[Cscwg-public] VOTING BEGINS: Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements

[Andrea Holland]

SecureTrust votes No on ballot CSC-6.



Sincerely,

Andrea



From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Ian
McMillan via Cscwg-public
Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2022 10:30 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org
Subject: [Cscwg-public] VOTING BEGINS: Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber
Private Key Protection Requirements



Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements

Purpose of this ballot: Update the subscriber private key protection
requirements in the Baseline Requirement for the Issuance and Management of
Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates v2.7. The following motion has
been proposed by Ian McMillan of Microsoft, and endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of
DigiCert and Bruce Morton of Entrust.



- MOTION BEGINS -



This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 2.7
according to the attached redline which includes:



1.	Update section 16.3 “Subscriber Private Key Protection” to
“Subscriber Private Key Protection and Verification”
2.	Update section 16.3 “Subscriber Private Key Protection” to include
sub-sections “16.3.1 Subscriber Private Key Protection” and “16.3.2
Subscriber Private Key Verification”
3.	Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.1 to remove allowance
of TPM key generation and software protected private key protection, and
remove private key protection requirement differences between EV and non-EV
Code Signing Certificates
4.	Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.1 to include the
allowance of key generation and protection using a cloud-based key
protection solution providing key generation and protection in a hardware
crypto module that conforms to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common
Criteria EAL 4+
5.	Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.2 to include
verification for Code Signing Certificates' private key generation and
storage in a crypto module that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS
140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ by the CAs. Include additional
acceptable methods for verification including cloud-based key generation and
protection solutions and a stipulation for CAs to satisfy this verification
requirement with additional means specified in their CPS. Any additional
means specified by a CA in their CPS, must be proposed to the CA/Browser
Forum for inclusion into the acceptable methods for section 16.3.2 within 6
months of inclusion in their CPS.



- MOTION ENDS -



The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:



Discussion (7 days)

Start Time: 2022-02-14, 19:30 Eastern Time (US)

End Time: not before 2022-02-21, 19:30 Eastern Time (US)



Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time:  2022-02-22,10:30 Eastern Time (US)

End Time: 2022-03-01,10:30 Eastern Time (US)





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