[cabfpub] Notes of meeting, CA/Browser Forum, Gjøvik, Norway, 26-28 June 2012
benl at google.com
Mon Jul 16 09:28:39 UTC 2012
On 11 July 2012 01:23, Chris Palmer <palmer at google.com> wrote:
> """Gerv said that CNNIC has applied to have its root included. He
> said that it is already included in Windows and Opera. Rick asked
> whether it would make sense to (for instance) remove Chinese CAs from
> the list of CAs trusted by default by US users. Gerv said that the
> idea of localized trust-stores has been consider. But, problems
> exist. He thought that CA-pinning would provide a better solution.
> Jens mentioned problems with pinning, such as the "initial trust"
> problem, key roll-over and multiple certificates per domain. Gerv
> said that "large-scale surveillance" helps with the initial trust
0. Another problem CT will fix :-)
> 1. I continue to be baffled as to why people keep bringing up this
> initial trust problem in pinning, as if we don't already suffer a far
> worse form of it without pinning.
> The current system is vulnerable to the initial trust problem *on
> every TLS session negotiation*. Each time you connect to a server, the
> server's identity could be verified by *any* CA, whether intended by
> the true site operator or not.
> Recall that, in my draft, pin assertions are invalid unless received
> over a validly-authenticated TLS connection, and that at least one of
> the asserted pins is for the same key as used to make the current,
> valid connection. Thus pinning is strictly better than the status quo,
> as regards the initial trust problem.
> 2. Key roll-over: In my draft, you can pin as many keys as you want,
> and clients will accept any of them when performing pin validation.
> (In fact, you currently *have to* assert a "back-up" pin, but I am
> probably going to remove that requirement.)
> 3. Multiple certificates per domain: We pin keys, not certificates.
> But yes, go ahead and pin as many keys as you want per domain. This
> is, in a sense, same thing as key roll-over.
> For reference, here is my current I-D:
> Finally, CNNIC: At least one CNNIC certificate is already a validate
> subordinate issuer in Mozilla (chains up to a trusted root), so adding
> them as a root does not actually expose Mozilla users to any *new*
> risk from that organization. See
> https://www.eff.org/files/DefconSSLiverse.pdf. If anything, making
> CNNIC a known public root increases their visibility and allows the
> world to at least begin the process of evaluating their
> trustworthiness. That can only be a good thing. People should be
> worried about the "dark matter" of unknown-but-publicly-trusted
> intermediate CAs, rather than one particular CA that is actually
> choosing to make themselves visible.
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