<div dir="ltr">I appreciate the continued discussion, and look forward to hearing additional opinions from the community.<div><br></div><div>A few thoughts below:</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Thank you Aaron, this is very useful information. First off, I am not convinced that the poor adoption of the must-staple extension by Let's Encrypt Subscribers correlates to poor adoption of OCSP stapling in general given that some web servers and many CDNs enable stapling by default. I did find some data to support my assertion: roughly 1/3 of connections made by clients to Fastly's CDN include the <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6066#page-14" target="_blank">TLS Certificate Status Request extension</a>, meaning that a stapled OCSP response is desired.</blockquote><div><br></div><span id="m_-4032697924175552204m_-8089371385559714851m_-5392468801298056975m_5289384595218326577m_-3452395711034007039gmail-docs-internal-guid-eb7b10c0-7fff-27a2-de35-03a708276aa4"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Poor adoption of the “must-staple” extension does not seem limited to any particular issuer’s subscriber population.</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><br></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">I queried the Censys.io dataset to understand usage of the “must-staple” extension across the ecosystem. Based on </span><a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1C0i0pOaI84gNccGzREPOrr5kMfpYkUEr87cBMZ09q_4/edit?usp=sharing" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(74,110,224);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">my interpretation of the results</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">, the “must-staple” extension is only present in approximately .0622% of time-valid TLS server certificates that assert a CA/Browser Forum policy OID (if we assume all pre-certificates have a corresponding certificate). Suggestions are welcome if these queries can be improved to produce more accurate results.</span></p></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The fact that Let's Encrypt continues to see high volumes of OCSP requests - despite my assumption that the most popular browsers have moved away from OCSP checking - is informative and makes me concerned about the effect this ballot will have on Relying Parties (RPs). One might reasonably conclude that OCSP is still heavily used by some clients today and that if this ballot passes some CAs will shut down their OCSP services due to the cost and operational burden. RPs can choose their browser, but not the server certificate for a website they wish to visit. So as a RP, if a website operator decides to use a CA that doesn't support OCSP, the RP would be forced to either (1) download CRLs, (2) switch to a client that supports a non-standardized revocation mechanism, or (3) forego revocation checking. Moving a significant quantity of status queries from OCSP back to traditional CRLs is not a net win for anyone, nor do the other two outcomes seem desirable from the perspective of a RP.<br>There are clear benefits to moving away from [non-stapled] OCSP, but it may be premature to allow CAs to stop operating a service that is still apparently in high demand by RPs when those RPs can't simply choose another CA.</blockquote></div><div><br></div><div><span id="m_-4032697924175552204m_-8089371385559714851m_-5392468801298056975m_5289384595218326577m_-3452395711034007039gmail-docs-internal-guid-ebcf5e9e-7fff-15c7-dd0c-39f94808293e"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">It’s my understanding that today, at least Firefox and Apple products perform “online” (sometimes called "live") OCSP checks by default. Chrome and some other Chromium-based browsers support enabling an optional </span><a href="https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#EnableOnlineRevocationChecks" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(74,110,224);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">enterprise policy</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> to offer similar functionality. These configurations, and others like them, might account for the high volume of requests observed by some CAs. However, user privacy concerns have led to some browsers that actively rely on online OCSP checks to express intent to change future behavior (e.g., </span><a href="https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/1-3-2022-October-Mozilla-Update-for-CABF-Berlin-F2F.pdf" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">slide 7</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">) - meaning existing request volume should drop if all else remains the same.</span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Regardless, despite online OCSP checks being made by some browsers (or other products) today, there’s no guarantee these checks are "used" or provide security value to relying parties (for example, where products soft-fail if OCSP responses are not received within defined time thresholds or return unexpected values). </span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Stapled responses address online checks’ privacy concerns, allow for "hard failure", and should be considered positive. Looking at existing </span><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">publicly available</span><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> data sources, Firefox </span><a href="https://telemetry.mozilla.org/new-pipeline/dist.html#!cumulative=0&end_date=2023-01-24&include_spill=0&keys=__none__!__none__!