[Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

Fri Mar 24 15:00:44 UTC 2023

Good call. I was following what SMIME did, which is restarting the numbering, but I see now that the TLS BRs don’t. I’ll put in a change 

From: Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com> 
Sent: Friday, 24 March 2023 15:54
To: Martijn Katerbarg <Martijn.Katerbarg at sectigo.com>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org; Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr>
Subject: RE: [Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

Hi Martijn,

Thanks for the update. I think the change will help to make revocation more consistent with SSL and S/MIME.

One comment is the numbering in section 4.9.1.1 should be continuous and not have lines with the same number, so I would recommend that the second section start with number 7.

Thanks, Bruce.

From: Martijn Katerbarg <Martijn.Katerbarg at sectigo.com <mailto:Martijn.Katerbarg at sectigo.com> > 
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2023 8:03 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> >; Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> >; Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com <mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrust.com> >
Subject: RE: [Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

Thanks to all for the discussion yesterday. I think this workshop like approach got us pretty far!

I’ve pushed the updates we discussed into GH. There’s no PR yet, but please review the language at https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/main...XolphinMartijn:code-signing:RevocationRevamp?expand=1#diff-904962f0e52198f4a232d6ef6732d57ccb47433d4bba47b3472d681405360e31

Let me know if there are any further concerns, or if we believe we can move forward with this.

From: Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com <mailto:martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com> > 
Sent: Thursday, 23 March 2023 14:30
To: Martijn Katerbarg <Martijn.Katerbarg at sectigo.com <mailto:Martijn.Katerbarg at sectigo.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> >; Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> >; Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com <mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrust.com> >
Subject: RE: [Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

All,

After talks with a few of you on which direction to take, I’ve come up with an updated proposal which covers a revamp on the entire section 4.9.1. 

Thank you Bruce for also adding some feedback on my earlier draft. In aligning the language with what the BRs use as format, I’m proposing to make section 4.9.1 and its subsections, into the following (markdown format):

### 4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

#### 4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs:

1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate.

2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization.

3. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate.

The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs: 

1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6; 

2. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused.

3. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

4. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate.

5. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement.

6. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate.

7. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository.

8. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement.

9. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber’s Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed.

10. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise.

11. The CA has reasonable assurance that a Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code.

The CA SHALL set a historic date as revocationDate when revocation is done due to a Key Compromise or use in Suspect Code. The CA SHALL determine the appropriate value for the revocationDate based on its own investigation.

**Note:** Nothing herein prohibits a CA from revoking a Code Signing Certificate prior to these time frames.

#### 4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:

1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;

2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;

3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of [Section 6.1.5](#615-key-sizes) and [Section 6.1.6](#616-public-key-parameters-generation-and-quality-checking);

4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;

5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with this document or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement;

6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;

7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate;

8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; or

9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement.

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Monday, 6 February 2023 09:59
To: Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> >; Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com <mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrust.com> >
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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Thank you all for contributing to this discussion. The more I think about it, I’m also of the belief that we may need to split out the difference between a key compromise and Suspect Code. While one can easily lead to the other, it seems different timelines for both, as well as different approaches for the CRL revocation date, may be what we need here.

That said, I do think it stands to reason to turn this into a complete revocation section overhaul, rather than “just” the suspect code bits. 

From: Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> > 
Sent: Thursday, 2 February 2023 21:32
To: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com <mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrust.com> >; Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com <mailto:martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com> >
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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Hi Bruce, Dimitris, and Martijn,

In general, I agree with the most of what is here. Let me provide my perspective to some of the specific items in this thread.

“If the CA has reasonable assurance that a Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code, then the CA shall revoke the Certificate within 24h and set a revocation date to a date and time before the signing of the Suspect Code”

I am in support of this statement as it is written and would not like us to get hung up on “reasonable assurance” and trying to define it. CA’s should be given the ability to define that “reasonable assurance” themselves, and if it an incident is out of line with Application Software Supplier’s view they may invoke 4.9.1.1 as it is in the CSBRs today. 

“We rarely see non-timestamped code out there but Ian might be able to share some more insight with real numbers (timestamped code executed vs non-timestamped).”

With regards to code not being countersigned with a timestamp, I have rarely seen this to be the case with good-natured code or Suspect Code (malware authors have figured out TS endpoints are free not a threat to their evasion tactics). 

“It would be great if after this ballot and the ballot that Dimitris is doing is if we had just sections 4.9.1.1 for 24-hour revocation and 4.9.1.2 for 7-day revocation. This would align the sections with the SSL and S/MIME BRs and probably our CPS documents.

