[Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

Wed Mar 9 10:13:04 UTC 2022

Section 16.3.1, post November 15, 2022, seems to be the double requirement here, when compared to most items in 16.3.2. I’ll break those down:

16.3.2 (1) – Since the CA has generated the keys on the HCM, there shouldn’t be a need for the representation required by 16.3.1 because the CA already has confirmed it

16.3.2 (2) – I suppose attestation could be the representation itself, but it still makes for a double language item

16.3.2 (3) – Now this one is interesting. If the user is told to use a prescribed crypto library and told to use an HCM (note: no attestation required), they could just not do that and still send a signed document stating they have done it. Even if CA’s would provide tooling that confirm  if a token in inserted, use the (for example Windows) CSP to generate a key and CSR on the token and then have their tool submit that to the CA for signing, does this really proof that a token was used?  In the end, it’s a client-side application that’s sending a CSR over an internet connection, something that could also be intercepted by the same client, allowing the CSR to be replaced before it is signed.

16.3.2 (4) – external audit, which could be used as the representation. Internal audit, means again as 16.3.2 (3) relying on the subscriber to provide correct, truthful documentation

16.3.2 (5, 6, 7) – It still seems like double language, but no additional comments on these.

In my opinion 16.3.2 (3) seems like a weak link in the whole of 16.3.2

Martijn

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Adriano Santoni via Cscwg-public
Sent: Wednesday, 9 March 2022 10:43
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

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As far as I'm concerned, I find confusing and overly complex the double requirement:

1) customer must make a "representation" that they will use a hardware crypto module (or signing service), and ...

2) the CA must ensure that the customer will really use a hardware crypto module (or signing service). 

If the CA will be obliged to meet req #2, then I do not see what use is req #1.

Adriano

-- Actalis

Il 09/03/2022 10:21, Inigo Barreira via Cscwg-public ha scritto:

Yes, please. 

It looks like this representation means something like “click here if you are over 18” or “click here if you agree” because these are also facts not opinions. 

IMO the message here is that CAs will rely in whatever the subscriber says, e.g.,  “yes, I´m a good guy and promise that I will keep my keys in a hardware device …” rather on making the corresponding tasks to ensure. Is this the right approach? This is what I understand from Dean´s response because CAs are not attesting anything just relying in a form signed by the subscriber in where it may say whatever.

Regards

De: Tim Hollebeek  <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> 
Enviado el: martes, 8 de marzo de 2022 20:35
Para: Dean Coclin  <mailto:dean.coclin at digicert.com> <dean.coclin at digicert.com>; Inigo Barreira  <mailto:Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com> <Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Bruce Morton  <mailto:bruce.morton at entrust.com> <bruce.morton at entrust.com>; Doug Beattie  <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com> <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>; Ian McMillan  <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> <ianmcm at microsoft.com>
Asunto: RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

“representation” is being used here in the legal sense: “a statement of fact. A representation should be distinguished from a statement of opinion for many legal purposes, especially in relation to contractual obligations.”

We should perhaps be using plain English instead of legalese.

-Tim

From: Dean Coclin <dean.coclin at digicert.com <mailto:dean.coclin at digicert.com> > 
Sent: Tuesday, March 8, 2022 1:00 PM
To: Inigo Barreira <Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com <mailto:Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Bruce Morton <bruce.morton at entrust.com <mailto:bruce.morton at entrust.com> >; Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com> >; Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> >; Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >
Subject: RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

This means exactly what it says, some representation that the subscriber makes to honor the condition. This traditionally has been something in writing that the subscriber signs and submits to the CA. CAs can provide a form to the subscriber which they attest to.

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Inigo Barreira via Cscwg-public
Sent: Tuesday, March 8, 2022 11:03 AM
To: Bruce Morton <bruce.morton at entrust.com <mailto:bruce.morton at entrust.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com> >; Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> >; Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

Hi all,

Reviewing the section 16.3.1 I have a “wording” question. What does it mean that “The CA MUST obtain a representation from the Subscriber that the Subscriber will use one of the following options …”. So, what is a “representation from the subscriber”?

