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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple style='word-wrap:break-word'><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>Hi Wendy,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>The intent behind the certificate profiles ballot was that the profile of all allowed certificate types issued from a BR-compliant CA were completely specified within the BRs. Adding a carve-out to allow the issuance of certificates whose profile is not specified and not intended for use outside the CA’s infrastructure would seem to go against that goal.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Is the use of a private PKI not feasible for these internal infrastructure certificates?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Corey<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Wendy Brown - QT3LB-C <wendy.brown@gsa.gov> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, July 19, 2023 3:54 PM<br><b>To:</b> Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell@digicert.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg@cabforum.org><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [Servercert-wg] Draft ballot SC-XX: Profiles cleanup ballot<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>I would not like to see #3 exclusion for Root CAs removed<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Some CA products when a new CA is established, automatically create some internal certificates that are necessary for the operation of the CA including possibly a key pair used to sign audit logs with a certificate signed by the Root CA that can be used to verify the integrity of the logs by verifying the signature. In addition to enabling cert-based authentication for trusted roles needing to access the CA, including for actions like manually instigating the issuance of a subordinate CA certificate or manually issuing a new CRL when there has not been a revocation.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>This change would make it so those products could not be compliant with the BRs, even though such certificates would never be seen outside the supporting infrastructure.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>If the rationale is there are no profiles for internal certificates, then I suggest a better fix would be to add the word public in the conflicting language in 7.1.2, as the internal certificates that have no BR profile should never be seen outside the CA's infrastructure. But removing the allowance would potentially trigger a non-compliance during an audit.:<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><blockquote style='margin-left:30.0pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>“If the CA asserts compliance with these Baseline Requirements, all <b><i><span style='background:yellow;mso-highlight:yellow'>public </span></i></b>certificates that it issues MUST comply with one of the following certificate profiles, which incorporate, and are derived from RFC<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>5280.”<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-family:"Segoe Script"'>Wendy</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Wendy Brown<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Supporting GSA<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>FPKIMA Technical Liaison<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Protiviti Government Services<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>703-965-2990 (cell)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 10:16 AM Corey Bonnell via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Hello,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>While adding support for SC-62 linting for TLS certificates in pkilint, a few issues were identified with the current language in section 6 and 7 of the BRs. To address these issues, I created a draft ballot on Github. The draft ballot text can be viewed here: <a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/SC63..CBonnell:servercert:sc62-cleanup" target="_blank">https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/SC63..CBonnell:servercert:sc62-cleanup</a>.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Chris Clements of the Chrome team reviewed and offered to endorse, so we’re looking for one more endorser to push this ballot forward.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Please let me know if you have any feedback on the proposed language or if you’d be willing to endorse.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Corey<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal>_______________________________________________<br>Servercert-wg mailing list<br><a href="mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a><br><a href="https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg" target="_blank">https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg</a><o:p></o:p></p></div></blockquote></div></div></body></html>