<div dir="ltr"><div>Hi Dimitris,</div><div><br></div>> I don't think the Registrar needs to necessarily authenticate the CA representative. Some Registrars offer the Domain Contact information publicly. It is similar to the WHOIS process where no authentication is needed by default.<br><br>This example was shared for illustrative purposes only. There was no intended implication to suggest authentication is necessary for communication to be considered “direct.” It would, however, seem in the best interest for the Registry to take reasonable steps to ensure they are only disclosing potentially private information with only those individuals considered authorized to handle it. This, of course, is beyond the scope of the BRs.<br><br>> Equally, the Applicant doesn't need to "authenticate" the CA for the communication to be considered "direct".<br><br>Same as above.<br><div><br></div><div>Thanks!</div><div><br></div><div>- Ryan</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 7:28 AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <<a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr" target="_blank">dzacharo@harica.gr</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div>On 10/10/2024 5:42 μ.μ., Ryan Dickson
via Servercert-wg wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Hi Yoshihiko,<br>
<br>
Thanks for clarifying your question.<br>
<br>
In my opinion, as currently written, the phrase “direct contact"
is not well-defined by the TLS BRs. <br>
<br>
My interpretation of “direct contact" between a CA and the
Domain Name Registrar is a phone-call or email between
representatives of the two organizations, possibly also
involving some sort of automated system.<br>
<br>
To help better describe my interpretation, please see the
illustrative examples below:<br>
<br>
Phone or Email:<br>
- CA representative calls/emails the Registrar.<br>
- A representative of the Registrar authenticates the CA
representative.<br>
- The CA representative asks the Registrar representative to
look up the Domain Contact information for the target domain.<br>
- The Registrar representative looks up the Domain Contact
information by relying on its authoritative database / source of
truth, and shares this with the CA representative.<br>
- The CA representative uses the Domain Contact information as
permitted by the TLS BRs.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
Automated System:<br>
- CA representative submits a form requesting Domain Contact
information from the Registrar.<br>
- The Registrar authenticates the requestor.<br>
<div>- The Registrar looks up the Domain Contact information by
relying on its authoritative database / source of truth, and
shares this with the CA representative (e.g., phone or email).<br>
- The CA representative uses the Domain Contact information as
permitted by the TLS BRs.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
Hi Ryan,<br>
<br>
I don't think the Registrar needs to necessarily authenticate the CA
representative. Some Registrars offer the Domain Contact information
publicly. It is similar to the WHOIS process where no authentication
is needed by default.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div>My interpretation is heavily influenced by language in
the TLS EVGs which, in my opinion, establishes framing for
the communication mechanisms considered by “direct
contact" through phrasing such as “or by direct contact
with the Incorporating or Registration Agency in person or
via mail, e‐mail, Web address, or telephone, using an
address or phone number obtained directly from the
Qualified Government Information Source, Incorporating or
Registration Agency, or from a Qualified Independent
Information Source.” (from 3.2.2.2.2 (“Acceptable Method
of Verification"))<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
Equally, the Applicant doesn't need to "authenticate" the CA for the
communication to be considered "direct".<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
Consequently, I would not consider querying a Registrar’s
WHOIS service to constitute “direct contact.” I further
interpret the WatchTowr report [1] to have demonstrated
flaws with several Registrar WHOIS-function websites.<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
I kind of disagree because the intent of the requirement has always
been to allow the WHOIS/RDAP service to be used in "direct contact"
with the Registrar. I'm sure the Registrar's website was considered
part of the "Web address" language of the EV Guidelines, so
discovering Domain Contact information by using the Registrar's web
site is also considered acceptable.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
If this interpretation is misaligned with others’
expectations, discussion is welcome.<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
I'm sure others can join the discussion as well.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thank you,<br>
Dimitris.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
Thanks,<br>
Ryan<br>
<div>[1] <a href="https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/" target="_blank">https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/</a><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Oct 10, 2024 at