I am good with alignment with SSL and S/MIME BRs, but taking 4.9.1.1 and 4.9.1.2 from the SSL BRs we’d have to clean out some of the items that do not apply (e.g. v1.8.6 of the SSL BR 4.9.1.1(5) regarding domain validation evidence doesn’t make sense for CSBRs). 

“If Ian is ok with not requiring long delays for Subscriber impact assessments and contacting Application Software Suppliers at a Global level (which in my opinion wouldn't really scale), we could do the following:

*       set the revocation timelines according to 4.9.1.1 and 4.9.1.2 to align with TLS and S/MIME BR numbering, setting the "revocation date/time" at "current time"

*       AND provide an option with a hard 7-days deadline after a Certificate Problem Report is received only to set the best "revocation time". The output of this second process will be either a "revocation time" before the signing of the Suspect Code, or a "more appropriate" one.”

I agree with both bullets above and agree that contacting all Application Software Suppliers at a Global level will not scale for the normal incidents. In the rare instances where a more “all parties involved" type response maybe needed are handled case by case without the CSBRs covering all possible scenarios for these rare instances.

Cheers,
Ian

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
Sent: Thursday, February 2, 2023 12:12 PM
To: Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com <mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrust.com> >; Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com <mailto:martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

On 2/2/2023 5:56 μ.μ., Bruce Morton wrote:

Hi Martijn,

I don’t think I can endorse the current proposal as it does not appear to be meeting the goal I was hoping for, which was to simplify the process. I do like the way that the requirements are defined in the SSL and S/MIME BRs. These documents give revocation time deadlines and reasons for each deadline.

I do understand that signing of suspect code is a little more complicated as the Subscriber may have good signatures, but then get compromised. I think we tried to address this issue, by providing 7-days to revoke a certificate which has signed suspect code. This would allow the CA, Subscriber and perhaps the Application Software Supplier to provide the earliest revocation date. Note, with private keys in hardware, the Subscriber will more likely be an attacker and will not respond.

If there is no response, then the CA revokes and can set the revocation date to the date before the signing of the Suspect Code. My suggestion on a previous meeting was the following:

*	If the CA has reasonable assurance that a Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code, then the CA shall revoke the Certificate within 24h and set a revocation date to a date and time before the signing of the Suspect Code.

There were concerns raised that this backdate revocation might invalidate other Code, not classified as "Suspect" and may cause more harm than good. I can't really see why we should allow Suspect Code to be executed and risk user's safety and personal data, because that Subscriber has signed other "good" Code after signing the Suspect Code.

Note, I don’t believe “Revoking a certificate at current time has absolutely no impact on existing signed malware” is true. If the suspect code is not time-stamped, then revoking at the current time will impact the suspect code signature and all other signatures which are not time-stamped. This might be the easiest and quickest way to deal with non-time-stamped signatures on suspect code. 

We rarely see non-timestamped code out there but Ian might be able to share some more insight with real numbers (timestamped code executed vs non-timestamped).

I don't disagree with revoking immediately (at "current date") and setting a revocation date in the past after 5, 7 or 10 days to further mitigate the Relying Party risk.

On the other hand, 7-days would allow the Subscriber to resign code they did not time-stamp. Although, I am not really in favor of providing extra time for Subscribers which are not time-stamping.

Agreed. Please see my previous comment.

It would be great if after this ballot and the ballot that Dimitris is doing is if we had just sections 4.9.1.1 for 24-hour revocation and 4.9.1.2 for 7-day revocation. This would align the sections with the SSL and S/MIME BRs and probably our CPS documents.

If Ian is ok with not requiring long delays for Subscriber impact assessments and contacting Application Software Suppliers at a Global level (which in my opinion wouldn't really scale), we could do the following:

*	set the revocation timelines according to 4.9.1.1 and 4.9.1.2 to align with TLS and S/MIME BR numbering, setting the "revocation date/time" at "current time"
*	AND provide an option with a hard 7-days deadline after a Certificate Problem Report is received only to set the best "revocation time". The output of this second process will be either a "revocation time" before the signing of the Suspect Code, or a "more appropriate" one.

Does that seem to work?

Thanks,

Dimitris.

Bruce.

