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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple style='word-wrap:break-word'><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Hi Chris, all,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>I’d like to discuss a few interpretations related to the scope of corroboration.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Case 1: DNS TXT with correct expected TXT value but different other TXT values present on remote perspective<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Suppose the following responses from:<o:p></o:p></span></p><ul style='margin-top:0cm' type=disc><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Primary perspective: TXT with 2 records: a=1; c=2<o:p></o:p></span></li><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Remote perspective: TXT with 2 records: a=1; c=3<o:p></o:p></span></li></ul><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>If the expected random value is a=1, is the corroboration limited to only the “a” TXT record, and not impacted by a difference to the “c” record? <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Our understanding is yes due to the statement “can corroborate the outcomes determined by the Primary Network Perspective”, where that outcome would be “was the primary perspective able to retrieve a TXT record a=1”.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Case 2: DNS TXT with corroboration between remote perspectives only<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Suppose the following responses from:<o:p></o:p></span></p><ul style='margin-top:0cm' type=disc><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Primary perspective: no TXT records<o:p></o:p></span></li><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Remote perspective 1: TXT with expected value<o:p></o:p></span></li><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Remote perspective 2: TXT with expected value<o:p></o:p></span></li></ul><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Suppose the # of allowed non-corroborations is 1 (the primary perspective being the non-corroborating instance). Is our understanding correct that “corroboration” is intended to <i>confirm</i> the value of the primary perspective, meaning that if there was no success obtaining the value on the primary perspective, it can not be corroborated? This is based on the statement “To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective MUST observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.”<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Or is the intention to consider the 3 nodes as the quorum and since remote perspective 1 and 2 corroborate, the expected value is verified successfully? In other words, is the quorum including all network perspectives, including the primary, or only the remote perspectives?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Case 3: CAA returns valid but different Issuer Domain Names from different subdomains<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Suppose the following responses from:<o:p></o:p></span></p><ul style='margin-top:0cm' type=disc><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Primary perspective: a.b.c.domain.com returns ca.com for CAA<o:p></o:p></span></li><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Remote perspective 1: b.c.domain.com returns ca.net for CAA<o:p></o:p></span></li></ul><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>And both ca.com and ca.net are defined by the CA as Issuer Domain Names.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Is the intention of corroboration to only confirm if all network perspectives return a “permission to issue”? Would corroboration also require the contents of the CAA values to match (so ca.com and ca.net would not corroborate)? Would the difference in path building (primary perspective obtains the result from a.b.c, remote perspective obtains from b.c) result in a non-corroboration result? The statement “regardless of whether the responses from both Perspectives are byte-for-byte identical.” Seems to hint at the contents of the CAA values, but maybe this is not intentional.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Christophe<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Chris Clements via Servercert-wg<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 20, 2024 4:30 PM<br><b>To:</b> CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg@cabforum.org><br><b>Subject:</b> [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>This Ballot proposes updates to the <i>Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates</i> (i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration” (“MPIC”).</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Background</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from multiple Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as described within the Ballot for the applicable validation methods in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 will require using MPIC.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- This work was most recently motivated by research presented at Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed for years prior as well.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for adversaries to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks against the domain validation processes described in the TLS BRs.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Additional background information can be found in an update shared at Face-to-Face 60 [2].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Benefits of Adoption</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool domain control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led to the impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][</span><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>4</span><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of global BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still pose a significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially reduces the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the integrity of domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of certificates a day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at Internet scale [7][9].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers from Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided academic expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed research to support Members in drafting this ballot.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not filed for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to do so in the future.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or with the CA/B Forum.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR statement. Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has granted a worldwide royalty free license to the intellectual property in MPIC developed by the researchers and has made representations regarding its lack of knowledge of any other Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in Discussion Round 1.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in the Forum in any capacity.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult their own counsel.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Proposal Revision History</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation Subcommittee collaboration) [10]</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Previous versions of this Ballot</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'>-</span><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069).</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15]. Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072).</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>References</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[1] </span><a href="https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[2] </span><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[3] </span><a href="https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[4] </span><a href="https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[5] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[6] </span><a href="https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[7] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[8] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[9] </span><a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[10] </span><a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[11] </span><a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[12] </span><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[13] </span><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[14] </span><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[15] </span><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan Dickson of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable (ISRG / Let’s Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly). </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>— Motion Begins —</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>— Motion Ends —</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>Discussion (at least 11 days)</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- End no earlier than: 2024-05-31 14:30:00 UTC</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#500050'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>Vote for approval (7 days)</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- Start: TBD</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- End: TBD</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></div></body></html>