6:27 AM Matsuo Yoshihiko <<a href="mailto:yoshihiko@jprs.co.jp" target="_blank">yoshihiko@jprs.co.jp</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi
Ryan,<br>
<br>
Thank you for your reply.<br>
<br>
I feel like I didn't express my points clearly in the previous
email, so please disregard it.<br>
<br>
I apologize for the confusion, but I have reorganized the
point I would like to confirm as follows:<br>
<br>
I am considering updating our system implementation for
obtaining Domain Contact in light of this revision.<br>
<br>
BR defines the source of Domain Contact as follows.<br>
#1 WHOIS record<br>
#2 DNS SOA record<br>
#3 direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar<br>
<br>
The questions I would like to ask is...<br>
<br>
<br>
Could it be interpreted that retrieving Domain Contact
information from the Whois operated by the Domain Name
Registrar itself falls under "3 direct contact with the Domain
Name Registrar"?<br>
I would like to hear your opinion on this.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
Yoshihiko Matsuo(JPRS)<br>
<br>
<br>
On Tue, 8 Oct 2024 15:10:38 -0400<br>
Ryan Dickson <<a href="mailto:ryandickson@google.com" target="_blank">ryandickson@google.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
<br>
> Hi Yoshihiko,<br>
> <br>
> The definition for “Domain Contact" (unchanged by the
proposal) is: “The<br>
> Domain Name Registrant, technical contact, or
administrative contact (or<br>
> the equivalent under a ccTLD) as listed in the WHOIS
record of the Base<br>
> Domain Name or in a DNS SOA record, or as obtained
through direct contact<br>
> with the Domain Name Registrar.”<br>
> <br>
> The definition for “Domain Name Registrar" (also
unchanged by the proposal)<br>
> is: “A person or entity that registers Domain Names under
the auspices of<br>
> or by agreement with:<br>
> - the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN),<br>
> - a national Domain Name authority/registry, or<br>
> *- a Network Information Center (including their
affiliates, contractors,<br>
> delegates, successors, or assignees)*.”<br>
> <br>
> For the circumstances described in your message, can you
please confirm<br>
> whether the organization operating the CA is considered:<br>
> - ONLY the ccTLD Domain Name Authority/Registry<br>
> - ONLY the Domain Name Registrar<br>
> - BOTH the ccTLD Domain Name Authority/Registry and
sometimes a Domain Name<br>
> Registrar<br>
> - BOTH the ccTLD Domain Name Authority/Registry and
always the Domain Name<br>
> Registrar<br>
> <br>
> Given the definition of “Domain Contact" and its
reference in 3.2.2.4.2,<br>
> 3.2.2.4.12, and 3.2.2.4.15, I believe the distinction
between roles (Domain<br>
> Name Authority/Registry and Domain Name Registrar) is
important.<br>
> <br>
> Thanks,<br>
> <br>
> Ryan<br>
> <br>
> <br>
> <br>
> <br>
> On Tue, Oct 8, 2024 at 7:29?AM Yoshihiko Matsuo via
Servercert-wg <<br>
> <a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>>
wrote:<br>
> <br>
> > All,<br>
> ><br>
> > > The only method relying on identifying a
“Domain Contact" via<br>
> > registration data left by the ballot is 3.2.2.4.12
(“Validating Applicant<br>
> > as a Domain Contact"). This was originally excluded
from the scope of<br>
> > sunsets given the expectation that in cases where
the organization<br>
> > operating the CA was also the Domain Name Registrar
(or an Affiliate),<br>
> > there would be (1) a lower likelihood of unreliable
Domain Contact<br>
> > information given a direct relationship with the
subscriber/subscriber<br>
> > organization, and (2) a higher potential for
seamless certificate lifecycle<br>
> > management because of that relationship. Regardless
of whether this<br>
> > expectation is misguided, nothing stops a future
ballot from contemplating<br>
> > the further improvement or sunset of 3.2.2.4.12
(“Validating Applicant as a<br>
> > Domain Contact").<br>
> ><br>
> > We are the CA, and at the same time we are also the
gTLD Registrar and the<br>
> > ccTLD Registry.<br>
> > In this case, I understand that it is acceptable to
use the Domain<br>
> > Contacts we hold as The gTLD Registrar for DCV.I
would like to hear your<br>
> > opinions on whether the same can be said for the
Domain Contacts we hold as<br>
> > the ccTLD Registry.<br>
> ><br>
> > Note: We require that ccTLD Domain Contacts be kept
current as the contact<br>
> > information for the domain name registrant.<br>
> ><br>
> > With this question, I would like to clarify whether
the BR allows the<br>
> > following cases.<br>
> ><br>
> > 1. The CA that is also the ccTLD Registry retrieves
Domain Contacts from<br>
> > its own database and performs validation in
accordance with 3.2.2.4.2.<br>
> ><br>
> > 2. The CA that is also the ccTLD Registry retrieves
Domain Contacts from<br>
> > the WHOIS operated by the ccTLD Registry (which is
also a CA) and performs<br>
> > validation in accordance with 3.2.2.4.2.<br>
> ><br>
> > Thanks,<br>
> > Yoshihiko Matsuo(JPRS)<br>
> ><br>
> ><br>
> > On 2024/10/08 4:49, Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg
wrote:<br>
> > > Hi Doug,<br>
> > ><br>
> > > > The title, purpose and background of this
ballot define the removal<br>
> > of WHOIS and does not discuss any other changes, but
we’re actually<br>
> > sunsetting other aspects of domain validation while
also leaving method<br>
