[Cscwg-public] Subject name stability

Wed May 31 15:40:33 UTC 2023

Hello Mike,

Please see response below, developed by the working group:

The resulting behaviors of  an implementation of leveraging authenticated values in a publicly trusted code signing certificate are the responsibilities of the implementation owner, not the CSBRs. 

The subject name values of a code signing certificate must be representative of the validated identity information as outlined in the CSBRs and the IETF standards for x.509, and not be manipulated in a way that caters to a specific implementation of how one is leveraging x.509 certificate data. The 3 issues called out here by Mike are all specific to MSIX and not about the general usage of x.509 code signing certificates. Any resolution to this complication with how authenticated values of a code signing certificate must be discussed with the implementation owner, and in this case it is Microsoft’s owners of MSIX. Organization changes such an HQ relocation is something that a CA will handle in the renewal of a certificate and the associated SubjectDN values will represent that location of the new HQ and not the old HQ. Again, the resulting impacts to how certificates are consumed is not the responsibility of the CA or the CSCWG, but the responsibility of the implementation owners.

On the sub topic of CA practices on the inclusion of SubjectDN values included based on CSBRs requirements is the CA’s choice. Some of the allowable fields are not mandated for inclusion and the ultimate decision for what is included is up to the CA issuing the certificate provided those practices are in compliance with the CSBRs. The allowable fields provide flexibility to the CAs to do what is right for their business practices (e.g. inclusion of OU field comes with additional requirements and costs a CA may choose not to do as part of their business and thus not offer this field in certificates). I see no justification for a change in the CSBRs at this time for SubjectDN value requirements.

Please take up this issue with the implementation owners that have dependencies on authenticated values in an x.509 certificate that do change over the life of an organization or individual. 

Dean Coclin 

CSCWG Chair

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Mike Hearn via Cscwg-public
Sent: Monday, May 8, 2023 6:56 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org
Subject: [Cscwg-public] Subject name stability

Hello,

I'd like to start a discussion on possible changes to the CSWG rules for issuing certificates in the case that the subject name of the subscriber changes.

By way of introduction, I run a company that makes a tool to simplify desktop app distribution <https://url.avanan.click/v2/___https:/hydraulic.software/___.YXAzOmRpZ2ljZXJ0OmE6bzo1ZmI4MjgwZDBhYjYzMWVkN2JmMzdjMmY4OTdlNzk1Yzo2OjUwNDg6Y2JjZDEzZTgzNDliNGU0YjM5NWVmYWFkYzljNzliOGIzNmMyYmNhNWVmNDY5YTg3NzYyZDQ5NWUxOTA1ZmQ5NTpoOkY> , which for now focuses on out-of-store apps (support for app stores may arrive in future versions). The tool conforms to modern standards on the Windows platform, and thus creates MSIX packages. The MSIX system relies on code signing identities more heavily than Windows has done in the past. Apps distributed this way get "package identity", in which the app is treated as a coherent whole rather than a collection of files that might or might not be in the same directory. App files and data are namespaced under a short hash of the X.500 name of the signing certificate. Package identity is promoted by Microsoft as a core part of their platform strategy, and a similar system exists on Apple platforms too.

Unfortunately using subject names in this way (as a database key) exposes subscribers to subject name instability. If a CA changes the subject name it issues to subscribers then Windows thinks that's a new organization and:

1.	Software updates silently break. This is a critical issue.
2.	Apps lose access to any {files, keys, permissions, etc} linked to their subject name.
3.	Publisher reputations appear to reset (probably? it's a bit unclear what happens in this case).

Microsoft has added a mechanism that lets you preserve your old "package family name" (sn hash) when a certificate identity changes, but after some close examination we've unfortunately had to conclude that the mechanism isn't really usable and that's unlikely to change soon. I can go into the gritty details if anyone is interested. As such we've started developing workarounds, but they aren't ideal for neither developers nor end users (e.g. the end user will sometimes see the app uninstall and reinstall itself). Changes to the SN will therefore be somewhat disruptive and certainly for anyone who isn't using our tools but who adopts modern Windows packaging, SN changes can be fatal. Left unaddressed this situation will simply cause people to avoid anything that might look at their certificates beyond the basic "is there one" check (as indeed ~30% of developers already ignore code signing completely).

There are a couple of possible answers to this situation:

1.	Define it as out of scope. The public PKI does not make any claims about identity stability and it's up to users to realize this and develop use-case specific plans for identity migrations. If Microsoft's mechanisms for this aren't workable then that's a problem for Windows users and developers but not the CA system.
2.	Address it via policy changes.

I've signed the IPR agreement and joined the CSWG list in order to start a discussion about (2). I argue that there are several strong reasons to consider policy changes here, both pragmatic and theoretical:

1.	Subject name stability is a valuable and desirable service for any non-trivial use of a PKI.
2.	It is in practice quite difficult to both realize the need for identity migration ahead of time and then implement it in a way that's both usable and secure. Microsoft has much greater time and resources than most organizations that would consume certificates but has struggled with this, and most systems that try to do things with certificate identity simply lack any method at all for migration. Pushing the problem to developers isn't working out well because they tend to assume at first that these sorts of problems are already solved by the CA/B Forum and that's why they're outsourcing identity verification to CAs to begin with. By the time they realize it's not the case it's already too late and systems are deployed in the wild.
3.	SN changes are often administrative. Even when justified by improvements in security, the fact that they can break software updates and cause apps to lose access to keystore entries and permissions means the overall security change can be negative.
4.	Non-disruptive policy changes can be made relatively quickly compared to the time needed to update all the Windows installs in the wild, which  can take many years. And of course once developers make architectural decisions to avoid relying on SNs those decisions can last decades.

There are quite a few possible policy-based ways to improve this situation, but the simplest is just to allow people who got certificates for a specific SN in the past to continue buying the exact same SN in future. That is, policy changes that affect the SN would only be mandatory for developers who are  new to the CS ecosystem and opt-in otherwise. The SAN field would be used to store new versions of the SN. This opens up some other questions, for example, what happens if a company changes its name from X to Y and then a new company forms that uses the now-free name X, but I think these can be worked through.

There are other possible solutions. Apple run their own code signing PKI and part of the reason is so they can allocate stable "team IDs" from a central database. Likewise, for their store Microsoft doesn't use the public PKI either. That strategy is a complete fix except for the need to once again change the SNs on people, and for all CAs to collaborate on a central database of identities. Apple also have a system called the "designated requirement" which in theory allows for some degree of identity migration, but it's unused in practice, probably due to complexity.

I hope this message sparks some ideas for how the CS ecosystem can be improved in this regard. Without some approach to granting long term identities with trustworthy stability, developers will have no choice but to find workarounds and ultimately abandon attempts to connect more things to subscriber identities.

thanks,

-mike

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