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Friday, January 27, 2023 6:04 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)  <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> <dzacharo at harica.gr>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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All, the language has been updated and is available on https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/files <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C5dce0d56c34548121af808db08205f29%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638112707375956264%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=X1ObigVH8oV3V6Bu7igS5F5B%2BWj9gh8lWHbmJpx137g%3D&reserved=0>  for review

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > on behalf of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public <cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> >
Date: Tuesday, 24 January 2023 at 22:45
To: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> >, cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org>  <cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> >
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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> There is nothing preventing the CA to revoke a certificate right away. Revoking a certificate at current time has absolutely no impact on existing signed malware. The impact assessment affects cases of backdating the revocation. I'm afraid this "SHOULD" is just going to be ignored, unless you feel that the CA has enough evidence to backdate revoke a certificate and does not want to wait for an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties by the Subscriber. If it's the latter, I agree but we need to write it a bit clearer.

That latter case is indeed the one I’d like to address. I’ll take a look at appropriate language for it.

> Yes. 7 days seem reasonable to pause the revocation process waiting for a response from the Application Software Supplier but IMO no more than that.

No objection from my end with that approach, but I would then like to combine bullet 2 and 3 into one since they are strongly connected. It takes away any doubt in interpretation.

I’ll get on adding these changes in GH

From: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> > 
Sent: Tuesday, 24 January 2023 16:25
To: Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com <mailto:martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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On 24/1/2023 11:47 π.μ., Martijn Katerbarg wrote:

Thanks for the proposal Dimitris.

I have a few remarks on this:

“The CA SHALL request the Subscriber to respond with an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties if the revocation date is set before the time that the Private Key became compromised or likely used to sign Suspect Code, and to state the associated Application Software Supplier(s).”
I’d like to propose  we change this into:
“The CA SHALL request the Subscriber to respond with an acknowledgement and SHOULD request the Subscriber to respond with an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties if the revocation date is set before the time that the Private Key became compromised or likely used to sign Suspect Code, and to state the associated Application Software Supplier(s).”

This offers CA’s the option not to request an impact assessment if they deem the evidence clear enough warranting revocation right away. 

There is nothing preventing the CA to revoke a certificate right away. Revoking a certificate at current time has absolutely no impact on existing signed malware. The impact assessment affects cases of backdating the revocation. I'm afraid this "SHOULD" is just going to be ignored, unless you feel that the CA has enough evidence to backdate revoke a certificate and does not want to wait for an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties by the Subscriber. If it's the latter, I agree but we need to write it a bit clearer.

I’m also wondering on the interpretation of the following 2 clauses:

“2. Based on the feedback received, the CA MAY determine a more appropriate revocation date to be associated with the revocation of the Certificate.

3. The CA SHALL revoke the Certificate within 7 days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report.”

I like to think this means that even with a plan submitted to the Application Software Suppliers, revocation MUST occur no later than 7 days after the CPR was received. Is that what you also intend here?

Yes. 7 days seem reasonable to pause the revocation process waiting for a response from the Application Software Supplier but IMO no more than that.

In my option that should be the maximum time before revocation needs to happen, however, it feels like the whole impact assessment may be a lot of work for a Subscriber, in order to only get 48 hours of extra time before a revocation needs to happen (Although to be fair these may be the very few edge cases, for which it could be useful). 

Thoughts?

We may need some more feedback from CAs that have actually experienced such cases. From my perspective, 48 hours for an quick impact assessment, seems reasonable considering the impact of a malware to millions of users worldwide that could be stopped by a single backdate revocation action from the CA.

Thanks,
Dimitris.

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
Sent: Thursday, 15 December 2022 14:27
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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On 12/15/2022 11:59 AM, Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public wrote:

All,

We had a good discussion on the malware proposal during the last call. I believe we’re nearly there. Trevoli and Tim you had suggestions (and thank you Dean for spelling it out in the minutes!) to make is more clear and also allow for the exceptional cases where revoking a CS cert would do more damage then not. 

Based on this, it seems we were leaning into making the following changes:

Change:

   a.  If the Subscriber responds within 72 hours, the CA and Subscriber MAY determine a "reasonable date" to revoke the certificate. The revocation date MUST NOT be more than 7 calendar days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report.
Into:
   a.  If the Subscriber responds within 72 hours, the CA MAY determine a "reasonable date" to revoke the certificate. The CA:

1.       MUST revoke the certificate no later than 7 calendar days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report; or,

2.       MUST submit a plan for revocation to all Application Software Suppliers based on discussions with the Subscriber no later than 7 calendar days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report

Thoughts on this?
The one thought I have on this is, are Application Software Suppliers (i.e Certificate Consumers, but that’s not a CSCBR defined term) willing to take on these plans and provide responses to the CA? 
Cause if they don’t, it seems we again have a loop hole in which revocation can be done much later based upon subscriber request…

I have the same concerns with the second bullet. And how do we determine "all" Suppliers? CAs have no visibility on Relying Party software.