> > 3.2.2.4.12 that can continue to use WHOIS.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > I feel “Objective 2", included in the
“Background" section, makes the<br>
> > intent to sunset methods clear (the objective's
description is: "/Sunset<br>
> > Methods 3.2.2.4.2 (“Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail
to Domain Contact”) and<br>
> > 3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact with Domain Contact")/").<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Would changing the title to something like
“/Strengthen registration<br>
> > data lookups and Sunset Methods 3.2.2.4.2 and
3.2.2.4.15/" help?<br>
> > ><br>
> > > > I understand the desire to remove WHOIS
based on the recent<br>
> > incident(s), but if we’re going to focus on
sunsetting WHOIS, we should<br>
> > 100% sunset it for all uses and we should not
include the removal of other<br>
> > methods within this ballot.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > All methods relying on identifying Domain
Contacts via registration data<br>
> > are strengthened by this ballot, beginning January
15, 2025. This includes<br>
> > methods:<br>
> > > - 3.2.2.4.2 (“Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail
to Domain Contact")<br>
> > > - 3.2.2.4.12 (“Validating Applicant as a Domain
Contact")<br>
> > > - 3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact with Domain
Contact")<br>
> > ><br>
> > > The ballot goes on to sunset the following
methods, beginning July 15,<br>
> > 2025:<br>
> > > - 3.2.2.4.2 (“Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail
to Domain Contact")<br>
> > > - 3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact with Domain
Contact")<br>
> > ><br>
> > > The only method relying on identifying a
“Domain Contact" via<br>
> > registration data left by the ballot is 3.2.2.4.12
(“Validating Applicant<br>
> > as a Domain Contact"). This was originally excluded
from the scope of<br>
> > sunsets given the expectation that in cases where
the organization<br>
> > operating the CA was also the Domain Name Registrar
(or an Affiliate),<br>
> > there would be (1) a lower likelihood of unreliable
Domain Contact<br>
> > information given a direct relationship with the
subscriber/subscriber<br>
> > organization, and (2) a higher potential for
seamless certificate lifecycle<br>
> > management because of that relationship. Regardless
of whether this<br>
> > expectation is misguided, nothing stops a future
ballot from contemplating<br>
> > the further improvement or sunset of 3.2.2.4.12
(“Validating Applicant as a<br>
> > Domain Contact").<br>
> > ><br>
> > > If there’s a case to make for including
3.2.2.4.12 in the sunsets<br>
> > covered in the proposal, it’s also welcome.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > > The VWG can be tasked to review methods
we think are weak and discuss<br>
> > removing them, for example, imo, all the methods
that rely on phone calls<br>
> > (Domain and IP address both), which to me are weaker
than automated methods<br>
> > like using they SOA record.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > I agree that it’s important for this community
to routinely re-evaluate<br>
> > the DCV methods permitted by the TLS BRs and
consider them against a set of<br>
> > desirable security and operational properties that
best enable subscriber<br>
> > organizations to make securely managing their TLS
implementations “boring"<br>
> > (effortless, routine, reliable, and without
excitement - even when facing<br>
> > the unexpected).<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Periodically over the past three years (when I
joined this community),<br>
> > I’ve participated in discussions where members have
expressed a desire for<br>
> > improved DCV methods, which has included suggestions
to remove perceived<br>
> > weak methods (with those that are phone or
email-based cited as examples).<br>
> > While very few of these discussions have led to
direct action, this ballot<br>
> > presents a proactive opportunity to address some of
those concerns, along<br>
> > with mitigating concerns related to registration
data lookups identified by<br>
> > recent events.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > I do not believe a holistic evaluation of the
DCV-methods permitted by<br>
> > the TLS BRs needs to be a blocking function on this
ballot, and that both<br>
> > activities can take place independently of one
another.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Thanks,<br>
> > > Ryan<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > On Mon, Oct 7, 2024 at 7:35?AM Doug Beattie
<<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com" target="_blank">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a><br>
> > <mailto:<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com" target="_blank">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>>
wrote:<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Hi Ryan,____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > The title, purpose and background of this
ballot define the removal<br>
> > of WHOIS and does not discuss any other changes, but
we’re actually<br>
> > sunsetting other aspects of domain validation while
also leaving method<br>
> > 3.2.2.4.12 that can continue to use WHOIS. Part of
this is the<br>
> > unfortunately extremely broad definition of “Domain
