<div dir="ltr"><div>It's my understanding that the intent of the updates made in SC-62 were to prohibit any non-HTTP URI. This was discussed in:<br></div><div><div><br></div><div>1) at least one historical GitHub <a href="https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/36" target="_blank">discussion</a> (referenced in ballot <a href="https://cabforum.org/2023/03/17/ballot-sc62v2-certificate-profiles-update/" target="_blank">preamble</a>):</div><div><br></div><div><ul dir="auto" style="box-sizing:border-box;padding-left:2em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:16px;color:rgb(31,35,40);font-family:-apple-system,"system-ui","Segoe UI","Noto Sans",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif,"Apple Color Emoji","Segoe UI Emoji""><li style="margin-left:0px;box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0.25em"><i><code style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,"SF Mono",Menlo,Consolas,"Liberation Mono",monospace;padding:0.2em 0.4em;margin:0px;border-radius:6px">"authorityInformationAccess</code>: This is a new requirement.</i></li><ul dir="auto" style="box-sizing:border-box;padding-left:2em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px"><li style="margin-left:0px;box-sizing:border-box"><i>BRs 7.1.2.2 (c) notes that it SHOULD contain the HTTP URL of the Issuing CA's certificate and MAY contain the HTTP URL of the Issuing CA's OCSP responder.</i></li><li style="margin-left:0px;box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0.25em"><i>Some questions were raised about whether this means other URLs, other schemes, or multiple URLs can be included. Similar to <code style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,"SF Mono",Menlo,Consolas,"Liberation Mono",monospace;padding:0.2em 0.4em;margin:0px;border-radius:6px">crlDistributionPoints</code>, the ordering of URLs implies processing semantics on clients, and only particular URL schemes are supported. Namely, if one of the two supported access methods are present (CA issuer or OCSP), <b>then the only URLs present MUST be HTTP URLs</b>, and MUST be listed in order of priority.</i></li><li style="margin-left:0px;box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0.25em"><i>This prohibits the use of other access methods, as they are not used in the Web PKI."</i></li></ul></ul><div><font color="#1f2328" face="-apple-system, system-ui, Segoe UI, Noto Sans, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif, Apple Color Emoji, Segoe UI Emoji"><i><br></i></font></div></div><div>and 2) Corey's Validation Subcommittee presentation at <a href="https://cabforum.org/2022/06/06/minutes-of-the-f2f-56-meeting-in-warsaw-poland-6-8-june-2022/" target="_blank">F2F 56</a> (slide <a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/attachments/20220608/ea4bb526/attachment-0001.pdf" target="_blank">14</a>, <i>"Non-HTTP (i.e., LDAP and FTP) OCSP and CA Issuers URIs are prohibited").</i><font color="#1f2328" face="-apple-system, system-ui, Segoe UI, Noto Sans, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif, Apple Color Emoji, Segoe UI Emoji"><i><br></i></font></div><div><i><br></i></div><div>D-Trust volunteered to propose an update to the BRs to address the issue in <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1884714#c1" target="_blank">this</a> Bugzilla Bug (Actions Table).</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Ryan</div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 3:44 AM Adriano Santoni via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<p><font face="Calibri">Hi,</font></p>
<p><font face="Calibri">IMO, including an HTTPS URI in the <b>id-ad-caIssuers</b>
accessMethod is at least a bad practice and very unwise (if done
on purpose), as it may give rise to unbounded loops, as it is
clearly explained in RFC5280:</font></p>
<p><font face="Calibri">
</font></p><blockquote type="cite"><font face="Calibri">
<pre>CAs SHOULD NOT include URIs that specify https, ldaps, or similar
schemes in extensions. CAs that include an https URI in one of these
extensions MUST ensure that the server's certificate can be validated
without using the information that is pointed to by the URI. Relying
parties that choose to validate the server's certificate when
obtaining information pointed to by an https URI in the
cRLDistributionPoints, authorityInfoAccess, or subjectInfoAccess
