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--></style></head><body lang=en-FI link=blue vlink=purple style='word-wrap:break-word'><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Hi Chris<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Could there be a numbering clash with this ballot and the one being worked on by Ben Wilson?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>“[Servercert-wg] Draft Ballot SC-067: Applicant, Subscriber and Subscriber Agreements - Feedback r”<br><br>As I am not completely sure how ballot numbering should work out, can the numbers be recycled or how that pans out?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>//Antti</span><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div id=mail-editor-reference-message-container><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span style='color:black'>From: </span></b><span style='color:black'>Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org> on behalf of Chris Clements via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg@cabforum.org><br><b>Date: </b>Monday, 18. March 2024 at 17.32<br><b>To: </b>CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg@cabforum.org><br><b>Subject: </b>[Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V1: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives”<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Purpose of Ballot SC-067</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>This Ballot proposes updates to the <i>Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates</i> (i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration” (“MPIC”).</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Background</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from multiple Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as described within the Ballot for the applicable validation methods in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 will require using MPIC.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- This work was most recently motivated by research presented at Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed for years prior as well.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for adversaries to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks against the domain validation processes described in the TLS BRs.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Additional background information can be found in an update shared at Face-to-Face 60 [2].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Benefits of Adoption</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool domain control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led to the impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][</span><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>4</span><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of global BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still pose a significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially reduces the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the integrity of domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of certificates a day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at Internet scale [7][9].</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers from Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided academic expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed research to support Members in drafting this ballot.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not filed for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to do so in the future.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or with the CA/B Forum.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR statement. Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has granted a worldwide royalty free license to the intellectual property in MPIC developed by the researchers and has made representations regarding its lack of knowledge of any other Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in the Forum in any capacity.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult their own counsel.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Proposal Revision History</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation Subcommittee collaboration) [10]</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>Previous versions of this Ballot</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>- N/A, this is the first discussion period.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>References</span></b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[1] </span><a href="https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[2] </span><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[3] </span><a href="https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[4] </span><a href="https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[5] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[6] </span><a href="https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[7] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[8] </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[9] </span><a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[10] </span><a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>[11] </span><a href="https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#0E101A'>The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan Dickson of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable (ISRG / Let’s Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly). </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>— Motion Begins —</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.2.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/41f01640748fa612386f8b1a3031cd1bff3d4f35..6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0"><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/41f01640748fa612386f8b1a3031cd1bff3d4f35..6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0</span></a><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>— Motion Ends —</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>Discussion (at least 21 days)</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- Start: 2024-03-18 15:30:00 UTC</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- End no earlier than: 2024-04-07 15:30:00 UTC</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><b><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>Vote for approval (7 days)</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- Start: TBD</span><o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin:0cm'><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>- End: TBD</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></div></div></div></body></html>