[Cscwg-public] Final minutes of CSCWG November 18
Dean Coclin
dean.coclin at digicert.com
Tue Dec 14 20:18:58 UTC 2021
Here are the final minutes of the subject call:
CSC WG Conference Call 2021-11-18
Role Call:
Bruce Morton
Dimitris Zacharopoulos
Inigo Barreira
Andrea Holland
Atsushi Inaba
Correy Bonnell
Chris Kemmerer
Ian McMillan
Kiran Tummala
Tim Hollebeek
Minutes of the previous Meeting were approved
Discussion regarding SC-50 from Server Working Group:
- Ballot is concerned with removal of 4.1.1
- Discussion is postponed until any changes are required
Ballot CSC-12:
- Ballot has passed, in IPR review through 3rd December
Ballot CSC-6:
- Effective date is set to Sep 1st 2022 based on reccuring feedback from the
group
- Date seems reasonable for most CAs but some want to double check time needed
to implement
- Discussion of proposed changes to 16.3.1:
- Dimitris points out that the CA shipping crypto modules with
keys should explicitly be allowed to ship modules with multiple keys
- Dimitris also points out that the current language would allow
the CA to import keys to the crypto module
- Hence, the CA should be required to generate a key inside the
crypto module
- Sebastian mentions that since it is already required for the
subscriber to generate keys on the module, it should follow for CAs to do the
same
- Overall, there is agreement that it would make sense to add
that requirement explicitly
- Language on the ballot is being updated slightly, as per
Dimitris proposal over Email
- Ian proceeds to discuss the requirements around generating the
key on a suitable hardware crypto module, with a CSR signed by the
manufacturer to claim generation of the key on the hardware
- Discussing whether or not that phrasing might be redundant,
Tim points out that an auditor would still be able to distinguish
- Upon a question for the difference between items 2 and 3,
Dimitris points out that 2 is Remote Key Attestation while 3 is constrained by
enrolment with a cetain crypto library
- Regarding item 4, Ian mentions that Microsoft provides
verification by IT audit for their own CodeSigning
- Tim Hollebeek mentions that there are some others using this
method
- Dimitris has concerns that the language may be misinterpreted
by some to provide their own audit (non-FIPS) for the devices
- Tim mentions that some use non-standard security practices
that in assurance level exceed what is required by the BR
- Bruce points out that an audit should ideally show only that a
suitable device according to BR is used, not introduce evluation of a new
device
- Dimitris still encourages reqording of the paragraph, to
clarify
- Tim points at that "suitable" needs a more clear-cut
definition of what is acceptable, are internal IT audits acceptable?
- For Ian, any audit that would clarify make, model and
procedures would be sufficient but that didnt come through for the whole group
- Dimitris is also pointing at item 6, which specifies CA or
qualified auditor witnessing key creation. Does this overlap with item 4?
- Through discussion, it becomes clear that number 4 and 6 are
meant for different purposes (bigger and smaller customers respectively)
- Tim points out that specifying IT audits would complicate this
ballot and can be improved upon in the future
- Dimitris points out item number 8, and how approval might
conflict with items 1 to 7
- It's generally agreed that item number 8 is only meant to
cover methods that are not described by item 1 through 7
- Regarding item number 8, CAs should also bring up additional
methods to question at cabforum.org <mailto:question at cabforum.org> . This seems
mostly important to CAs not participating (of whicht here are many)
- Looping back to item number 4, Dimitris is asking for
clarification whether an itnernal or external audit should be used
- There is discussion around whether and what should be
clarified now and what should be addressed with a future ballot
- Dimitris will propose some language for clarification of item
4
- Bruce also raises some concerns regarding reuse, specifically
for item 4 and 5 (limiting the validity of audits or reports)
- Bruce is pointing out that reuse is already addressed in
section 11 (validation)
- Dimitris is mentioning that there are different reuse periods
for EV and non-EV
- Ian believes that the reuse period of EV (13 months) is more
appropiate, Bruce will update the ballot for items 4, 5 and 7
- Corey is mentioning that 11.7 also has some specifications
regarding takeover attacks and wondering whether these should be updated as
well
- Dimitris agrees that it should be updated with the ballot, Ian
agrees to update
- Discussion regarding CSBR format change:
- Corey has been distributing an updated mapping document and
incorporated CSC-11 changes
- Dimitris agrees that most mapping seems ok so far, with only
some comments remaining
- Dimitris comes with a reminder that clarification ballots
should not introduce normative changes
- The appendix with certificate profile sections talks about
Email Protections EKUs being allowed - should this be added to 3647
conversion?
- Corey refers to MS Root program requirements for Email
protection and Document Signing EKUs
- Bruce suggests that while not updating with the conversion,
but introducing a new ballot immediately to make the changes. The group agrees
- Corey is addressing the delegation of audits as well, with
Dimitris agreeing that the section needs further discussion (section 14.2.1)
- For Dimitris, it reads as if delegated RA can be internall
audited
- Overall, it doesn't seem like it's a format change issue but
there's a problem with the existing content not being understood properly
- If it's not understood, should it not be moved or moved just
somewhere because some may rely on it?
- There's agreement that the item needs further discussion and
updating before introduing a format change
Next Meeting is December 2nd, Meeting is adjourned
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