<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body style="overflow-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;"><div>Hi Dimitris,</div><div><br></div>My understanding is that the intent was indeed to restrict these to HTTP specifically. That is, the phrase “the only URLS present MUST be HTTP URLs” is intended to preclude the use of HTTPS, and not just to indicate that any scheme which relies on the Hypertext Transfer Protocol can be used.<div><br></div><div>Presumably when 5280 was drafted, the authors were aware of the updates 2817 made to 2616, but chose not to reference those updates. Even if not, I concur with Ryan and my recollection is also that the discussion during SC-62’s formation did include this topic with the consensus (at that time) being that some fields would be restricted to using only HTTP URIs.</div><div><br></div><div>To your original questions:</div><div><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:0100018f153b72fc-053f7204-7d34-4284-89db-bba51e655881-000000@email.amazonses.com"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-style: solid; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;"><blockquote type="cite">Do Members agree with that interpretation? <br></blockquote></blockquote></div></blockquote></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:0100018f153b72fc-053f7204-7d34-4284-89db-bba51e655881-000000@email.amazonses.com"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-style: solid; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;"><blockquote type="cite"><br>If this is the correct interpretation, would it be considered a violation of the BRs if a CA or end-entity certificate contains https:// URL in the id-ad-caIssuers accessMethod ? <br></blockquote></blockquote></div></blockquote></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, at least for certificates issued after SC-62 went into effect (maybe also for those prior, I just haven’t looked).</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:0100018f153b72fc-053f7204-7d34-4284-89db-bba51e655881-000000@email.amazonses.com"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-style: solid; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;"><blockquote type="cite"><br>I'm afraid that this might not be as clear in the BRs as it should be, so if people agree with the above, we should probably update <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#71277-subscriber-certificate-authority-information-access" moz-do-not-send="true">section 7.1.2.7.7</a> (and possibly other parts) to explicitly state that the allowed scheme is "http" and not "https", just like we do for the CRLDP in <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#712112-crl-distribution-points" moz-do-not-send="true">section 7.1.2.11.2</a> . </blockquote></blockquote></div></blockquote></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I’m not convinced a clarification is worthwhile here. To be clear, I’m not opposed, I’m just not sure it’s something CAs are actively getting or likely to get wrong — if some are, then I would instead support such a clarification.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers!</div><div>-Clint</div><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>On Apr 25, 2024, at 5:41 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg@cabforum.org> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div>
Hi Ryan,<br>
<br>
The question is not between HTTP vs FTP vs LDAP but specifically for
"HTTP URL" that could have two schemes "http" and "https".<br>
<br>
RFC 2616 (June 1999) included only "http" and was updated in May
2000 by <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2817">RFC
2817</a> to include TLS Within HTTP/1.1 ("https").<br>
<br>
I hope this clarifies the issue.<br>
<br>
<br>
Dimitris.<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 25/4/2024 3:29 μ.μ., Ryan Dickson
via Servercert-wg wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:0100018f153b72fc-053f7204-7d34-4284-89db-bba51e655881-000000@email.amazonses.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>It's my understanding that the intent of the updates made
in SC-62 were to prohibit any non-HTTP URI. This was discussed
in:<br>
</div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1) at least one historical GitHub <a href="https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/36" moz-do-not-send="true">discussion</a> (referenced in
ballot <a href="https://cabforum.org/2023/03/17/ballot-sc62v2-certificate-profiles-update/" moz-do-not-send="true">preamble</a>):</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<ul dir="auto" style="box-sizing:border-box;padding-left:2em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:16px;color:rgb(31,35,40);font-family:-apple-system,"system-ui","Segoe UI","Noto Sans",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif,"Apple Color Emoji","Segoe UI Emoji"">
<li style="margin-left:0px;box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0.25em"><i>"authorityInformationAccess:
This is a new requirement.</i></li>
<ul dir="auto" style="box-sizing:border-box;padding-left:2em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px">
<li style="margin-left:0px;box-sizing:border-box"><i>BRs
7.1.2.2 (c) notes that it SHOULD contain the HTTP
URL of the Issuing CA's certificate and MAY contain
the HTTP URL of the Issuing CA's OCSP responder.</i></li>
<li style="margin-left:0px;box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0.25em"><i>Some
questions were raised about whether this means other
URLs, other schemes, or multiple URLs can be
included. Similar to crlDistributionPoints, the
ordering of URLs implies processing semantics on
clients, and only particular URL schemes are
supported. Namely, if one of the two supported
access methods are present (CA issuer or OCSP), <b>then
the only URLs present MUST be HTTP URLs</b>, and
MUST be listed in order of priority.</i></li>
<li style="margin-left:0px;box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0.25em"><i>This
prohibits the use of other access methods, as they