__none__&max_channel_version=beta%252F110&measure=SSL_OCSP_STAPLING&min_channel_version=beta%252F104&processType=*&product=Firefox&sanitize=0&sort_by_value=0&sort_keys=submissions&start_date=2023-01-16&table=0&trim=0&use_submission_date=0" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(74,110,224);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">telemetry</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> suggests that approximately 8% of connections in Firefox 110 Beta serve a stapled response. I’m unaware of anything that would suggest telemetry from Beta would be significantly different than Stable - or that Firefox user browsing habits are significantly different than those of other browser users. </span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Independent of usage statistics, relying parties can’t consistently depend on OCSP stapling for security unless responses are stapled on all connections. Further, even if the web server ecosystem had improved support for OCSP-stapling and we could require the use of the “must-staple” extension, we’d remain dependent upon robust and highly-reliable OCSP services, which have been an ongoing ecosystem challenge (</span><a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?list_id=16246368&bug_status=UNCONFIRMED&bug_status=NEW&bug_status=ASSIGNED&bug_status=REOPENED&bug_status=RESOLVED&bug_status=VERIFIED&bug_status=CLOSED&product=CA%20Program&query_format=advanced&component=CA%20Certificate%20Compliance&resolution=---&resolution=FIXED&resolution=INVALID&resolution=WONTFIX&resolution=INACTIVE&resolution=DUPLICATE&resolution=WORKSFORME&resolution=INCOMPLETE&resolution=SUPPORT&resolution=EXPIRED&resolution=MOVED&classification=Client%20Software&classification=Developer%20Infrastructure&classification=Components&classification=Server%20Software&classification=Other&classification=Graveyard&short_desc=OCSP&short_desc_type=allwordssubstr" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(74,110,224);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">1</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> and </span><a href="https://sslmate.com/labs/ocsp_watch/" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(74,110,224);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">2</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">).</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-left:36pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">In my opinion, prioritizing the transition to short-lived TLS server certificates (incentivized in this ballot) is a better use of ecosystem participant (i.e., server platforms, site owners, CAs, and certificate consumers) effort and resources with security benefits that go beyond improved certificate status checking (e.g., improved agility, continuous improvement as standards and best practices evolve, improved incident response, etc.). </span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">My opinion aside, giving CA owners the option of choosing whether they continue supporting OCSP beyond the required period described in the ballot may instead present them with the opportunity to pursue other initiatives that improve the security, reliability, and agility of the Web PKI and/or better serve their subscriber community needs -- without constraining CAs who wish to continue supporting OCSP from also doing the same.</span></p></span><br></div><div><br><div><br></div><div><br></div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 1:29 PM Wayne Thayer <<a href="mailto:wthayer@gmail.com" target="_blank">wthayer@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div>Thank you Aaron, this is very useful information. First off, I am not convinced that the poor adoption of the must-staple extension 
by Let's Encrypt Subscribers correlates to poor adoption of OCSP stapling in general 
given that some web servers and many CDNs enable stapling by default. I did find some data to support my assertion: roughly 1/3 of connections made by clients to Fastly's CDN include the <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6066#page-14" target="_blank">TLS Certificate Status Request extension</a>, meaning that a stapled OCSP response is desired.<br></div><div><br></div><div>The fact that Let's Encrypt continues to see high volumes of OCSP requests - despite my assumption that the most popular browsers have moved away from OCSP checking - is informative and makes me concerned about the effect this ballot will have on Relying Parties (RPs). One might reasonably conclude that OCSP is still heavily used by some clients today and that if this ballot passes some CAs will shut down their OCSP services due to the cost and operational burden. RPs can choose their browser, but not the server certificate for a website they wish to visit. So as a RP, if a website operator decides to use a CA that doesn't support OCSP, the RP would be forced to either (1) download CRLs, (2) switch to a client that supports a non-standardized revocation mechanism, or (3) forego revocation checking. Moving a significant quantity of status queries from OCSP back to traditional CRLs is not a net win for anyone, nor do the other two outcomes seem desirable from the perspective of a RP.</div><div><br></div><div>There are clear benefits to moving away from [non-stapled] OCSP, but it may be premature to allow CAs to stop operating a service that is still apparently in high demand by RPs when those RPs can't simply choose another CA.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Wayne<br></div><div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Jan 18, 2023 at 12:31 PM Aaron Gable <<a href="mailto:aaron@letsencrypt.org" target="_blank">aaron@letsencrypt.