Contact” and “Domain<br>
> > Name Registrant” and the wide scope of 3.2.2.4.2,
which I agree we need to<br>
> > clarify and fix. I understand the desire to remove
WHOIS based on the<br>
> > recent incident(s), but if we’re going to focus on
sunsetting WHOIS, we<br>
> > should 100% sunset if for all uses and we should not
include the removal of<br>
> > other methods within this ballot. The VWG can be
tasked to review methods<br>
> > we think are weak and discuss removing them, for
example, imo, all the<br>
> > methods that rely on phone calls (Domain and IP
address both), which to me<br>
> > are weaker than automated methods like using they
SOA record.____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Doug____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > *From:*Ryan Dickson <<a href="mailto:ryandickson@google.com" target="_blank">ryandickson@google.com</a>
<mailto:<br>
> > <a href="mailto:ryandickson@google.com" target="_blank">ryandickson@google.com</a>>><br>
> > > *Sent:* Friday, October 4, 2024 2:55 PM<br>
> > > *To:* Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com" target="_blank">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>
<mailto:<br>
> > <a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com" target="_blank">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>><br>
> > > *Cc:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG
Public Discussion List <<br>
> > <a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>
<mailto:<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>>><br>
> > > *Subject:* Re: [Servercert-wg] Discussion
Period Begins - Ballot<br>
> > SC-080 V2: "Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify
Domain Contacts and relying<br>
> > DCV Methods”____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Hi Doug,____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Your interpretation of the latest version
of the ballot is correct.<br>
> > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > As currently presented, Method 3.2.2.4.2
(“Email, Fax, SMS, or<br>
> > Postal Mail to Domain Contact”) and Method
3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact with<br>
> > Domain Contact”) are sunset, in their entirety,
effective July 15, 2025.<br>
> > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Specific to domain contact email addresses
from SOA records, can you<br>
> > share your perspective for adding this specific
option given the existence<br>
> > of (1) other email-based alternatives (e.g.,
3.2.2.4.4, 3.2.2.4.13 and<br>
> > 3.2.2.4.14) and (2) other far more heavily relied
upon DCV methods that<br>
> > present an opportunity for improved automation and
scalability (and also<br>
> > benefit from MPIC)?____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > For example, detailing responses below
would be helpful for<br>
> > understanding:____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * existing reliance on this specific
approach in comparison to the<br>
> > other DCV methods offered?____<br>
> > > * how this reliance has trended over time
(e.g., last 1 / 3 / 5<br>
> > years)?____<br>
> > > * how the sunset would affect
subscribers?____<br>
> > > * a general description of the level of
effort for affected<br>
> > subscribers to transition to another method?____<br>
> > > * what barriers exist that prevent
subscribers from transitioning<br>
> > to other methods?____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > I think it’s reasonable for the community
to approach RNAME lookups<br>
> > with the same degree of concern for accuracy and
reliability as<br>
> > registration data due to the potential for:____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * neglected configurations (e.g., in
2020, [1] indicated only<br>
> > 39.74% of a set of “top” 1M domains contained
“reachable” SOA contacts, and<br>
> > only approximately 20% of the sampled .com and .net
domains did).____<br>
> > > * potential CA reliance on third-party
tools with unknown<br>
> > operational characteristics for performing SOA
lookups (the same concern as<br>
> > WHOIS lookups using HTTPS websites).____<br>
> > > * a lack of oversight and enforcement for
ensuring SOA record<br>
> > updates (e.g, accuracy/correctness and
timeliness).____<br>
> > > * use of automated DNS management
solutions that can result in an<br>
> > unintended and/or unknown delegation of authority to
approve TLS<br>
> > certificates, while also representing a single point
of failure (or<br>
> > attack).____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Thanks,____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Ryan____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > [1] <a href="https://mkorczynski.com/WTMC2020.pdf" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mkorczynski.com/WTMC2020.pdf</a>
<<br>
> > <a href="https://mkorczynski.com/WTMC2020.pdf" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mkorczynski.com/WTMC2020.pdf</a>>____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > __ __<br>
> > ><br>
> > > On Thu, Oct 3, 2024 at 9:57?AM Doug Beattie
<<br>
> > <a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com" target="_blank">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>
