[Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: DISCUSS/ENDORSE: Ballot CSC-11: Update to log data retention requirements

Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) dzacharo at harica.gr
Thu Sep 2 10:51:36 UTC 2021


Hi Sebastian,

I'd like to share with the CSCWG a proposal I wrote after some 
collaboration with Clint Wilson from Apple. You may find the proposed 
changes to the BRs in https://github.com/dzacharo/servercert/pull/2/files.

The fact that the retention period has a lower limit, nothing prevents a 
CA from keeping logs/archives for longer periods in order to investigate 
past security incidents. This is highlighted in a NOTE in the proposal 
above. Similarly the NetSec SCWG subcommittee is working on a draft in 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SCyrt8la1slPJhvnWUW6ROlqIV3yaDwb3LKZ5qjdiH4.

For the CA Certificates' retention period, which is proposed to be 2 
years after the expiration/revocation/key deletion of the CA, IMHO the 
same principle applies. The CA must determine if it needs to keep logs 
for more time in order to perform proper retrospection related to a 
security incident AFTER a CA has been decommissioned.


Thanks,
Dimitris.


On 2/9/2021 1:35 μ.μ., Sebastian Schulz via Cscwg-public wrote:
>
> Hey All, Hey Ian
>
> What seems a little odd to me is that the requirements for the 
> duration of log retention are the same for CA certificates as for 
> subscriber certificates, given their wildly different original 
> validity periods. I know the TLS BR handle it like that as well but 
> come to think of it….isn’t the purpose of log retention to be able to 
> identify possible errors in operation of a CA from the aftermath? 
> Since CA certificate lifecycle operations are carried out at much 
> lower frequency than those for subscriber certificates, I would have 
> assumed that more logged time is needed to identify possible systemic 
> errors (in contrast, 2 years retention for subscriber certificates 
> with max 3 year validity almost seems long)
>
> Just a thought that came to mind, maybe I just missed discussion 
> around it. Or another discussion needs to be had, but not for this 
> ballot then. When it comes to adding TS requirements and detaching it 
> from TLS BR - looks good to me 😊
>
> Best,
>
> Seb
>
> *Sebastian Schulz*
> /Product Manager Client Certificates/
>
> *From:*Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> *On Behalf Of 
> *Ian McMillan via Cscwg-public
> *Sent:* 01 September 2021 17:00
> *To:* Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org; 
> dzacharo at harica.gr; Bruce.Morton at entrust.com
> *Subject:* Re: [Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: DISCUSS/ENDORSE: Ballot 
> CSC-11: Update to log data retention requirements
>
> Hi All,
>
> Please review the attached updated redline with the removal of all 
> references to the SSL/TLS BRs for section 15 on data records.
>
> I’d like to note that Signing Services are included in the data 
> records requirements but seem really out of place as they are 
> responsible for subscriber key generation and protection as it is 
> described in section 16.2, and not the management or creation of CA 
> certificates. I could easily see us removing Sign Services from this 
> section or authoring a new set of requirements for signing services as 
> part of the refinement of the CSBRs for signing services.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ian
>
> *From:*Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> *On Behalf Of 
> *Ian McMillan via Cscwg-public
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 1, 2021 8:27 AM
> *To:* dzacharo at harica.gr; Bruce.Morton at entrust.com; 
> cscwg-public at cabforum.org
> *Subject:* Re: [Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re: DISCUSS/ENDORSE: Ballot 
> CSC-11: Update to log data retention requirements
>
> Hi Bruce and Dimitris,
>
> I like this idea and I’ll work on this update to share with the group 
> before next week’s meeting.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ian
>
> Get Outlook for iOS 
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> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> *From:*Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr 
> <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr>>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 1, 2021 8:16:03 AM
> *To:* Bruce Morton <Bruce.Morton at entrust.com 
> <mailto:Bruce.Morton at entrust.com>>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org 
> <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org> <cscwg-public at cabforum.org 
> <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org>>; Ian McMillan 
> <ianmcm at microsoft.com <mailto:ianmcm at microsoft.com>>
> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] DISCUSS/ENDORSE: Ballot 
> CSC-11: Update to log data retention requirements
>
> On 26/8/2021 9:00 μ.μ., Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public wrote:
>
>     Hi Ian,
>
>     I am wondering if we could change the text, so we do not reference
>     the SSL BRs. I’m saying this because:
>
>       * CSBRs refer to SSL BR version 1.6.9, which was updated per SC27
>       * CSBR section 15.2 would be easier to read
>       * CSBR section 15.2 would be independent of the SSL BRs, which
>         goes in the direction of our goal
>
>     Thanks, Bruce.
>
>
> I agree with Bruce. We should try to incorporate text from the TLS BRs 
> that makes sense for the CS BRs as much as we can and avoid references 
> that have the risk of becoming broken or amended by the SCWG.
>
>
> Thanks,
> Dimitris.
>
>     *From:*Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org>
>     <mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> *On Behalf Of *Ian
>     McMillan via Cscwg-public
>     *Sent:* Thursday, August 26, 2021 12:29 PM
>     *To:* cscwg-public at cabforum.org <mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org>
>     *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] [Cscwg-public] DISCUSS/ENDORSE: Ballot
>     CSC-11: Update to log data retention requirements
>
>     WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.
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>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>     Hi Folks,
>
>     I am looking for feedback and at least two endorsements on this
>     new ballot I am proposing. Please share your feedback and if you
>     are willing to endorse this ballot.
>
>     Ballot CSC-11: Update to log data retention requirements
>     <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Furldefense.com%2Fv3%2F__https%3A%2Fwiki.cabforum.org%2Fcscwg%2Fcsc_11_-_update_to_log_data_retention_requirements__%3B!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!OxtP9iVwcvkR2NB3D6_-cStNUlZ0jiRsvQI7kzZGF3vX8NFDtimB6Te0-iBFuXDSLg0%24&data=04%7C01%7Cianmcm%40microsoft.com%7Cd8eca44b0c5e4d00879208d96d43c57f%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C0%7C0%7C637660960159807394%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=DlBAif7z2cKBTI%2FGqxkwPJSj%2BndNeDaY8DIt0L9TAcM%3D&reserved=0>
>
>     Purpose of this ballot:
>
>     Update the log data and retention of log data requirements in the
>     Baseline Requirement for the Issuance and Management of
>     Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates v2.5.
>
>     The following motion has been proposed by Ian McMillan of
>     Microsoft, and I am looking for endorsements from two other
>     members of the CSCWG.
>
>     — MOTION BEGINS —
>
>     This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
>     and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“
>     version 2.5 according to the attached redline which including
>
>     Update section 15 “Data Records” to include sub-section 15.1
>     “Timestamp Authority Data Records”
>
>     Update section 15.1 to clarify 4(f) for security event logging on
>     Timestamp Authority servers
>
>     Update section 15.1 on 4(d) for security event logging to no
>     longer include “hardware failures”
>
>     Update section 15 “Data Records” to include sub-section 15.2 “Data
>     Retention Period for Audit Logs”
>
>     Update section 15.2 to no longer reference Baseline Requirements
>     section 5.4.3 and defined a specific retention period for CA,
>     subscriber certificate, Timestamp Authority, and security event
>     data records for at least 2 years
>
>     — MOTION ENDS —
>
>     Thanks,
>
>     Ian
>
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