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr">Apologies for resurrecting a two-month-old thread, but I think it's valuable to address Wayne's questions here about current usage of OCSP.<div><br></div><div>For Let's Encrypt, OCSP is easily our greatest cost. We receive approximately an order of magnitude more requests for OCSP than we do for *all ACME endpoints combined*. And that's after using a CDN to aggressively cache OCSP responses, too. We spent a significant amount of engineering time last year completely rearchitecting our OCSP serving infrastructure in order to scale beyond 200M simultaneously active certificates.</div><div><br></div><div>At the same time, stapling is incredibly rare. We obviously can't tell how many of our OCSP requests come from servers for the purpose of stapling, rather than from clients. But we can look at what percentage of certificates are issued with the "must-staple" extension: over the last 30 days, 0.11% of Let's Encrypt certs have been issued with the must-staple extension. That's not indicative of any kind of widespread adoption, even though the must-staple RFC is over 7 years old at this point.</div><div><br></div><div>I hope this data helps others consider whether allowing OCSP to fall by the wayside will benefit or harm the Web PKI ecosystem.</div><div><br></div><div>Aaron</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Nov 11, 2022 at 9:54 AM Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div>I raised this concern on yesterday's SCWG call and want to mention it here as well: OCSP stapling, when enabled, is a standardized approach to delivering revocation information that is performant, scalable, and privacy preserving. Stapling of course requires CAs to support OCSP, but this ballot combined with the costs and challenges of operating OCSP services disincentivizes CAs from doing so. It was pointed out that this ballot doesn't prevent CAs from offering OCSP and that is a fair point. But it does mean that clients can't depend on it being there, and seems likely to move the ecosystem further down the path of relying on proprietary revocation mechanisms or none at all.</div><div><br></div><div>I would find it very helpful to have some data from CAs* on current OCSP usage levels, and how much of that is stapling. I'd be more comfortable with this change if I knew that OCSP was already essentially "dead".</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div><br></div><div>Wayne</div><div><br></div><div>* Yes I represent a CA, but our services are too new to constitute a meaningful sample.<br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Nov 8, 2022 at 6:56 PM Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><span id="m_-4032697924175552204m_-8089371385559714851m_-5392468801298056975m_5289384595218326577m_-3452395711034007039m_-1333308273746189127m_-3496576485201342157m_-5260207220022456504m_7286848159347329817m_-5314245302272170408m_8172515561054115618gmail-docs-internal-guid-71d07e0f-7fff-00bb-79fa-abe6739cf945"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Hi Martijn,</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"> </p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Thank you for opening up the conversation (and my apologies for the delay in my response)! Responses are inline, below.</span></p></span></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span lang="EN-US">Would you be able to make this into a draft pull request already? That may aid in discussing and adding suggestions directly int GitHub.</span></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><br></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><u></u><a href="https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/402" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Done</span></a><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;font-family:Arial;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">!</span> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><br></span></p><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span lang="EN-US">At the moment, the one item that caught my attention is the proposed removal of having to revoke short-lived subscriber certificates. <br></span><span lang="EN-US"> <br></span><span lang="EN-US">As I understand it, the proposal on the one hand removes the needs for adding an OCSP Pointer and CRLDP into Short-lived subscriber certificates. With the current requirement from several root store operators to disclose CRLs into CCADB (even when not actually included in the subscriber certificates) however, CAs still need to generate and publish CRLs, even for Short-lived Subscriber Certificates.</span></blockquote><div><br></div><span id="m_-4032697924175552204m_-8089371385559714851m_-5392468801298056975m_5289384595218326577m_-3452395711034007039m_-1333308273746189127m_-3496576485201342157m_-5260207220022456504m_7286848159347329817m_-5314245302272170408m_8172515561054115618gmail-docs-internal-guid-f61e7347-7fff-a9c6-ca04-485cf72ee9cb"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Correct. As currently presented in the draft and discussed further below:</span></p><br><ul style="margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px"><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" role="presentation"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">CAs may optionally issue Short-lived Subscriber Certificates</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" role="presentation"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">CAs may optionally revoke Short-lived Subscriber