[Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

Martijn Katerbarg martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com
Tue Jan 24 21:44:44 UTC 2023


> There is nothing preventing the CA to revoke a certificate right away. Revoking a certificate at current time has absolutely no impact on existing signed malware. The impact assessment affects cases of backdating the revocation. I'm afraid this "SHOULD" is just going to be ignored, unless you feel that the CA has enough evidence to backdate revoke a certificate and does not want to wait for an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties by the Subscriber. If it's the latter, I agree but we need to write it a bit clearer.

 

That latter case is indeed the one I’d like to address. I’ll take a look at appropriate language for it.

 

> Yes. 7 days seem reasonable to pause the revocation process waiting for a response from the Application Software Supplier but IMO no more than that.



No objection from my end with that approach, but I would then like to combine bullet 2 and 3 into one since they are strongly connected. It takes away any doubt in interpretation.

 

I’ll get on adding these changes in GH

 

From: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr> 
Sent: Tuesday, 24 January 2023 16:25
To: Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

 

 

On 24/1/2023 11:47 π.μ., Martijn Katerbarg wrote:

Thanks for the proposal Dimitris.

 

I have a few remarks on this:

 

“The CA SHALL request the Subscriber to respond with an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties if the revocation date is set before the time that the Private Key became compromised or likely used to sign Suspect Code, and to state the associated Application Software Supplier(s).”
I’d like to propose  we change this into:
“The CA SHALL request the Subscriber to respond with an acknowledgement and SHOULD request the Subscriber to respond with an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties if the revocation date is set before the time that the Private Key became compromised or likely used to sign Suspect Code, and to state the associated Application Software Supplier(s).”

 

This offers CA’s the option not to request an impact assessment if they deem the evidence clear enough warranting revocation right away. 


There is nothing preventing the CA to revoke a certificate right away. Revoking a certificate at current time has absolutely no impact on existing signed malware. The impact assessment affects cases of backdating the revocation. I'm afraid this "SHOULD" is just going to be ignored, unless you feel that the CA has enough evidence to backdate revoke a certificate and does not want to wait for an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties by the Subscriber. If it's the latter, I agree but we need to write it a bit clearer.




 

I’m also wondering on the interpretation of the following 2 clauses:

“2. Based on the feedback received, the CA MAY determine a more appropriate revocation date to be associated with the revocation of the Certificate.

3. The CA SHALL revoke the Certificate within 7 days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report.”

 

I like to think this means that even with a plan submitted to the Application Software Suppliers, revocation MUST occur no later than 7 days after the CPR was received. Is that what you also intend here?


Yes. 7 days seem reasonable to pause the revocation process waiting for a response from the Application Software Supplier but IMO no more than that.





In my option that should be the maximum time before revocation needs to happen, however, it feels like the whole impact assessment may be a lot of work for a Subscriber, in order to only get 48 hours of extra time before a revocation needs to happen (Although to be fair these may be the very few edge cases, for which it could be useful). 




Thoughts?


We may need some more feedback from CAs that have actually experienced such cases. From my perspective, 48 hours for an quick impact assessment, seems reasonable considering the impact of a malware to millions of users worldwide that could be stopped by a single backdate revocation action from the CA.


Thanks,
Dimitris.




 

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
Sent: Thursday, 15 December 2022 14:27
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

 

 

On 12/15/2022 11:59 AM, Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public wrote:

All,

 

We had a good discussion on the malware proposal during the last call. I believe we’re nearly there. Trevoli and Tim you had suggestions (and thank you Dean for spelling it out in the minutes!) to make is more clear and also allow for the exceptional cases where revoking a CS cert would do more damage then not. 

Based on this, it seems we were leaning into making the following changes:


Change:

   a.  If the Subscriber responds within 72 hours, the CA and Subscriber MAY determine a "reasonable date" to revoke the certificate. The revocation date MUST NOT be more than 7 calendar days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report.
Into:
   a.  If the Subscriber responds within 72 hours, the CA MAY determine a "reasonable date" to revoke the certificate. The CA:

1.       MUST revoke the certificate no later than 7 calendar days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report; or,

2.       MUST submit a plan for revocation to all Application Software Suppliers based on discussions with the Subscriber no later than 7 calendar days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report

 


Thoughts on this?
The one thought I have on this is, are Application Software Suppliers (i.e Certificate Consumers, but that’s not a CSCBR defined term) willing to take on these plans and provide responses to the CA? 
Cause if they don’t, it seems we again have a loop hole in which revocation can be done much later based upon subscriber request…


I have the same concerns with the second bullet. And how do we determine "all" Suppliers? CAs have no visibility on Relying Party software.

I believe that the reason to "contact negatively-affected Application Software Suppliers" is to determine the proper "reasonable date" that would invalidate the malware signatures and not affect other "good signatures" that would have a significant impact on Relying Parties. If there is no response from the Application Software Supplier, the CA should revoke with a "reasonable date" based on its investigation at the time.