Regards

De: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> > En nombre de Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public
Enviado el: jueves, 3 de marzo de 2022 15:08
Para: Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com> >; Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> >; Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> 
Asunto: Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

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Doug,

Regarding the 16.2 section, this statement was also struck-out, “After 2021-06-01, the same protection requirements SHALL apply to Non EV Code Signing Certificates.” So I believe that the requirement already applied to normal code signing certificates. The edits are just a cleanup.

Bruce.

From: Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com> > 
Sent: Thursday, March 3, 2022 6:56 AM
To: Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> >; Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com <mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrust.com> >
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

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  _____  

Hi Ian,

Good work on section 16.3, that is much more clear now.  I have 2 more comments for your consideration.

Comment #1:

In Section 11.7 we say:

If the CA is aware that the Applicant was the victim of a Takeover Attack, the CA MUST verify that the Applicant is protecting its Code Signing Private Keys under Section 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2). The CA MUST verify the Applicant’s compliance with Section 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2) (i) through technical means that confirm the Private Keys are protected using the method described in 16.3.1(1) or 16.3.1(2) or (ii) by relying on a report provided by the Applicant that is signed by an auditor who is approved by the CA and who has IT and security training or is a CISA.

But now there are actually 2 lists in sections 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2) with those list numbers.  Do we need to be more specific, or renumber the second list a-c?  

After 15 November, what is the right remediation for Take Over attack, do we need to reference one or more of the items in the new list (the list we might renumber a-c), or is there no remediation now?

There are multiple references to 16.3.1(1) so we’d want to apply the same logic to all instances.

Comment #2:

Section 16.2 removed the reference to EV in the scope so this applies to normal Code signing certificates.  Since this does not have a date associated with it, do we assume that this requirement change for normal code signing certs is effective immediately?

From: Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> > 
Sent: Wednesday, March 2, 2022 5:56 PM
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com> >; Bruce Morton <bruce.morton at entrust.com <mailto:bruce.morton at entrust.com> >
Subject: RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

Thank you, Tim, I really like the structure suggestions here. I’ve made those updates per your suggestion in the attached copy of the redline document. 

I’ll note your endorsement.

Cheers,

Ian

From: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> > 
Sent: Wednesday, March 2, 2022 4:57 PM
To: Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> >; cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com> >; Bruce Morton <bruce.morton at entrust.com <mailto:bruce.morton at entrust.com> >
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

I would recommend against using parentheticals to express the deprecation dates, as it makes the sentences more complicated than they need to be.  I’d just modify the first sentence of each part so the structure is as follows:

   For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to November 15, 2022, …

   For EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to November 15, 2022, …

   Effective November 15, 2022, …

But otherwise, the updates look good and we are willing to endorse CSC-13.

-Tim

From: Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com> > 
Sent: Wednesday, March 2, 2022 11:31 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> ; Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com> >; Bruce Morton <bruce.morton at entrust.com <mailto:bruce.morton at entrust.com> >; Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >
Subject: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)

Hi Folks,

Attached you will find an updated redline doc of v2.7 of the CSBRs with the updates to the subscriber private key protection requirements as outlined previously in CSC-6. This updated version also includes edits to address issues Doug Beattie raised during the voting period of CSC-6, so I am looking for confirmation from Doug on these edits addressing the concerns he raised. 

Additionally, I’m looking to get endorsements on this ballot under CSC 13 - Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.cabforum.org%2Fcscwg%2Fcsc_13_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements&data=04%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C47634215d8ed4b42c31008da01b137c3%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C637824157930966055%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=c%2BAF%2BqZf4FdQsSXIcrB5p5eL%2Bx3sj%2Bfxt6GrNjQUAB4%3D&reserved=0> , and hope that Bruce and Tim, as previous endorsers can review the edits and endorse the new ballot. Once we have endorsers I’ll proceed with the formal ballot process. 

Cheers,

Ian 

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