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> the CA SHOULD implement a Linting process to test the technical conformity of the Certificate to be issued with these Requirements.</div>
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If a CA runs one or more linters during preissuance but chooses to always completely ignore those linters' findings, can that CA claim to be compliant with this (currently draft) ballot language?</div>
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If so, should this ballot be more prescriptive regarding how CAs are expected to handle linter findings?</div>
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(For example, perhaps we could write something along the lines of "The CA MUST block issuance if the linter(s) return one or more 'fatal', 'error', or 'bug' findings, and SHOULD block issuance if the linter(s) return one or more 'warning' findings").</div>
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<div id="divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><b>From:</b> Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org> on behalf of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg@cabforum.org><br>
<b>Sent:</b> 20 May 2024 18:56<br>
<b>To:</b> CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg@cabforum.org><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 - Pre-sign linting</span>
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<span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">CAUTION:</span><span style="color: black;"> This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span></div>
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<h1>SC-75 Pre-sign linting</h1>
<h2>Summary</h2>
<p style="direction: ltr;">There have been numerous compliance incidents publicly disclosed by CAs in which they failed to comply with the technical requirements described in standards associated with the issuance and management of publicly-trusted TLS Certificates.
However, the industry has developed open-source tools, linters, that are free to use and can help CAs avoid certificate misissuance. Using such linters before issuing a precertificate from a Publicly-Trusted CA (pre-issuance linting) can prevent the mis-issuance
in a wide variety of cases.</p>
<p style="direction: ltr;">The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA and endorsed by Corey Bonnell of Digicert and Ben Wilson of Mozilla.</p>
<p>You can view the GitHub pull request representing this ballot <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/518" id="OWAf2ef93fe-9087-fb39-d743-8d10a0805a1f" class="OWAAutoLink" shash="Li7nL0TNcpycrqc/4HFQfRNzigYd0IDCbqp+1FFACu2oEthpn7g35YWuG1/ohzN84JsTsc5GtBDuHDSW6pAxxKxfc/eJrqfCtO1SK7Uom5iFAl/aH+CCf+WwRkA/7cpF0buTe1LmjFDOY73ksauo357XZujP72Dl+YUJ1IrxyQs=" originalsrc="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/518" data-auth="Verified" data-loopstyle="linkonly" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
here</a>. </p>
<h2>Motion Begins</h2>
<p>MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates" based on Version 2.0.4 as specified in the following redline:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/049237e096650fe01f67780b7c24bd5211ee3038...ada5d6e0db76b32be28d64edd7b0677bbef9c2f5" id="OWAb0920ff4-55c1-90f3-2376-bc83229befd1" class="x_moz-txt-link-freetext OWAAutoLink" shash="bwHYYnYTUxfeNb6qJ5LygMm6WaCSiSbUd3KkLFb9b351PA0R/moubdV7FGwQYEhTvw8VTw4vuo/ZNR7nCmOMGpyazgn4dWnsWe2ZcxrCP7OnE7G45XJ5Y9iZuOzhVFcx8f9YQibzef4JmuzF/9z/YnUw0ynwWLYbiaWgXf+YHRs=" originalsrc="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/049237e096650fe01f67780b7c24bd5211ee3038...ada5d6e0db76b32be28d64edd7b0677bbef9c2f5" data-auth="Verified" data-loopstyle="linkonly">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/049237e096650fe01f67780b7c24bd5211ee3038...ada5d6e0db76b32be28d64edd7b0677bbef9c2f5</a> </li></ul>
<h2>Motion Ends</h2>
<p>This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:</p>
<h4>Discussion (at least 7 days)</h4>
<ul>
<li>Start time: 2024-05-20 18:00:00 UTC</li><li>End time: on or after 2024-05-27 18:00:00 UTC</li></ul>
<h4>Vote for approval (7 days)</h4>
<ul>
<li>Start time: TBD</li><li>End time: TBD</li></ul>
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