Please take a look at the following proposal. I'd appreciate feedback and language improvements to describe the process accurately and safely in order to protect Relying Parties from executing Suspect Code as much as possible. Worse case, CAs will revoke the Certificate with a revocation date set at the time of the revocation event which does not affect any previously signed code, including the Suspect Code which will be executed successfully by Relying Parties even after the revocation of the Certificate.


4.9.1.3 Revocation Based on Reported or Detected Compromise or Use in Suspect Code


Except for cases that fall under Section 4.9.1.1, if, while investigating a Certificate Problem Report, the CA determines the Subscriber's Private Key is compromised or likely being used for Suspect Code, the CA SHALL revoke the corresponding Code Signing Certificate in accordance with and within the following maximum time frames. Nothing herein prohibits a CA from revoking a Code Signing Certificate prior to these time frames.

1.	The CA SHALL contact the Subscriber within 24 hours after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report, notifying that the Certificate is scheduled to be revoked with a revocation date set before the time that the Private Key became compromised or likely used to sign Suspect Code. This revocation date is set in the past to prevent Relying Parties from executing Suspect Code signed with the affected Code Signing Certificate.
2.	The CA SHALL request the Subscriber to respond with an impact assessment of affected Relying Parties if the revocation date is set before the time that the Private Key became compromised or likely used to sign Suspect Code, and to state the associated Application Software Supplier(s).
3.	The CA SHALL request the Subscriber to respond to the CA within 72 hours of the CA sending the notification. 
4.	If the Subscriber responds within 72 hours, then based on the Subscriber's impact assessment:

1.	the CA MAY submit a revocation plan to associated Application Software Suppliers no later than 7 calendar days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report. The revocation plan:

1.	SHALL contain informing about the planned revocation date to be set for the to-be-revoked Certificate; and
2.	SHALL request suggestions for a "more appropriate" revocation date in case the proposed revocation date has a significant impact on Relying Parties associated with that particular Application Software Supplier. 
3.	The CA SHALL request the Application Software Supplier to respond within 72 hours.

2.	Based on the feedback received, the CA MAY determine a more appropriate revocation date to be associated with the revocation of the Certificate.
3.	The CA SHALL revoke the Certificate within 7 days after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report.

5.	If the CA does not receive a response from the Subscriber, then the CA SHALL revoke the Certificate within 24 hours from the end of the response period.

A CA revoking a Certificate because the Certificate was associated with signed Suspect Code or other fraudulent or illegal conduct SHOULD provide all relevant information and risk indicators to other CAs, Application Software Suppliers, or industry groups. The CA SHOULD contact the Application Software Suppliers within 24 hours after the CA received the Certificate Problem Report.


Thanks,
Dimitris.




 

 

Note: I won’t be able to attend todays call, but feel free to discuss.

 

 

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
Sent: Tuesday, 29 November 2022 10:13
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

 

On 28/11/2022 2:50 μ.μ., Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public wrote:

All, 

 

I just pushed a new commit (https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/commits/8e7e3b4e57960994edea267f0e753358aad99574 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Fcommits%2F8e7e3b4e57960994edea267f0e753358aad99574&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846038185%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=su4UQFbqpT1s8GvJ5kH%2BM6LKbWjD%2F4ezud1zI2OuwnU%3D&reserved=0> ) based on the discussions and comments I’ve had and received. 

 

The complete ballot “redline” in GitHub is available for review on https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/files <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846038185%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=%2FJeO1%2BawREvNZ3ulTEXkFtrLrUX8ehMUSsac8J18tzo%3D&reserved=0> 


If the CA confirms that a Subscriber has signed "Suspect Code", how would the group feel with a proposal to require CAs to backdate revoke the Code Signing Certificate to a date and time that would neutralize the Suspect Code? If this date and time is unlikely to be determined, backdate revoke 1'' after the notBefore date and time of the Code Signing Certificate?


Thanks,
Dimitris.







 

 

 

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Monday, 26 September 2022 11:58
To: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)  <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> <dzacharo at harica.gr>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

 

Thank you Dimitris. That makes sense. I’ve pushed an update to the draft-PR

 

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
Sent: Friday, 23 September 2022 18:47
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

 

I posted some proposed changes for consistency and accuracy.

1.	https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10#pullrequestreview-1118760785 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%23pullrequestreview-1118760785&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846194414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=XX%2BO4N2vdyMETGjerXdv7xD7q2y4PnnyPq69ghdeAEY%3D&reserved=0> 


Thanks,
Dimitris.

On 23/9/2022 3:55 μ.μ., Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public wrote:

Hi Martjin,

 

I will endorse the ballot.

 

Thanks, Bruce.

 

From: Cscwg-public  <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2022 3:44 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.
DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.


  _____  


All,

 

As discussed on yesterdays call, the latest changes which Tim and I were discussing are pushed into Github. 

 

The complete change can be found at https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/files <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846194414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=0t20NCshSgV4JdwR9Yf%2B4Puel3rBO%2BheN5R63pFiSa8%3D&reserved=0>  for review.