I believe that the reason to "contact negatively-affected Application Software Suppliers" is to determine the proper "reasonable date" that would invalidate the malware signatures and not affect other "good signatures" that would have a significant impact on Relying Parties. If there is no response from the Application Software Supplier, the CA should revoke with a "reasonable date" based on its investigation at the time.

Please take a look at the following proposal. I'd appreciate feedback and language improvements to describe the process accurately and safely in order to protect Relying Parties from executing Suspect Code as much as possible. Worse case, CAs will revoke the Certificate with a revocation date set at the time of the revocation event which does not affect any previously signed code, including the Suspect Code which will be executed successfully by Relying Parties even after the revocation of the Certificate.

4.9.1.3 Revocation Based on Reported or Detected Compromise or Use in Suspect Code

Except for cases that fall under Section 4.9.1.1, if, while investigating a Certificate Problem Report, the CA determines the Subscriber's Private Key is compromised or likely being used for Suspect Code, the CA SHALL revoke the corresponding Code Signing Certificate in accordance with and within the following maximum time frames. Nothing herein prohibits a CA from revoking a Code Signing Certificate prior to these time frames.

1.	The CA SHALL contact the Subscriber within 24 hours after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report, notifying that the Certificate is scheduled to be revoked with a revocation date set before the time that the Private Key became compromised or likely used to sign Suspect Code. This revocation date is set in the past to prevent Relying Parties from executing Suspect Code signed with the affected Code Signing Certificate.
2.	The CA SHALL request the Subscriber to respond with an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties if the revocation date is set before the time that the Private Key became compromised or likely used to sign Suspect Code, and to state the associated Application Software Supplier(s).
3.	The CA SHALL request the Subscriber to respond to the CA within 72 hours of the CA sending the notification. 
4.	If the Subscriber responds within 72 hours, then based on the Subscriber's impact assessment:

1.	the CA MAY submit a revocation plan to associated Application Software Suppliers no later than 7 calendar days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report. The revocation plan:

1.	SHALL contain informing about the planned revocation date to be set for the to-be-revoked Certificate; and
2.	SHALL request suggestions for a "more appropriate" revocation date in case the proposed revocation date has a significant impact on Relying Parties associated with that particular Application Software Supplier. 
3.	The CA SHALL request the Application Software Supplier to respond within 72 hours.

2.	Based on the feedback received, the CA MAY determine a more appropriate revocation date to be associated with the revocation of the Certificate.
3.	The CA SHALL revoke the Certificate within 7 days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report.

5.	If the CA does not receive a response from the Subscriber, then the CA SHALL revoke the Certificate within 24 hours from the end of the response period.

A CA revoking a Certificate because the Certificate was associated with signed Suspect Code or other fraudulent or illegal conduct SHOULD provide all relevant information and risk indicators to other CAs, Application Software Suppliers, or industry groups. The CA SHOULD contact the Application Software Suppliers within 24 hours after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report.

Thanks,
Dimitris.

Note: I won’t be able to attend todays call, but feel free to discuss.

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
Sent: Tuesday, 29 November 2022 10:13
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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On 28/11/2022 2:50 μ.μ., Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public wrote:

All, 

I just pushed a new commit (https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/commits/8e7e3b4e57960994edea267f0e753358aad99574 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Fcommits%2F8e7e3b4e57960994edea267f0e753358aad99574&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C5dce0d56c34548121af808db08205f29%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638112707375956264%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Wgbn8LeAxIkFtCWJEXJH%2F3sxuakiXa%2FY19nZ7acIPs0%3D&reserved=0> ) based on the discussions and comments I’ve had and received. 

The complete ballot “redline” in GitHub is available for review on https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/files <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C5dce0d56c34548121af808db08205f29%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638112707375956264%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=X1ObigVH8oV3V6Bu7igS5F5B%2BWj9gh8lWHbmJpx137g%3D&reserved=0> 

If the CA confirms that a Subscriber has signed "Suspect Code", how would the group feel with a proposal to require CAs to backdate revoke the Code Signing Certificate to a date and time that would neutralize the Suspect Code? If this date and time is unlikely to be determined, backdate revoke 1'' after the notBefore date and time of the Code Signing Certificate?

Thanks,
Dimitris.

