[Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)
dzacharo at harica.gr
Wed Mar 9 13:08:14 UTC 2022
On 9/3/2022 2:58 μ.μ., Inigo Barreira wrote:
>
> I agree with Adriano. Point 1 does not make customer accountable for
> anything (I will promise I´m a good guy) and then point 2 is useless
> because with point 1 you´re allowing the customer to do whatever,
> independently if they use a hardw device or not. The CSRs can be
> generated in a crypto device or not and with point 1 you, as the CA,
> are “sure” that the keys are in a hardware crypto device. That´s a lot
> to assume.
>
You are missing the point of Subscriber representations and warranties
which is clearly included in the BRs. Subscribers have obligations as
well and we must ensure they are aware and bound to those obligations.
Dimitris.
> *De:* Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> *En nombre de
> *Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
> *Enviado el:* miércoles, 9 de marzo de 2022 13:27
> *Para:* Adriano Santoni <adriano.santoni at staff.aruba.it>;
> cscwg-public at cabforum.org
> *Asunto:* Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key
> Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do
> not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender
> and know the content is safe.
>
> I believe this language and double confirmation comes from years ago
> when tools like remote key attestation were not available.
>
> If we are to allow an Applicant to generate keys remotely (i.e.
> without the presence of a CA representative and without hardware that
> supports remote key attestation), which seems to be the case with the
> CSCWG today, we need to rely on policy to accomplish that. It is
> reasonable to hold both sides, the Applicant and the CA, accountable
> to this policy. See below.
>
> On 9/3/2022 11:43 π.μ., Adriano Santoni via Cscwg-public wrote:
>
> As far as I'm concerned, I find confusing and overly complex the
> double requirement:
>
> 1) customer must make a "representation" that they will use a
> hardware crypto module (or signing service), and ...
>
>
> This is required because a customer could potentially "fake" the
> hardware device id and create a virtual driver that emulates the
> actual hardware device. The Applicant must be held accountable if they
> try to manipulate the process or make any changes to the process and
> tools provided by the CA.
>
>
> 2) the CA must ensure that the customer will really use a hardware
> crypto module (or signing service).
>
>
> The CA must establish a process and develop the proper tools to
> provide reasonable assurance that the Applicant remotely generates
> keys in a hardware crypto module which is usually within a limited set
> of devices approved by the CA. The CA is not allowed to say "please
> send me a CSR and pinky swear that it was generated in a crypto
> device". They must develop tools and middleware and establish a
> process to make sure the key is generated in approved crypto-devices only.
>
>
> If the CA will be obliged to meet req #2, then I do not see what
> use is req #1.
>
>
> Hope this explanation helps.
> Dimitris.
>
>
> Adriano
>
> -- Actalis
>
> Il 09/03/2022 10:21, Inigo Barreira via Cscwg-public ha scritto:
>
> Yes, please.
>
> It looks like this representation means something like “click
> here if you are over 18” or “click here if you agree” because
> these are also facts not opinions.
>
> IMO the message here is that CAs will rely in whatever the
> subscriber says, e.g., “yes, I´m a good guy and promise that
> I will keep my keys in a hardware device …” rather on making
> the corresponding tasks to ensure. Is this the right approach?
> This is what I understand from Dean´s response because CAs are
> not attesting anything just relying in a form signed by the
> subscriber in where it may say whatever.
>
> Regards
>
> *De:* Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>
> <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>
> *Enviado el:* martes, 8 de marzo de 2022 20:35
> *Para:* Dean Coclin <dean.coclin at digicert.com>
> <mailto:dean.coclin at digicert.com>; Inigo Barreira
> <Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com>
> <mailto:Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com>;
> cscwg-public at cabforum.org; Bruce Morton
> <bruce.morton at entrust.com> <mailto:bruce.morton at entrust.com>;
> Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>
> <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com>; Ian McMillan
> <ianmcm at microsoft.com> <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com>
> *Asunto:* RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection
> Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> “representation” is being used here in the legal sense: “a
> statement of fact. A representation should be distinguished
> from a statement of opinion for many legal purposes,
> especially in relation to contractual obligations.”
>
> We should perhaps be using plain English instead of legalese.
>
> -Tim
>
> *From:*Dean Coclin <dean.coclin at digicert.com>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 8, 2022 1:00 PM
> *To:* Inigo Barreira <Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com>;
> cscwg-public at cabforum.org; Bruce Morton
> <bruce.morton at entrust.com>; Doug Beattie
> <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>; Ian McMillan
> <ianmcm at microsoft.com>; Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>
> *Subject:* RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection
> Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> This means exactly what it says, some representation that the
> subscriber makes to honor the condition. This traditionally
> has been something in writing that the subscriber signs and
> submits to the CA. CAs can provide a form to the subscriber
> which they attest to.