<mailto:<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com" target="_blank">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>><br>
> > wrote:____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Hey Ryan,____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > The way I read the ballot is that using
domain approver email<br>
> > addresses from SOA records is being removed since
that’s part of<br>
> > 3.2.2.4.2. Should we add a new method specifically
for that, or was the<br>
> > intent to remove that as a valid location to obtain
domain approver email<br>
> > addresses?____<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > Doug____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > *From:*Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org</a><br>
> > <mailto:<a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org</a>>>
*On Behalf Of *Ryan Dickson<br>
> > via Servercert-wg<br>
> > > *Sent:* Tuesday, October 1, 2024 12:59
PM<br>
> > > *To:* ServerCert CA/BF <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>
<mailto:<br>
> > <a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>>><br>
> > > *Subject:* [Servercert-wg] Discussion
Period Begins - Ballot<br>
> > SC-080 V2: "Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify
Domain Contacts and relying<br>
> > DCV Methods”____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > *_Purpose of Ballot SC-080 V2:<br>
> > > _*This ballot proposes updates to the
Baseline Requirements for<br>
> > the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS
Server Certificates<br>
> > (TLS BRs) to address concerns regarding the use of
WHOIS and HTTPS websites<br>
> > for identifying Domain Contacts.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > *_Background:<br>
> > > _*This ballot intends to accomplish two
objectives, originally<br>
> > described in [1].____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Objective 1: Enhance WHOIS/RDAP
validation of gTLDs with<br>
> > comparable security properties to DNS-based
validation and sunset<br>
> > WHOIS/RDAP for ccTLDs.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > _Justification:_____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * A recent disclosure [2]
demonstrated how threat actors could<br>
> > exploit deficiencies in the WHOIS protocol and WHOIS
tools served via HTTPS<br>
> > websites to obtain fraudulent TLS certificates.____<br>
> > > * Discussions within the Mozilla Dev
Security Policy (MDSP)<br>
> > community [3] further expressed corresponding risks
related to WHOIS, while<br>
> > also noting that ccTLDs may not maintain accurate or
up-to-date WHOIS<br>
> > server records. Several examples of inoperative
WHOIS servers for ccTLDs<br>
> > were identified.____<br>
> > > * Discussion in [4] further called
into question the<br>
> > reliability of ccTLD WHOIS servers given, per IANA,
there is no global<br>
> > policy requirement for ccTLD managers to operate a
WHOIS server, and if<br>
> > they do, what kind of information is provided.____<br>
> > > * Solutions to strengthen existing
WHOIS lookup methods were<br>
> > proposed in [5] and are considered in this
ballot.____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Objective 2: Sunset Methods 3.2.2.4.2
(“Email, Fax, SMS, or<br>
> > Postal Mail to Domain Contact”) and 3.2.2.4.15
(“Phone Contact with Domain<br>
> > Contact”).<br>
> > ><br>
> > > _Justification:_____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * While solutions to strengthen
WHOIS-relying DCV methods are<br>
> > considered in this ballot (see above), there is
limited public evidence of<br>
> > significant reliance on these methods, including in
response to [3] and<br>
> > [6].____<br>
> > > * Instead, discussion has identified
at least one CA Owner has<br>
> > already sunset reliance on WHOIS [7], and another
that has changed its<br>
> > approach [8] for relying on WHOIS since disclosure
of [2].____<br>
> > > * More modern and heavily relied-upon
DCV methods offer<br>
> > advantages over the existing WHOIS-based methods,
including greater<br>
> > opportunity for seamless certificate lifecycle
management automation (e.g.,<br>
> > [9] and [10]), while also benefiting from recently
improved security<br>
> > practices [11]. These methods can also more
effectively align subscriber<br>
> > capabilities with agility and resilience
expectations necessary to respond<br>
> > to the revocation timelines described in the TLS BRs
[12].____<br>
> > > * Beyond the above, previous
discussions within the CA/Browser<br>
> > Forum have raised concerns about the perceived value
(e.g., [13]) and<br>
> > security (e.g., [14]) of the DCV methods relying on
WHOIS, further<br>
> > supporting the rationale for their gradual
sunset.____<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > *_Benefits of adoption:_*____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * Enhanced Security: Eliminates
reliance on outdated and<br>
> > vulnerable DCV methods that cannot consistently
provide the security<br>
> > required by the TLS BRs, or benefit from recent DCV
security enhancements<br>
> > (i.e., Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration
[11]). ____<br>
> > > * Increased Agility: Encourages site
owners to transition to<br>
> > modern DCV methods, creating opportunities for
faster, more efficient, and<br>
> > less error-prone certificate lifecycle management.