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Monday, 26 September 2022 11:58
To: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)  <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> <dzacharo at harica.gr>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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Thank you Dimitris. That makes sense. I’ve pushed an update to the draft-PR

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
Sent: Friday, 23 September 2022 18:47
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

I posted some proposed changes for consistency and accuracy.

1.	https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10#pullrequestreview-1118760785 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%23pullrequestreview-1118760785&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C5dce0d56c34548121af808db08205f29%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638112707375956264%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Xb1j%2B1AVAOsVLHV41bldcQMdlMZyskGpJt4JB5za73A%3D&reserved=0> 

Thanks,
Dimitris.

On 23/9/2022 3:55 μ.μ., Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public wrote:

Hi Martjin,

I will endorse the ballot.

Thanks, Bruce.

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2022 3:44 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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  _____  

All,

As discussed on yesterdays call, the latest changes which Tim and I were discussing are pushed into Github. 

The complete change can be found at https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/files <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C5dce0d56c34548121af808db08205f29%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638112707376112476%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=LoyxGFNMZpdVruKAuYmKACvlb5Ir5VSFOcZvuTmAinQ%3D&reserved=0>  for review.

Bruce, Ian, since I earlier had your endorsements, please let me know if they still stand. The changes since the endorsements, are captured in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/commits/90fa38ab4dc5e5f9b25fce844b750d693f7256b7 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Fcommits%2F90fa38ab4dc5e5f9b25fce844b750d693f7256b7&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C5dce0d56c34548121af808db08205f29%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638112707376112476%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=tMe%2B02h33pcmIbcnWfMOgwCqzN4jwORERRcvUekv81M%3D&reserved=0> 

If there are no other comments, then hopefully we can start a ballot process on this.

Regards,

Martijn

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Tuesday, 19 July 2022 09:22
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

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Thanks Tim,

1.	What is the motivation for allowing a waiver if approved by just “at least one” of the stakeholders, instead of all of them?
2.	I’m a bit concerned that language might be increasingly troublesome as we continue to expand the scope and participation of this group.

I believe it might be difficult to get approval from all stakeholders within a certain amount of time, meaning the CA would possibly never get all approvals, and never be able to utilize the waiver.  

Considering that signed code is often (but not exclusively) targeted for a specific platform, stakeholders of other platforms might not be inclined to give approval for something that does not even affect them.  

I do share your concern, but I also don’t see a better path towards the same goal.

3.	Similarly, I’m unsure how I feel about making compliance distinctions based on whether a particular root program has decided to have a contractual relationship with its issuers or not.  That seems like an implementation detail of the relationship that the guidelines should remain silent on.  But I appreciate what that definition is intended to do, and would like to perhaps find a different way to express the same intent.

Good point, and maybe the word “contract” is too much here?

Although I would note this language is already part of the “Certificate Beneficiaries” definition right now.

I’m open for a different suggestion 

From: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> > 
Sent: Friday, 15 July 2022 18:18
To: Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com <mailto:martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: RE: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

What is the motivation for allowing a waiver if approved by just “at least one” of the stakeholders, instead of all of them?

I’m a bit concerned that language might be increasingly troublesome as we continue to expand the scope and participation of this group.

Similarly, I’m unsure how I feel about making compliance distinctions based on whether a particular root program has decided to have a contractual relationship with its issuers or not.  That seems like an implementation detail of the relationship that the guidelines should remain silent on.  But I appreciate what that definition is intended to do, and would like to perhaps find a different way to express the same intent.

-Tim

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2022 10:04 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

All,

As already hinted during the last meeting during the F2F, Ian and I, have been working on a proposal affecting the guidelines regarding malware based revocation.

The intent of this change is to:

1.	Limit the number of days before a certificate needs to be revoked, especially when the subscriber is not responding to inquiries
2.	Remove the OCSP log analysis requirements
3.	Simplify the process that has to be followed

I have attached 3 documents: one with the current language, one with the proposed language, as well as a redlined version.

The changes have been made based on upcoming version 3.0 of the CSCBRs. In case you wish to compare with version 2.8, the relevant section is 13.1.5.3. Besides to that section, there is also a change to the “Suspect Code” definition, as well as a new definition in the proposal.

Once PR6 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F6&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C5dce0d56c34548121af808db08205f29%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638112707376112476%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=uMt7dnnKCjf%2F3L%2BEAZy1Cb4QXaINZKqByClXGcSKl14%3D&reserved=0>  has been merged, I will also prepare the changes in GIT for those that prefer comparing there.

Looking forward to comments to this and move towards a potential ballot.

Regards,

Martijn

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