Certificates</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" role="presentation"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">X.509/</span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-3.3:~:text=A%20CRL%20is%20a%20time%2Dstamped%20list%0A%20%20%20identifying%20revoked%20certificates%20that%20is%20signed%20by%20a%20CA%20or%20CRL%20issuer%0A%20%20%20and%20made%20freely%20available%20in%20a%20public%20repository." style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">RFC 5280</span></a><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> describes a CRL as “</span><span style="background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">a time-stamped list identifying </span><span style="background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">revoked</span><span style="background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> certificates that is signed by a CA or CRL issuer and made freely available in a public repository.</span><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">” </span></p></li></ul><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Consequently, if a Short-lived Subscriber Certificate is not revoked, we should not expect it to appear on a CRL disclosed to CCADB. </span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Regardless of whether a CA issues Short-lived Subscriber Certificates, it does not change the expectation of root program policies related to CRL generation and publication. As an aside, it seems reasonable to expect that a CA that only issues Short-lived Subscriber Certificates would sign a CRL with no revoked serial numbers represented.</span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">I do not interpret the failure to revoke a Short-lived Subscriber Certificate to conflict with </span><a href="https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_program.html#:~:text=Effective%20October%201,Apple%20Root%20Program." style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Apple</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> or </span><a href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/#:~:text=Effective%20October%201,Partitioned%20CRLs%22%3B%20and" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Mozilla’s</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> requirements for CRL publication. However, those program representatives are encouraged to share their interpretations to avoid assumptions.</span></p></span><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span lang="EN-US">The proposal to remove the 24 hour and 5 day rules for revocation on these certificates seems to make it completely impossible to revoke these certificates, which seems like another security boundary is being removed.</span><span lang="EN-US"> <br></span></blockquote><div> </div><div><span id="m_-4032697924175552204m_-8089371385559714851m_-5392468801298056975m_5289384595218326577m_-3452395711034007039m_-1333308273746189127m_-3496576485201342157m_-5260207220022456504m_7286848159347329817m_-5314245302272170408m_8172515561054115618gmail-docs-internal-guid-134bd51f-7fff-20c8-ba10-1d7ab9679812"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">More below, but minor clarification - the proposal expresses revocation for Short-lived Subscriber Certificates is </span><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">optional</span><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">. </span></p></span></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span lang="EN-US"></span><span lang="EN-US">I can’t help but think the contrast is very big on this. Are we ready to allow for potential subscriber key compromises and the inability to revoke at all for up to 10 days vs required revocation within 24 hours at this moment?</span></blockquote><div><br></div><span id="m_-4032697924175552204m_-8089371385559714851m_-5392468801298056975m_5289384595218326577m_-3452395711034007039m_-1333308273746189127m_-3496576485201342157m_-5260207220022456504m_7286848159347329817m_-5314245302272170408m_8172515561054115618gmail-docs-internal-guid-f34e71e5-7fff-8218-bbc8-1b6fe9a16bc8"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Thanks for calling attention to this. </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">In my last message, I highlighted that one of the update’s goals was to align the BRs with browser behavior. The proposed changes related to Short-lived Subscriber Certificates are consistent with today’s </span><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">default</span><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> behavior of many, but not all, of the browsers represented in this Forum. </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">[</span><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Disclaimer</span><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">: I cannot and do not intend to speak authoritatively for any of the products represented in the list below other than Chrome. Please call out anything that is inaccurate or misrepresents existing functionality!]</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">For example:</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><ul style="margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px"><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" role="presentation"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">By default, regardless of validity, Chrome does not perform online OCSP or CRL checks for TLS server certificates. Chrome will honor stapled OCSP responses and communicates some status information via CRLSets, a feature primarily intended to communicate the status of CA certificates. </span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" role="presentation"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Edge’s behavior is </span><a href="https://textslashplain.com/2022/08/01/certificate-revocation-in-microsoft-edge/" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(74,110,224);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">similar</span></a><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> to Chrome’s (Chromium-based).