[cabf_netsec] "Zones" Ballot Endorsers

Ponds-White, Trevoli trevolip at amazon.com
Mon Jun 1 12:05:08 MST 2020

Daymion from GoDaddy right? We had cut the scoping definitions out of a previous ballot because it made it too bloated with different topics and I thought we decided those should have their own ballot.

How do these changes overlap with the ballot that is clarifying offline CA requirements?

From: Netsec <netsec-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Ben Wilson via Netsec
Sent: Monday, June 1, 2020 11:23
To: Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com>
Cc: CABF Network Security List <netsec at cabforum.org>
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [cabf_netsec] [EXTERNAL]Re: "Zones" Ballot Endorsers

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.

Also, in working on this, I recalled that Daymion when he was at Google had requested that we define the scope of the requirements.
Excerpted below:

Add below section to the “Scope and Applicability” to define scope of PKI Trusted Environment and to read as follows:

The network security requirements apply to all system components included in or connected to the publicly trusted certificate authority (CA) environment. The CA environment is comprised of people, processes and technologies that store, process, or transmit CA data. “System components” include network devices, servers, hardware security modules (HSM), computing devices, and applications residing within the CA environment. Examples of system components include, but are not limited to the following:

a.    Systems that provide security services (for example, authentication servers), facilitate segmentation (for example, internal firewalls), or may impact the security of (for example, name resolution or web redirection servers).

b.    Virtualization components such as virtual machines, virtual switches/routers, virtual appliances, virtual applications/desktops, and hypervisors.

c.    Network components including but not limited to firewalls, switches, routers, network appliances, IPMI remote management cards, HSM and other security appliances.

d.    Server types including but not limited to web, application, database, authentication, mail, proxy, Network Time Protocol (NTP), and Domain Name System (DNS).

e.    Applications including all purchased and custom applications.

f.    Any other component or device located within the CA environment.

On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 1:01 PM Ben Wilson <bwilson at mozilla.com<mailto:bwilson at mozilla.com>> wrote:
I'll work on a re-draft, hopefully this afternoon, and re-circulate it.

On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:53 PM Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com<mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com>> wrote:
I would assume that if we did not amend the BRs, then it would look like the security requirements were being reduced. So yes, I think that the BRs should be changed at the same time.


From: Ben Wilson <bwilson at mozilla.com<mailto:bwilson at mozilla.com>>
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 2:45 PM
To: Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com<mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com>>
Cc: Neil Dunbar <ndunbar at trustcorsystems.com<mailto:ndunbar at trustcorsystems.com>>; CABF Network Security List <netsec at cabforum.org<mailto:netsec at cabforum.org>>
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabf_netsec] "Zones" Ballot Endorsers

I'm open to discussion on this.  Would we want to amend section 5.1 of the BRs with the same ballot?

On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:33 PM Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com<mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrustdatacard.com>> wrote:
Hi Ben,

Thanks for all the work on this ballot. I am wondering if we should try to remove physical security and physical access requirements from the NetSec document. Physical Security requirements could be put into BR 5.1 in a section called Physical Security Controls.

For instance, item 1.c. states “Maintain Root CA Systems in a Physically Secure Environment and in an offline state or air-gapped from all other networks.” This could be changed so that 1.c. states “Maintain Root CA Systems in an offline state or air-gapped from all other networks” and BR 5.1 could state “Maintain CA Systems in a physically secure environment.”

It also seems that now that the old zone definitions have been combined and now Physically Secure Environment now covers both physical and logical environments. If we eliminate physical security, then we could just address logical security which could be better applied to the NetSec document.

In a future ballot, we might want to push some of the Trusted Role requirements into BR 5.2.

Thanks, Bruce.

From: Netsec <netsec-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:netsec-bounces at cabforum.org>> On Behalf Of Neil Dunbar via Netsec
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2020 7:42 AM
To: netsec at cabforum.org<mailto:netsec at cabforum.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabf_netsec] "Zones" Ballot Endorsers

WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust Datacard.
DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

I'm happy to endorse, Ben. Trev and David also said they would be good to endorse the ballot.

On 13/05/2020 20:58, Ben Wilson via Netsec wrote:
I can't remember whether there were people who volunteered to be endorsers of the "Zones" ballot.

See below:

Ballot and Explanation - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Xlbg-0Hg1A3Px1Gj8XCQFSal5V_84hBjtVwohbXqiqM/edit?usp=sharing

Redlined version of NCSSRs - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n6LPNN0WJY9Cdw5qOl2-fFzQxBiZtw-q/view?usp=sharing


Netsec mailing list

Netsec at cabforum.org<mailto:Netsec at cabforum.org>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/netsec/attachments/20200601/55d042f2/attachment-0001.html>

More information about the Netsec mailing list