 

Bruce, Ian, since I earlier had your endorsements, please let me know if they still stand. The changes since the endorsements, are captured in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/10/commits/90fa38ab4dc5e5f9b25fce844b750d693f7256b7 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F10%2Fcommits%2F90fa38ab4dc5e5f9b25fce844b750d693f7256b7&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846194414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=g7sT5FZDuqA%2BHFotZE1KuBJUb%2FAvfuampeTZ2FT8OmY%3D&reserved=0> 

 

If there are no other comments, then hopefully we can start a ballot process on this.


Regards,

Martijn

 

 

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Tuesday, 19 July 2022 09:22
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

 

Thanks Tim,

 

1.	What is the motivation for allowing a waiver if approved by just “at least one” of the stakeholders, instead of all of them?
2.	I’m a bit concerned that language might be increasingly troublesome as we continue to expand the scope and participation of this group.

 

I believe it might be difficult to get approval from all stakeholders within a certain amount of time, meaning the CA would possibly never get all approvals, and never be able to utilize the waiver.  

 

Considering that signed code is often (but not exclusively) targeted for a specific platform, stakeholders of other platforms might not be inclined to give approval for something that does not even affect them.  

 

I do share your concern, but I also don’t see a better path towards the same goal.

 

3.	Similarly, I’m unsure how I feel about making compliance distinctions based on whether a particular root program has decided to have a contractual relationship with its issuers or not.  That seems like an implementation detail of the relationship that the guidelines should remain silent on.  But I appreciate what that definition is intended to do, and would like to perhaps find a different way to express the same intent.

 

Good point, and maybe the word “contract” is too much here?

Although I would note this language is already part of the “Certificate Beneficiaries” definition right now.

 

I’m open for a different suggestion 

 

From: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> > 
Sent: Friday, 15 July 2022 18:18
To: Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com <mailto:martijn.katerbarg at sectigo.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: RE: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

 

What is the motivation for allowing a waiver if approved by just “at least one” of the stakeholders, instead of all of them?

 

I’m a bit concerned that language might be increasingly troublesome as we continue to expand the scope and participation of this group.

 

Similarly, I’m unsure how I feel about making compliance distinctions based on whether a particular root program has decided to have a contractual relationship with its issuers or not.  That seems like an implementation detail of the relationship that the guidelines should remain silent on.  But I appreciate what that definition is intended to do, and would like to perhaps find a different way to express the same intent.

 

-Tim

 

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2022 10:04 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Subject: [Cscwg-public] Proposal to make changes to revocation based on malware

 

All,

 

As already hinted during the last meeting during the F2F, Ian and I, have been working on a proposal affecting the guidelines regarding malware based revocation.

 

The intent of this change is to:

1.	Limit the number of days before a certificate needs to be revoked, especially when the subscriber is not responding to inquiries
2.	Remove the OCSP log analysis requirements
3.	Simplify the process that has to be followed

 

I have attached 3 documents: one with the current language, one with the proposed language, as well as a redlined version.

 

The changes have been made based on upcoming version 3.0 of the CSCBRs. In case you wish to compare with version 2.8, the relevant section is 13.1.5.3. Besides to that section, there is also a change to the “Suspect Code” definition, as well as a new definition in the proposal.

Once PR6 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F6&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846194414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=4paT4Lb%2F70BqliGMY8ev84oAl0tCRa8rUeHB2UV9PQY%3D&reserved=0>  has been merged, I will also prepare the changes in GIT for those that prefer comparing there.

 

Looking forward to comments to this and move towards a potential ballot.

Regards,

Martijn

Any email and files/attachments transmitted with it are confidential and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If this message has been sent to you in error, you must not copy, distribute or disclose of the information it contains. Please notify Entrust immediately and delete the message from your system. 

_______________________________________________
Cscwg-public mailing list
Cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:Cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/cscwg-public <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.cabforum.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fcscwg-public&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846194414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=EZPaL8i%2F5Nu8TuTq6Il8Q1%2FL5dETN%2F4ZVnwhkGSRU8s%3D&reserved=0> 

 







_______________________________________________
Cscwg-public mailing list
Cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:Cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/cscwg-public <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.cabforum.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fcscwg-public&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846194414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=EZPaL8i%2F5Nu8TuTq6Il8Q1%2FL5dETN%2F4ZVnwhkGSRU8s%3D&reserved=0> 

 






_______________________________________________
Cscwg-public mailing list
Cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:Cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/cscwg-public <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.cabforum.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fcscwg-public&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Ce659b9687b6944290f0908dafe1f1b69%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638101706846194414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=EZPaL8i%2F5Nu8TuTq6Il8Q1%2FL5dETN%2F4ZVnwhkGSRU8s%3D&reserved=0> 

 

 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/cscwg-public/attachments/20230124/655d5084/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: smime.p7s
Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Size: 6827 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/cscwg-public/attachments/20230124/655d5084/attachment-0001.p7s>


More information about the Cscwg-public mailing list