extensions MUST be prepared for the possibility that this will result
in unbounded recursion.</pre>
</font></blockquote><font face="Calibri">
</font><p></p>
<p><font face="Calibri">That said, whether it amounts to a violation
of the BRs it's a different matter. Generally speaking, since
the requirement for </font><font face="Calibri">the <b>id-ad-caIssuers</b>
accessMethod </font><font face="Calibri">is expressed in the
same way as for the </font><font face="Calibri"><b>id-ad-ocsp</b>
accessMethod </font><font face="Calibri">and for <b>distributionPoint</b>
(see 7.1.2.11.2), therefore if using an "https" URI is indeed a
violation it should be so for all three cases.</font></p>
<p><font face="Calibri">It should also be noted that PKILINT
contains a validator for checking that the URI in the </font><font face="Calibri"><b>id-ad-caIssuers</b> accessMethod starts with
"http://".<br>
</font></p>
<p><font face="Calibri">Adriano</font></p>
<p><font face="Calibri"><br>
</font></p>
<div>Il 25/04/2024 08:10, Dimitris
Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg ha scritto:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div align="center">
<table width="30%" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="2" border="1">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" bgcolor="#ffff00"> <span style="color:red">NOTICE:</span> Pay attention -
external email - Sender is
<a href="mailto:0100018f13e0c532-cd7a8efa-701a-498e-9678-2ba113a48abf-000000@amazonses.com" target="_blank">0100018f13e0c532-cd7a8efa-701a-498e-9678-2ba113a48abf-000000@amazonses.com</a>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br>
</div>
<br>
<br>
Dear Members,
<br>
<br>
I have a quick question regarding the <span></span>
<code style="box-sizing:inherit;font-variant-ligatures:none;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:normal;border-radius:3px;padding:2px 3px 1px;font-size:12px;line-height:1.50001;font-family:Monaco,Menlo,Consolas,"Courier New",monospace">id-ad-caIssuers</code>
<span> </span>
accessMethod URI.
<br>
<br>
<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280.html#section-4.2.2.1" target="_blank">Section
4.2.2.1 of RFC 5280</a> states that:
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite" style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:4px 0px;padding:0px 0px 0px 16px;color:rgb(29,28,29);font-family:Slack-Lato,Slack-Fractions,appleLogo,sans-serif;font-size:15px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:common-ligatures;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(248,248,248);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">
When the<span> </span><code style="box-sizing:inherit;font-variant-ligatures:none;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:normal;border-radius:3px;padding:2px 3px 1px;font-size:12px;line-height:1.50001;font-family:Monaco,Menlo,Consolas,"Courier New",monospace">id-ad-caIssuers</code><span> </span>accessMethod
is used, at least one instance SHOULD specify an accessLocation
that is an HTTP [RFC2616] or LDAP [RFC4516] URI.</blockquote>
<br>
RFC 2616 does not support https. That was introduced in a
superseded version.
<br>
<br>
Since RFC 5280 points to RFC 2616, based on past discussions about
strictly adhering to RFC 5280 despite the existence of superseded
versions, I believe that the proper interpretation of this
requirement is that the "http" scheme is allowed and "https" is
not.
<br>
<br>
Do Members agree with that interpretation?
<br>
<br>
If this is the correct interpretation, would it be considered a
violation of the BRs if a CA or end-entity certificate contains
https:// URL in the id-ad-caIssuers accessMethod ?
<br>
<br>
I'm afraid that this might not be as clear in the BRs as it should
be, so if people agree with the above, we should probably update <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#71277-subscriber-certificate-authority-information-access" target="_blank">
section 7.1.2.7.7</a> (and possibly other parts) to explicitly
state that the allowed
scheme is "http" and not "https", just like we do for the CRLDP in
<a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#712112-crl-distribution-points" target="_blank">
section 7.1.2.11.2</a>
.
<br>
<br>
<br>
Thank you,
<br>
Dimitris.
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
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</blockquote>
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