</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" role="presentation"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Mozilla’s </span><a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Revocation_Checking_in_Firefox#:~:text=Firefox%20does%20not%20perform%20any%20form%20of%20revocation%20checking%20for%20certificates%20with%20a%20validity%20period%20of%20less%20than%2010%20days.%20That%20period%20is%20configurable%20via%20the%20security.pki.cert_short_lifetime_in_days%20preference." style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(74,110,224);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Wiki</span></a><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> states Firefox “does not perform revocation checking for certificates with a validity of less than 10 days.”</span></p></li></ul><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">We know the above behavior is only true for some user agents. For example, Apple’s default status-checking behavior currently relies on OCSP checks (online and cached). Some user agents offer policies that change the default behavior to enable online revocation checks (e.g., “</span><a href="https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#EnableOnlineRevocationChecks" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(74,110,224);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">EnableOnlineRevocationChecks</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">” in Chrome). For context, across clients where this policy is supported and measurable, Chrome sees it enabled for less than .1% of stable users.</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Regardless of certificate validity, when online checks are performed by default, it is not clear to what extent these checks result in soft failures because:</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"> </p><ul style="margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px"><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" role="presentation"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Response timeouts (e.g., the response is not received within 2 seconds - possibly due to client networking issues or CA-side errors)</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" role="presentation"><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Requesting host is compromised or under active attack (e.g., status request is intentionally misrouted or the response is blocked - and in this case, limiting the corresponding certificate validity </span><span style="background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">could </span><span style="background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">improve users’ security compared to a 398-day certificate)</span></p></li></ul><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">The maximum 10-day certificate validity is aligned with the existing maximum values for CRL nextUpdate and OCSP response validity allowed by the BRs today. It’s possible, through these discussions, we realize the desire to re-evaluate these permitted thresholds (e.g., the CRL requirements have existed since </span><a href="https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Baseline_Requirements_V1.pdf" style="text-decoration-line:none" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Version 1</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> of the BRs). It seems reasonable to correlate the validity of a Short-lived Subscriber Certificate with the nextUpdate / response validity periods - but I am open to other perspectives.</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">It might be compelling to better understand the impact of this proposed change by studying historical data (though imperfect, it might allow us to better imagine future impacts). For example, knowing how often, on average, we see certificates revoked within ten days of issuance - and what percentage of those are marked with a reasonCode of keyCompromise. Given the dynamic nature of CRLs (e.g., revoked certificates falling off lists), this analysis might best be accomplished by CAs.</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">In any event, I’m happy to see this conversation beginning and am hopeful we’ll hear from additional participants (either on the thread or on GitHub) soon.</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(14,16,26);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">- Ryan</span></p></span><br><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Nov 4, 2022 at 7:50 AM Martijn Katerbarg <<a href="mailto:martijn.katerbarg@sectigo.com" target="_blank">martijn.katerbarg@sectigo.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>





<div lang="en-SE">
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Ryan,<br>
<br>
Would you be able to make this into a draft pull request already? That may aid in discussing and adding suggestions directly int GitHub.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">At the moment, the one item that caught my attention is the proposed removal of having to revoke short-lived subscriber certificates. 
