[Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: FW: Ballot CSC-22: High Risk Requirements Update

Bruce Morton Bruce.Morton at entrust.com
Wed Jan 17 17:58:01 UTC 2024

Yes, that is the email which started the discussion period.


From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
Sent: Wednesday, January 17, 2024 12:10 PM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] FW: Ballot CSC-22: High Risk Requirements Update

Dean, Bruce, Apologies for not spotting this sooner. Can you please confirm if this is the email that was sent to the public list to start the discussion period? https: //lists. cabforum. org/pipermail/cscwg-public/2023-December/001141. html If

Dean, Bruce,

Apologies for not spotting this sooner. Can you please confirm if this is the email that was sent to the public list to start the discussion period?


If this is the only email that was sent to start the discussion period, I'm afraid it is not compliant with the Bylaws because when the official discussion period started, the ballot did not include two endorsers. Instead, it seems that it went straight to voting, per https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/cscwg-public/2024-January/001145.html<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/cscwg-public/2024-January/001145.html__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!fSDk2HOLnm7WIn39bQFF9-yDtQjM_HQmeMzH0CWlB2U54D1EYMxay5UCeLFyDe9zbdbMWsSBCoW8X4fz5-57vQ0vidAH$>.

Again, sorry for not discovering this earlier and I would definitely need another pair of eyes to confirm this.

On 17/1/2024 6:36 μ.μ., Dean Coclin via Cscwg-public wrote:
Resending to the list…

Dean Coclin

From: Dean Coclin
Sent: Friday, January 12, 2024 4:26 PM
Subject: Ballot CSC-22: High Risk Requirements Update

Voting has concluded on Ballot CSC 22 and the results are as follows:

Certificate Issuers:
Yes: (7) Digicert, eMudra, Entrust, Globalsign, HARICA, Sectigo, Viking Cloud
No: (0)
Abstain: (0)

Certificate Consumers:
Yes: (1) Microsoft
No: (0)
Abstain: (0)

Quorum was achieved. Therefore the ballot passes.

Dean Coclin

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org>> On Behalf Of Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public
Sent: Friday, January 5, 2024 3:02 PM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org>
Subject: [Cscwg-public] Voting Period begins - Ballot CSC-22: High Risk Requirements Update

Purpose of the Ballot
This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 3.4 in order to clarify language regarding Signing Service and signing requests. The main goals of this ballot are to:

  1.  Remove references to High Risk Certificate Request, since the CSBRs do not provide any actions for a high risk application.
  2.  Remove references to High Risk Region of Concern, since the CSBR appendix has never been populated.
  3.  Remove rules for a Takeover Attack to require the Subscriber to generate keys in a crypto device, since crypto device key generation is now a baseline requirement for all code signing certificates.
  4.  Remove option to transfer private key which has been generated in software.
  5.  Cleanup to remove Subscriber key generation option which expired effective 1 June 2023.
  6.  Cleanup to remove “any other method” to verify the Subscriber key was generated in a crypto device, since this option expired 1 June 2023.
The following motion has been proposed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Ian McMillan of Microsoft.


This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” ("Code Signing Baseline Requirements") based on version 3.4. MODIFY the Code Signing Baseline Requirements as specified in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/e0da5532ab81e35e2e92536c1bc9ea3c36765b26...50871dc08d39102daf6c93fa556a869790643fb6<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/url.avanan.click/v2/___https:/urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/e0da5532ab81e35e2e92536c1bc9ea3c36765b26...50871dc08d39102daf6c93fa556a869790643fb6__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!eGQ4FLzNANTdAsLaGTDHePbCY7_W0AsXx1qTmmyTqiyaSVcoj5VGsgK7r7e1D0YQaI5U-YDAzAAi90kRle47DpUbNXxd$___.YXAzOmRpZ2ljZXJ0OmE6bzpkNzM2ZWY2OTUzNWVhMjY4M2JhMWY5ZDQ5ZmY0MjRkODo2OjNmNzk6OWNkNzk0NTVmM2U3NTY4NGE1NWE4MmI0M2ZjMmE1YzU0MGZiMDljODdiYzFhZTdhMDdhYTJiODZmZDM3OWQ5ZjpoOkY__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!fSDk2HOLnm7WIn39bQFF9-yDtQjM_HQmeMzH0CWlB2U54D1EYMxay5UCeLFyDe9zbdbMWsSBCoW8X4fz5-57vdp8Qrzd$>

The procedure for this ballot is as follows: Discussion (minimum 7 days)

  1.  Start Time: 2023-12-15 00:00 UTC
  2.  End Time: 2024-01-05 20:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

  1.  Start Time: 2024-01-05 20:00 UTC
  2.  End Time: 2024-01-12 20:00 UTC
Any email and files/attachments transmitted with it are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If this message has been sent to you in error, you must not copy, distribute or disclose of the information it contains. Please notify Entrust immediately and delete the message from your system.


Cscwg-public mailing list

Cscwg-public at cabforum.org<mailto:Cscwg-public at cabforum.org>


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/cscwg-public/attachments/20240117/fa969795/attachment-0001.html>

More information about the Cscwg-public mailing list