[cabfpub] Short Lived Certificates

[Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)]

On 07/27/2012 09:53 PM, From Adam Langley:
> I agree that in the event that the attacker is competent enough to
> MITM with the leaked key, but dumb enough that they don't block OCSP
> lookups, revocation does protect the user.

One of the goals are to enable hard failure for cases where no OCSP 
response and no CRL could be obtained.

Regards
Signer: 	Eddy Nigg, COO/CTO
	StartCom Ltd. <http://www.startcom.org>
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Blog: 	Join the Revolution! <http://blog.startcom.org>
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