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">As I understand it, the proposal on the one hand removes the needs for adding an OCSP Pointer and CRLDP into Short-lived subscriber certificates. With the current requirement from several
 root store operators to disclose CRLs into CCADB (even when not actually included in the subscriber certificates) however, CAs still need to generate and publish CRLs, even for Short-lived Subscriber Certificates.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">The proposal to remove the 24 hour and 5 day rules for revocation on these certificates seems to make it completely impossible to revoke these certificates, which seems like another
 security boundary is being removed. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I can’t help but think the contrast is very big on this. Are we ready to allow for potential subscriber key compromises and the inability to revoke at all for up to 10 days vs required
 revocation within 24 hours at this moment?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><br>
Martijn<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="en-SE"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span lang="EN-US">From:</span></b><span lang="EN-US"> Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org</a>>
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, 1 November 2022 13:51<br>
<b>To:</b> ServerCert CA/BF <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" target="_blank">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [Servercert-wg] Following up: Proposal to make OCSP optional (introduced at Face-to-Face 57)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:12pt;background:rgb(250,250,3)"><span style="font-size:10pt;color:black">CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the
 content is safe.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
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<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Hi all,</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">I am following up on our discussions from last week’s Face-to-Face meeting in Berlin.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">During the SCWG, I shared
</span><a href="https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Fdocument%2Fd%2F180T6cDSWPy54Rb5d6R4zN7MuLEMShaZ4IRLQgdPqE98%2Fedit&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Cfb8f20d33c014483310508dabc07b273%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638029038496783843%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=IxGeR8SIaBoejzGxWJ9wt3QyEGIdkNwLmvDvrN%2F9ni4%3D&reserved=0" target="_blank"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(74,110,224)">this</span></a><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">
 link that describes a proposal for a <a href="https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fservercert%2Fcompare%2Fprofiles...ryancdickson%3Astaging%3Aprofiles&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7Cfb8f20d33c014483310508dabc07b273%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638029038496783843%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=eqcrkqO1V9KOyRP1Bk3bNRhNih4OUq4sYcQ6jLSuxH4%3D&reserved=0" target="_blank">
future ballot</a> that:</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<ol type="1" start="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">Requires CAs generate and publish either:<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li></ol>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p style="margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p style="margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">a full and complete CRL, or<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p style="margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p style="margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">partitioned CRLs (sometimes called “sharded” CRLs) that, when aggregated, represent the equivalent of a full and<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p style="margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"> complete CRL.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:72pt;vertical-align:baseline">
<u></u><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Symbol;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><span>·<span style="font:7pt "Times New Roman"">      
</span></span></span><u></u><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<ol type="1" start="2">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">Requires CRLs are updated and reissued at least once daily.<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li></ol>
<ol type="1" start="6">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">Requires CAs include the corresponding HTTP URI for either the full and complete or partitioned/sharded CRL in<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">the CRL Distribution Point extension of subscriber certificates (i.e., TLS server certificates), with an exception for Short-lived Subscriber Certificates (see below).<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li></ol>
<ol type="1" start="11">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">Makes OCSP services<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">optional<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">for CAs. If a CA continues supporting OCSP, the same requirements apply as they do today.<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li></ol>
<ol type="1" start="17">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">Re-visits the concept of a Short-lived Subscriber Certificate - an<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">optional<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">certificate offering with a validity less than ten days that is not required to contain either a CRLDP or OCSP Pointer. As currently written, CAs may<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">optionally<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">support revocation for short-lived certificates - but they would still be responsible for blocking future issuance to confirmed compromised keys (defined in 6.1.1.3).<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li></ol>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Justification for combining both the proposed revocation changes and the Short-lived Subscriber Certificate discussion into a single ballot is two-fold:</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<ol type="1" start="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">reduce administrative burden in the ballot review, discussion, and approval process; and<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">use of Short-lived Subscriber Certificates reduces CRL sizes, and due to the proposal requiring CRLs - this opportunity<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">seemed beneficial to both CA Owners and certificate consumers.<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li></ol>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Discussion at the Face-to-Face focused on:</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<ul type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">how the proposal impacts offline intermediates that are only brought online to issue test certificates as required<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">by the BRs; <u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">concern regarding delays in user agents consuming certificate status information (i.e., comparing the speed by<u></u><u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">which changes can be conveyed via OCSP versus daily CRLs); and<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li><li style="color:rgb(14,16,26);margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif">the corresponding implementation timeline (currently sharing the same effective date included in the profile work).<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="color:rgb(14,16,26);vertical-align:baseline">
<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></li></ul>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">The doc linked above also contains additional considerations worth exploring (e.g., impact on CT log operators, impacts on other user agents, etc.).</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Beyond the goals and justification described in the doc linked above (e.g., privacy concerns with OCSP, the volume of OCSP-related incidents, and operational costs of running secure,
 highly available, and resilient OCSP services), we see an opportunity to align requirements defined in the BRs with browser implementations (both current and planned). The consideration for Short-lived Subscriber Certificates also presents an opportunity to
 incentivize the use of automation and the issuance of certificates with a reduced validity without requiring either behavior in the BRs. </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)"><br>
<br>
</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Comments, concerns, and volunteers for endorsers are welcome.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Thanks,</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p style="margin:0cm"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(14,16,26)">Ryan</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
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</div>
</div>

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