[Cscwg-public] VOTING RESULTS: Ballot CSC-13: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements

Bruce Morton Bruce.Morton at entrust.com
Wed Apr 6 18:55:32 UTC 2022

Voting has closed on CSCWG-13 and the ballot has passed.

Voting Results
Certificate Issuers
7 votes total, with no abstentions:

  *   7 Yes votes: Certum (Asseco), DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, HARICA, Sectigo, SSL.com
  *   0 No votes
  *   0 Abstentions

Certificate Consumers
1 vote total, with no abstentions

  *   1 Yes vote: Microsoft
  *   0 No votes
  *   0 Abstentions

Bylaw Requirements
1.     Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:
*      A "yes" vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose.
This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.
*      At least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted.
This requirement was MET.
2.    Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot.
This requirement was MET.

This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.


From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Ian McMillan via Cscwg-public
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2022 1:01 PM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Cscwg-public] VOTING BEGINS: Ballot CSC-13: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements

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Ballot CSC-13: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https*3A*2F*2Fwiki.cabforum.org*2Fcscwg*2Fcsc_13_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements&data=04*7C01*7Cianmcm*40microsoft.com*7C31d96159f5ed42ea367808da0ceebaa5*7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47*7C0*7C0*7C637836517169400423*7CUnknown*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0*3D*7C1000&sdata=W9JW6jbaoIP9q5eo5kI9KtC*2FbyLkrPw4*2BknyEac9Fa8*3D&reserved=0__;JSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSU!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!MYP8nntl_HIl8acy3IX1BSy9KDw03s4s-Iq9hy2JIlgcyb3etHjF79amo1fImlNaYj4$>
Purpose of this ballot: Update the subscriber private key protection requirements in the Baseline Requirement for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates v2.7. The following motion has been proposed by Ian McMillan of Microsoft and endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Bruce Morton of Entrust.


This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 2.7 according to the attached redline which includes:

  *   Update section 16.3 “Subscriber Private Key Protection” to “Subscriber Private Key Protection and Verification”
  *   Update section 16.3 “Subscriber Private Key Protection” to include sub-sections “16.3.1 Subscriber Private Key Protection” and “16.3.2 Subscriber Private Key Verification”
  *   Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.1 to remove allowance of TPM key generation and software protected private key protection, and remove private key protection requirement differences between EV and non-EV Code Signing Certificates
  *   Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.1 to include the allowance of key generation and protection using a cloud-based key protection solution providing key generation and protection in a hardware crypto module that conforms to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+
  *   Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.2 to include verification for Code Signing Certificates' private key generation and storage in a crypto module that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ by the CAs. Include additional acceptable methods for verification including cloud-based key generation and protection solutions and a stipulation for CAs to satisfy this verification requirement with additional means specified in their CPS. Any additional means specified by a CA in their CPS, must be proposed to the CA/Browser Forum for inclusion into the acceptable methods for section 16.3.2 by November 15, 2022.


The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7 days)
Start Time: 2022-03-23, 13:00 Eastern Time (US)
End Time: 2022-03-30, 13:00 Eastern Time (US)

Vote for approval (7 days)
Start Time: 2022-03-30, 13:00 Eastern Time (US)
End Time: 2022-04-06, 13:00 Eastern Time (US)

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