____<br>
> > > * Opportunity for Innovation:
Promotes the development of new<br>
> > and/or improved DCV methods, fostering innovation
that may enhance the<br>
> > overall security and agility of the ecosystem.____<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > *_Proposed Key Dates:_*____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > The effective dates considered in this
update are intended to 1)<br>
> > address the immediate concerns identified by [2],
and 2) offer near-term<br>
> > and longer-term transition periods for subscribers
and CA Owners relying on<br>
> > existing implementations of these methods.____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * January 15, 2025: (1) Prohibit the
use of RFC 3912 (WHOIS)<br>
> > and HTTPS websites to identify Domain Contact
information. (2) Prohibit the<br>
> > reuse of DCV relying on information obtained using
these technologies. (3)<br>
> > Prohibit WHOIS-based DCV methods for Subscriber
Certificates containing<br>
> > ccTLDs. (4) CAs MUST NOT rely on cached WHOIS/RDAP
data more than 48 hours<br>
> > old. ____<br>
> > > * July 15, 2025: (1) Sunset DCV
Methods 3.2.2.4.2 ("Email,<br>
> > Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact") and
3.2.2.4.15 ("Phone Contact<br>
> > with Domain Contact"). (2) Prior validations using
these methods and<br>
> > validation data gathered therein MUST NOT be used to
issue new Subscriber<br>
> > Certificates.____<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > *_Proposal Revision History:_*____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * Pre-Ballot Version #1 [4]____<br>
> > > * Ballot Version #1 [7]____<br>
> > > * Version #2 Pre-Release [17] and
discussion [18]____<br>
> > > * Version #2 (this version) [19]____<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > The following motion has been proposed
by Ryan Dickson and Chris<br>
> > Clements of Google (Chrome Root Program) and
endorsed by Arvid Vermote<br>
> > (GlobalSign) and Pedro Fuentes (OISTE).____<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > ? Motion Begins ?<br>
> > ><br>
> > > This ballot modifies the “Baseline
Requirements for the Issuance<br>
> > and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server
Certificates” (“Baseline<br>
> > Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.7.<br>
> > ><br>
> > > MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as
specified in the following<br>
> > Redline:<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7f2b54cfa5b89f41458a88211566ce508c464804" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7f2b54cfa5b89f41458a88211566ce508c464804</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7f2b54cfa5b89f41458a88211566ce508c464804" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7f2b54cfa5b89f41458a88211566ce508c464804</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > ? Motion Ends ?<br>
> > ><br>
> > > This ballot proposes a Final
Maintenance Guideline. The<br>
> > procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:<br>
> > ><br>
> > > _Discussion (no less than 7 days)_____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * Start: 2024-10-01 17:00:00 UTC____<br>
> > > * End no earlier than: 2024-10-08
17:00:00 UTC____<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > _Vote for approval (7 days)_____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > * Start: TBD____<br>
> > > * End: TBD____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Comments are welcome either on-list or
with suggested edits via<br>
> > GitHub (preferred) at [19].____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Thanks,____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > Ryan____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > *References:*____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > [1]<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004900.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004900.html</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004900.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004900.html</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [2]<br>
> > <a href="https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [3]<br>
> > <a href="https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U/m/hKJOz3XzAAAJ" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U/m/hKJOz3XzAAAJ</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U/m/hKJOz3XzAAAJ" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U/m/hKJOz3XzAAAJ</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [4]<br>
> > <a href="https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA/m/oDNWxtPwAQAJ" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA/m/oDNWxtPwAQAJ</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA/m/oDNWxtPwAQAJ" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA/m/oDNWxtPwAQAJ</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [5]<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004839.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004839.html</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004839.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004839.html</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [6]<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004844.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004844.html</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004844.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004844.html</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [7]<br>