>
> *From:*Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> *On
> Behalf Of *Inigo Barreira via Cscwg-public
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 8, 2022 11:03 AM
> *To:* Bruce Morton <bruce.morton at entrust.com>;
> cscwg-public at cabforum.org; Doug Beattie
> <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>; Ian McMillan
> <ianmcm at microsoft.com>; Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key
> Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> Hi all,
>
> Reviewing the section 16.3.1 I have a “wording” question. What
> does it mean that “The CA MUST obtain a representation from
> the Subscriber that the Subscriber will use one of the
> following options …”. So, what is a “representation from the
> subscriber”?
>
> Regards
>
> *De:* Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> *En
> nombre de *Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public
> *Enviado el:* jueves, 3 de marzo de 2022 15:08
> *Para:* Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>; Ian
> McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com>; Tim Hollebeek
> <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org
> *Asunto:* Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key
> Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the
> organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless
> you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Doug,
>
> Regarding the 16.2 section, this statement was also
> struck-out, “After 2021-06-01, the same protection
> requirements SHALL apply to Non EV Code Signing Certificates.”
> So I believe that the requirement already applied to normal
> code signing certificates. The edits are just a cleanup.
>
> Bruce.
>
> *From:*Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 3, 2022 6:56 AM
> *To:* Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com>; Tim Hollebeek
> <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org; Bruce
> Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com>
> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key
> Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.
> DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender
> and know the content is safe.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Hi Ian,
>
> Good work on section 16.3, that is much more clear now. I
> have 2 more comments for your consideration.
>
> Comment #1:
>
> In Section 11.7 we say:
>
> If the CA is aware that the Applicant was the victim of a
> Takeover Attack, the CA MUST verify that the Applicant is
> protecting its Code Signing Private Keys under Section
> 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2). The CA MUST verify the
> Applicant’s compliance with Section 16.3.1(1) or Section
> 16.3.1(2) (i) through technical means that confirm the Private
> Keys are protected using the method described in 16.3.1(1) or
> 16.3.1(2) or (ii) by relying on a report provided by the
> Applicant that is signed by an auditor who is approved by the
> CA and who has IT and security training or is a CISA.
>
> But now there are actually 2 lists in sections 16.3.1(1) or
> Section 16.3.1(2) with those list numbers. Do we need to be
> more specific, or renumber the second list a-c?
>
> After 15 November, what is the right remediation for Take Over
> attack, do we need to reference one or more of the items in
> the new list (the list we might renumber a-c), or is there no
> remediation now?
>
> There are multiple references to 16.3.1(1) so we’d want to
> apply the same logic to all instances.
>
> Comment #2:
>
> Section 16.2 removed the reference to EV in the scope so this
> applies to normal Code signing certificates. Since this does
> not have a date associated with it, do we assume that this
> requirement change for normal code signing certs is effective
> immediately?
>
> *From:*Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 2, 2022 5:56 PM
> *To:* Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>;
> cscwg-public at cabforum.org; Doug Beattie
> <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>; Bruce Morton
> <bruce.morton at entrust.com>
> *Subject:* RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection
> Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> Thank you, Tim, I really like the structure suggestions here.
> I’ve made those updates per your suggestion in the attached
> copy of the redline document.
>
> I’ll note your endorsement.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Ian
>
> *From:*Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 2, 2022 4:57 PM
> *To:* Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com>;
> cscwg-public at cabforum.org; Doug Beattie
> <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>; Bruce Morton
> <bruce.morton at entrust.com>
> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key
> Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> I would recommend against using parentheticals to express the
> deprecation dates, as it makes the sentences more complicated
> than they need to be. I’d just modify the first sentence of
> each part so the structure is as follows:
>
> For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to
> November 15, 2022, …
>
> For EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to November
> 15, 2022, …
>
> Effective November 15, 2022, …
>
> But otherwise, the updates look good and we are willing to
> endorse CSC-13.
>
> -Tim
>
> *From:*Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 2, 2022 11:31 AM
> *To:* cscwg-public at cabforum.org; Doug Beattie
> <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>; Bruce Morton
> <bruce.morton at entrust.com>; Tim Hollebeek
> <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>
> *Subject:* Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection
> Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)
>
> Hi Folks,
>
> Attached you will find an updated redline doc of v2.7 of the
> CSBRs with the updates to the subscriber private key
> protection requirements as outlined previously in CSC-6. This
> updated version also includes edits to address issues Doug
> Beattie raised during the voting period of CSC-6, so I am
> looking for confirmation from Doug on these edits addressing
> the concerns he raised.
>
> Additionally, I’m looking to get endorsements on this ballot
> under CSC 13 - Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection
> Requirements
> <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.cabforum.org%2Fcscwg%2Fcsc_13_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements&data=04%7C01%7Cinigo.barreira%40sectigo.com%7C42db05f8eba549d8f9e308da01c817d1%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C637824256154384548%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=9YlDE7BkPySPH%2F8%2FxevYMjwnruchCLOKSfOgLS1xXU0%3D&reserved=0>,
> and hope that Bruce and Tim, as previous endorsers can review
> the edits and endorse the new ballot. Once we have endorsers
> I’ll proceed with the formal ballot process.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Ian
>
>
>
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