are not used in the Web PKI."</i></li>
</ul>
</ul>
<div><font face="-apple-system, system-ui, Segoe UI, Noto Sans, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif, Apple Color Emoji, Segoe UI Emoji" color="#1f2328"><i><br>
</i></font></div>
</div>
<div>and 2) Corey's Validation Subcommittee presentation at <a href="https://cabforum.org/2022/06/06/minutes-of-the-f2f-56-meeting-in-warsaw-poland-6-8-june-2022/" moz-do-not-send="true">F2F 56</a> (slide <a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/attachments/20220608/ea4bb526/attachment-0001.pdf" moz-do-not-send="true">14</a>, <i>"Non-HTTP (i.e., LDAP
and FTP) OCSP and CA Issuers URIs are prohibited").</i><font face="-apple-system, system-ui, Segoe UI, Noto Sans, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif, Apple Color Emoji, Segoe UI Emoji" color="#1f2328"><i><br>
</i></font></div>
<div><i><br>
</i></div>
<div>D-Trust volunteered to propose an update to the BRs to
address the issue in <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1884714#c1" moz-do-not-send="true">this</a> Bugzilla Bug (Actions
Table).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks,</div>
<div>Ryan</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at
3:44 AM Adriano Santoni via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div><p><font face="Calibri">Hi,</font></p><p><font face="Calibri">IMO, including an HTTPS URI in the <b>id-ad-caIssuers</b>
accessMethod is at least a bad practice and very unwise
(if done on purpose), as it may give rise to unbounded
loops, as it is clearly explained in RFC5280:</font></p><div><font face="Calibri"> </font><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div>
<blockquote type="cite"><font face="Calibri">
<pre>CAs SHOULD NOT include URIs that specify https, ldaps, or similar
schemes in extensions. CAs that include an https URI in one of these
extensions MUST ensure that the server's certificate can be validated
without using the information that is pointed to by the URI. Relying
parties that choose to validate the server's certificate when
obtaining information pointed to by an https URI in the
cRLDistributionPoints, authorityInfoAccess, or subjectInfoAccess
extensions MUST be prepared for the possibility that this will result
in unbounded recursion.</pre>
</font></blockquote>
<font face="Calibri"> </font><p><font face="Calibri">That said, whether it amounts to a
violation of the BRs it's a different matter. Generally
speaking, since the requirement for </font><font face="Calibri">the <b>id-ad-caIssuers</b> accessMethod
</font><font face="Calibri">is expressed in the same way
as for the </font><font face="Calibri"><b>id-ad-ocsp</b>
accessMethod </font><font face="Calibri">and for <b>distributionPoint</b>
(see 7.1.2.11.2), therefore if using an "https" URI is
indeed a violation it should be so for all three cases.</font></p><p><font face="Calibri">It should also be noted that PKILINT
contains a validator for checking that the URI in the </font><font face="Calibri"><b>id-ad-caIssuers</b> accessMethod
starts with "http://".<br>
</font></p><p><font face="Calibri">Adriano</font></p><p><font face="Calibri"><br>
</font></p>
<div>Il 25/04/2024 08:10, Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)
via Servercert-wg ha scritto:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div align="center">
<table width="30%" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="2" border="1">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" bgcolor="#ffff00"> <span style="color:red">NOTICE:</span> Pay attention
- external email - Sender is
<a href="mailto:0100018f13e0c532-cd7a8efa-701a-498e-9678-2ba113a48abf-000000@amazonses.com" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">0100018f13e0c532-cd7a8efa-701a-498e-9678-2ba113a48abf-000000@amazonses.com</a>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br>
</div>
<br>
<br>
Dear Members, <br>
<br>
I have a quick question regarding the <span></span>
id-ad-caIssuers <span> </span> accessMethod URI. <br>
<br>
<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280.html#section-4.2.2.1" moz-do-not-send="true">Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 5280</a>
states that: <br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite" style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:4px 0px;padding:0px 0px 0px 16px;color:rgb(29,28,29);font-family:Slack-Lato,Slack-Fractions,appleLogo,sans-serif;font-size:15px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:common-ligatures;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(248,248,248);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">
When the<span> </span>id-ad-caIssuers<span> </span>accessMethod
is used, at least one instance SHOULD specify an
accessLocation that is an HTTP [RFC2616] or LDAP
[RFC4516] URI.</blockquote>
<br>
RFC 2616 does not support https. That was introduced in a
superseded version. <br>
<br>
Since RFC 5280 points to RFC 2616, based on past
discussions about strictly adhering to RFC 5280 despite
the existence of superseded versions, I believe that the
proper interpretation of this requirement is that the
"http" scheme is allowed and "https" is not. <br>
<br>
Do Members agree with that interpretation? <br>
<br>
If this is the correct interpretation, would it be
considered a violation of the BRs if a CA or end-entity
certificate contains https:// URL in the id-ad-caIssuers
accessMethod ? <br>
<br>
I'm afraid that this might not be as clear in the BRs as
it should be, so if people agree with the above, we should
probably update <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#71277-subscriber-certificate-authority-information-access" moz-do-not-send="true"> section 7.1.2.7.7</a> (and
possibly other parts) to explicitly state that the allowed
scheme is "http" and not "https", just like we do for the
CRLDP in <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#712112-crl-distribution-points" moz-do-not-send="true"> section 7.1.2.11.2</a> . <br>
<br>
<br>
Thank you, <br>
Dimitris. <br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
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