> > <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [8] <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1917896" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1917896</a>
<<br>
> > <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1917896" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1917896</a>><br>
> > > [9]<br>
> > <a href="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#32247-dns-change" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#32247-dns-change</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#32247-dns-change" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#32247-dns-change</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [10]<br>
> > <a href="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#322419-agreed-upon-change-to-website---acme" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#322419-agreed-upon-change-to-website---acme</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#322419-agreed-upon-change-to-website---acme" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#322419-agreed-upon-change-to-website---acme</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [11]<br>
> > <a href="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#3229-multi-perspective-issuance-corroboration" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#3229-multi-perspective-issuance-corroboration</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#3229-multi-perspective-issuance-corroboration" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#3229-multi-perspective-issuance-corroboration</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [12]<br>
> > <a href="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#491-circumstances-for-revocation" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#491-circumstances-for-revocation</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#491-circumstances-for-revocation" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#491-circumstances-for-revocation</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [13]<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2018-August/000113.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2018-August/000113.html</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2018-August/000113.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2018-August/000113.html</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [14]<br>
> > <a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/2024-July/001995.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/2024-July/001995.html</a>
<<br>
> > <a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/2024-July/001995.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/2024-July/001995.html</a>><br>
> > > [15]<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004825.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004825.html</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004825.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004825.html</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [16]<br>
> > <a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/356799f0dcfe11deb0a375a11233403236ab72c9..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/356799f0dcfe11deb0a375a11233403236ab72c9..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/356799f0dcfe11deb0a375a11233403236ab72c9..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/356799f0dcfe11deb0a375a11233403236ab72c9..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [17]<br>
> > <a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac</a><br>
> > <<br>
> > <a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [18] <a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/9" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/9</a>
<<br>
> > <a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/9" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/9</a>><br>
> > > [19] <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/551" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/551</a>
<<br>
> > <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/551" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/551</a>>____<br>
> > ><br>
> > > ____<br>
> > ><br>
> > ><br>
> > > _______________________________________________<br>
> > > Servercert-wg mailing list<br>
> > > <a href="mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a><br>
> > > <a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg</a><br>
> ><br>
> > _______________________________________________<br>
> > Servercert-wg mailing list<br>
> > <a href="mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a><br>
> > <a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg</a><br>
> ><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
<pre>_______________________________________________
Servercert-wg mailing list
<a href="mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>
<a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg" target="_blank">https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote></div>