[Cscwg-public] Discussion: Proposed Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements

[Bruce Morton]

Hi Ian,

Great meeting. Looks like we are making progress now. It will be nice to get this behind us.

Since the change will impact the CAs, we need the ballot to have an effectivity date. As such, we need to keep the current requirements as is with no change. We will also add in the new requirements and have them be effective on a future date. It is understood that the CAs may implement the requirement before that date.

Attached is a draft with the idea. I used the latest version of the CSBRs and captured most of the changes.

It would be great, if the CAs could provide some feedback on an effective date.

Thanks, Bruce.

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public
Sent: Wednesday, November 3, 2021 1:21 PM
To: Ian McMillan <ianmcm at microsoft.com>; cscwg-public at cabforum.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] Discussion: Proposed Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements

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Hi Ian,

Thanks for the proposal. Please find your document with some edits. I wanted to state that the subscriber could use a Signing Service to protect the private key. In addition I tried to reduce the number of “FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+” call outs as I am sure they will not remain consistent.

Looking forward to the discussion tomorrow.

Thanks again, Bruce.

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org>> On Behalf Of Ian McMillan via Cscwg-public
Sent: Wednesday, November 3, 2021 10:58 AM
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public at cabforum.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Cscwg-public] Discussion: Proposed Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements

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Hi Folks,

I’ve found the time to write up the subscriber private key protection update under a proposed Ballot CSC-6. Please review the attached redline doc and provide feedback. Also, please let me know if you are willing to endorse this ballot.

cscwg:csc_6_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements [CAB Forum Wiki]<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/wiki.cabforum.org/cscwg/csc_6_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!JFXFBvuicNpp5JGeK1TvRJ-6eotM5fhSRjTUe2CUTty2HljPYkdltIcLdAbGX374fBk$>
Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements
Purpose of this ballot: Update the subscriber private key protection requirements in the Baseline Requirement for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates v2.5. The following motion has been proposed by Ian McMillan of Microsoft, and endorsed by <Name + Org> and <Name + Org>.

- MOTION BEGINS - This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 2.5 according to the attached redline which includes:

  *   Update section 16.3 “Subscriber Private Key Protection” to “Subscriber Private Key Protection and Verification”
  *   Update section 16.3 “Subscriber Private Key Protection” to include sub-sections “16.3.1 Subscriber Private Key Protection” and “16.3.2 Subscriber Private Key Verification”
  *   Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.1 to remove allowance of TPM key generation and software protected private key protection, and remove private key protection requirement differences between EV and non-EV Code Signing Certificates
  *   Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.1 to include the allowance of key generation and protection using a cloud-based key protection solution providing key generation and protection in a hardware crypto module that conforms to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+
  *   Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.2 to include verification for Code Signing Certificates' private key generation and storage in a crypto module that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ by the CAs. Include additional acceptable methods for verification including cloud-based key generation and protection solutions and a stimpulation for CAs to satisfy this verification requirement with additional means specified in their CPS. Any additional means specified by a CA in their CPS, must be proposed to the CA/Browser Forum for inclusion into the acceptable methods for section 16.3.2 within 6 months of inclusion in their CPS.
- MOTION ENDS -

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
Discussion (7 days) Start Time: TBD End Time: TBD
Vote for approval (7 days) Start Time: TBD End Time: TBD

Thanks,
Ian
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