issue #10)
>
>
> 1. Add the following to Section 3. References
>
>
> "NIST SP 800-89, Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital
> Signature Applications,
> http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-89/SP-800-89_November2006.pdf
> "
>
>
> 2. Add the following after Appendix A, table (3):
>
>
> "(4) General requirements for public keys (Effective 1 January 2013)
>
>
> RSA: The CA SHALL confirm that the value of the public exponent is an odd
> number equal to 3 or more. Additionally, the public exponent SHOULD be in
> the range between 216+1 and 2256-1. The modulus SHOULD also have the
> following characteristics: an odd number, not the power of a prime, and  
> have
> no factors smaller than 752. [Source: Section 5.3.3, NIST SP 800-89]."
>
>
> Erratum ends
>
>
> ... Motion ends ...
>
>
> The review period for this ballot commenced at 21:00 UTC on 17 October  
> 2012.
> A voting period of seven days began and was suspended on 31 October 2012  
> at
> which time the tally was cleared and the review-and-comment period
> continued. The ballot has been amended and voting will begin again at  
> 21:00
> UTC on 2 November 2012. Voting will close at 21:00 UTC on Wednesday, 7
> November 2012. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this
> thread.
>
>
> ... Motions ends ...
>
>
> A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the  
> response.
>
>
> A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to  
> abstain
> must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will  
> not
> be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting
> member before the close of the voting period will be counted.
>
>
> Voting members are listed here: http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html
>
>
> In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes  
> cast
> by members in the CA category and one half or more of the votes cast by
> members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at least six  
> members
> must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting  
> against or
> abstaining.
>


-- 
Sincerely,
Yngve N. Pettersen
********************************************************************
Senior Developer		     Email: yngve at opera.com
Opera Software ASA                   http://www.opera.com/
Phone:  +47 96 90 41 51              Fax:    +47 23 69 24 01
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