<div dir="ltr">Hi Doug,<div><br></div><div>A <a href="https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-June/004705.html">response</a> was provided to the list on 6/27.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Ryan</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Jul 2, 2024 at 7:42 AM Doug Beattie via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div class="msg2869154855584236761"><div lang="EN-US" style="overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div class="m_2869154855584236761WordSection1"><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">Hi Chris,<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">I sent over a question the other day but not sure it made it though the mail system, or maybe I did it the wrong way.  Here it is again:<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">----------------------------<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">Hi Chris,<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">I was taking a closer look at the ballot and specifically this section on caching the remote node CAA checks:<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:0.5in"><span class="m_2869154855584236761ui-provider">A CA MAY reuse corroborating evidence for CAA record quorum compliance for a maximum of 398 days. After issuing a Certificate to a domain, remote Network Perspectives MAY omit retrieving and processing CAA records for the same domain or its </span><strong><span style="font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">subdomains </span></strong><span class="m_2869154855584236761ui-provider">in subsequent Certificate requests from the same Applicant for up to a maximum of 398 days.</span><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">I think understand the first sentence – if you do a full check on a FQDN (the value that you will put into the SAN field), then you only need to do the normal CAA check for that FQDN from the primary node for 398 days.  <u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">I don’t understand the references to domain and subdomains in the second sentence.  Can you explain how this should work?<u></u><u></u></span></p><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><li class="m_2869154855584236761MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left:0in"><span style="font-size:11pt">You do a full MIC  check on <a href="http://www.example.com" target="_blank">www.example.com</a> on day 1<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="m_2869154855584236761MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left:0in"><span style="font-size:11pt">You find CAA records with permission to issue on <a href="http://example.com" target="_blank">example.com</a> on primary and remote nodes so you issue<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="m_2869154855584236761MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left:0in"><span style="font-size:11pt">Day 100, customer wants to issue to <a href="http://shop.example.com" target="_blank">shop.example.com</a><u></u><u></u></span></li><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="circle"><li class="m_2869154855584236761MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left:0in"><span style="font-size:11pt">This is a subdomain of <a href="http://example.com" target="_blank">example.com</a> where we found the records permitting issuance on day 1. <u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="m_2869154855584236761MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left:0in"><span style="font-size:11pt">What checks do we need to do for this request?<u></u><u></u></span></li></ul><li class="m_2869154855584236761MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left:0in"><span style="font-size:11pt">Day 150, Applicant wants to issue to <a href="http://x1.www.example.com" target="_blank">x1.www.example.com</a> (a subdomain of <a href="http://www.example.com" target="_blank">www.example.com</a> we issued on day 1):<u></u><u></u></span></li><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="circle"><li class="m_2869154855584236761MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left:0in"><span style="font-size:11pt">What checks would be required here?<u></u><u></u></span></li></ul></ul><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">Maybe I’m reading too much into this…<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">Thanks!<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">Doug<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><div style="border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org</a>> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Chris Clements via Servercert-wg<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 1, 2024 4:43 PM<br><b>To:</b> So, Nicol <<a href="mailto:nicol.so@commscope.com" target="_blank">nicol.so@commscope.com</a>>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><p class="MsoNormal">All, <br><br>We have considered the communication from CommScope dated May 30, 2024. <br><br>We would like to proceed with a vote on Ballot SC-067 V3 on July 15, 2024. If any SCWG participant has questions regarding the communication or the referenced patent, we encourage them to seek legal counsel.<br><br>Thank you<br>-Chris<u></u><u></u></p></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><div><p class="MsoNormal">On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 4:50<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"> </span>PM So, Nicol via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style="border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><div><p class="MsoNormal">I’ve come to be aware of a granted US patent that <i>seems</i> relevant to the subject matter of Ballot SC-067 V3. The patent is US 11700263 B2 [1]. I don’t know whether the patent has been considered in previous discussions in the CA/B Forum or the SCWG, but I thought I should bring it to the attention of SCWG members, in case it has not.<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">If the patent has not been considered previously, I propose that we extend the discussion period of this ballot so that members have an opportunity to consult with their legal counsel for advice.<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">CommScope expresses no opinion on the patent, including but not limited to its validity and whether it covers the practices introduced in Ballot SC-067 V3.<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Best regards,<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Nicol So<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">CommScope<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">[1] <a href="https://patents.google.com/patent/US11700263B2/en" target="_blank">https://patents.google.com/patent/US11700263B2/en</a><u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><div><div style="border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org</a>> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Chris Clements via Servercert-wg<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 20, 2024 10:30 AM<br><b>To:</b> CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3</span></b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">This Ballot proposes updates to the <i>Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates</i> (i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration” (“MPIC”).</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Background</span></b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from multiple Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as described within the Ballot for the applicable validation methods in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 will require using MPIC.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- This work was most recently motivated by research presented at Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed for years prior as well.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for adversaries to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks against the domain validation processes described in the TLS BRs.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Additional background information can be found in an update shared at Face-to-Face 60 [2].</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Benefits of Adoption</span></b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool domain control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led to the impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][</span><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">4</span><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">].</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of global BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still pose a significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6].</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially reduces the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the integrity of domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8].</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of certificates a day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at Internet scale [7][9].</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure</span></b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers from Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided academic expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed research to support Members in drafting this ballot.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not filed for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to do so in the future.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or with the CA/B Forum.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR statement. Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has granted a worldwide royalty free license to the intellectual property in MPIC developed by the researchers and has made representations regarding its lack of knowledge of any other Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in Discussion Round 1.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">- For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in the Forum in any capacity.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">- Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult their own counsel.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Proposal Revision History</span></b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation Subcommittee collaboration) [10]</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Previous versions of this Ballot</span></b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069).</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">- Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15]. Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072).</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">References</span></b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[1] </span><a href="https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf</span></a><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[2] </span><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[3] </span><a href="https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[4] </span><a href="https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[5] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">  </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[6] </span><a href="https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[7] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[8] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[9] </span><a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[10] </span><a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[11] </span><a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[12] </span><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[13] </span><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5</span></a><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[14] </span><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">[15] </span><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan Dickson of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable (ISRG / Let’s Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly). </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">— Motion Begins —</span></b><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">— Motion Ends —</span></b><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">Discussion (at least 11 days)</span></b><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">- Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">- End no earlier than: 2024-05-31 14:30:00 UTC</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(80,0,80)"> </span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><b><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">Vote for approval (7 days)</span></b><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">- Start: TBD</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style="margin:0in"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">- End: TBD</span><u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p></div></div></div><p class="MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>Servercert-wg mailing list<br><a href="mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a><br><a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg" target="_blank">https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg</a><u></u><u></u></p></div></blockquote></div></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>
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