
<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><div class=""><div dir="auto" class="">It could be helpful to be a little bit more explicit on the fact that the required check is against the modulus<span style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" class=""> only as it </span><span style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">could avoid d</span><span style="border-color:rgb(0,0,0)" class="">evelopers to</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;border-color:rgb(0,0,0)" class=""> implement this check against full public keys, which </span><span style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">can lead to:</span></div><div dir="auto" class=""><ul class=""><li class=""><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class="">Some CAs could </span><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class="">unknowingly </span><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class="">embark themselves in the onerous task of generating the affected key pairs for each different public exponent, which is not really required</span><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class="">.</span></li><li class=""><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class="">Because of the higher amount of work required for supporting/maintaining the check in this way, some CAs </span><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class="">might mistakenly omit checking some subscriber keys, e.g. they might have in their blocklists only the affected public keys with the public exponent set to 65537, even when they (</span><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class="">unintentionally</span><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class="">) support subscriber keys with other values for the public exponent.</span></li></ul></div></div><div class=""><div class=""><br class=""><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, 28 Oct 2021 at 03:02 Rob Stradling <<a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" target="_blank" class="">rob@sectigo.com</a>> wrote:<br class=""></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">


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> I think we can merely state that CAs must check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept. Using a comparison of the modulus (or its hash) is essentially an implementation detail that we don’t need to explicitly mandate.</div>

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Thanks Corey.  That makes sense.</div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">From:</b> Corey Bonnell<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b> Wednesday, October 27, 2021 18:43<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">To:</b> Rob Stradling; Jaime Hablutzel; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">Cc:</b> Christopher Kemmerer<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b> RE: [EXTERNAL]-Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys

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> <span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">Hi Jaime.  Ooh, you're right!  The affected OpenSSL versions generate the same predictable moduli regardless of the public exponent value.</span></div><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

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Yes, that’s great to know; thanks for pointing it out.</div><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

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> <span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">What's the best way to capture all this in the ballot?</span></div><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

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I think we can merely state that CAs must check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept. Using a comparison of the modulus (or its hash) is essentially an implementation detail that we don’t need to explicitly mandate.</div><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

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Thanks,</div><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

Corey</div><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b> Rob Stradling <<a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">rob@sectigo.com</a>> <br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b> Wednesday, October 27, 2021 5:31 AM<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b> Jaime Hablutzel <<a href="mailto:jhablutz@WISEKEY.COM" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">jhablutz@WISEKEY.COM</a>>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Cc:</b> Corey Bonnell <<a href="mailto:Corey.Bonnell@digicert.com" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">Corey.Bonnell@digicert.com</a>>; Christopher Kemmerer <<a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">chris@ssl.com</a>><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b> Re: [EXTERNAL]-Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">Hi Jaime.  Ooh, you're right!  The affected OpenSSL versions generate the same predictable moduli regardless of the public exponent value.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">So yes, the optimal approach seems to be for CAs to use Debian weak key blocklists that are based on only the RSA modulus.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">Corey's point applies if a CA chooses instead to implement a Debian weak key blocklist of (for example) SubjectPublicKeyInfos with public exponent 65537.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">What's the best way to capture all this in the ballot?</span></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class=""> Jaime Hablutzel<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b> Sunday, October 24, 2021 23:25<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b> Rob Stradling; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Cc:</b> Corey Bonnell; Christopher Kemmerer<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b> Re: [EXTERNAL]-Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys

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Hi, I might be (very) wrong here, but, shouldn’t blocklists be based only on the RSA modulus for different key sizes so validation implementations match the module only irrespective of whatever the public exponent is? or does the affected prime generation random

 source seed from the public exponent too?</div>

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On 22 Oct 2021, at 08:58, Rob Stradling via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:</div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">> ...my opinion is that we should introduce a new requirement such that CAs must check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept. CAs are uniquely positioned to prevent the usage of these

 weak keys in the web PKI, so there is a security benefit in mandating such universal checks.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Hi Corey.  Yeah, OK.  You've persuaded me.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">FWIW, my tools at<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_CVE-2D2008-2D0166&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=gZAtYdIgwjZ_F9FpjPlUFmh9SQve9WXOyzZCTDLhsH4&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166</a> only

 support 65537 at the moment.  I guess I'll just have to wait and see if anyone asks for other public exponent values to be supported. <span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif" class="">🙂</span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""></span></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</span></b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Corey Bonnell<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Tuesday, October 19, 2021 19:48<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Rob Stradling; Christopher Kemmerer; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>RE: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys

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Hi Rob,</div>

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Comments inline.</div>

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><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">AFAICT, in the affected Debian OpenSSL versions:</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">  - "openssl req -newkey" had a hardcoded public exponent of 65537 (see </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_apps_req.c-23L768&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=Vu5UXlPv7euZNJXCO15ReMLK_k5MyC3YaUliVn6DQcU&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/apps/req.c#L768</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">).</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">  - "openssl genrsa" defaulted to 65537, but provided a "-3" command-line option to use a public exponent of 3 instead (see </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_apps_genrsa.c&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=MXbwubefERoNQfWd4kC0f7rxRrBl5yB1YZ2Y3OmPQoo&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/apps/genrsa.c</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">).</span></div>

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As you point out, the command-line tooling bundled with OpenSSL 0,9.8 generally restricted the allowed exponent. However, the RSA key generation API allowed any exponent to be specified [1], so it is possible that a custom application passed exponent values

 besides 3 or 65537 to the RSA key generation function.</div>

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><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Are there any good reasons to continue to permit the public exponent 3 ?</span></div>

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Judging from Censys, it appears that there are some publicly trusted certificates containing RSA keys with an exponent of 3, so there will presumably be a (minor) ecosystem impact if an exponent value of 3 were banned. That being said, exponents smaller than

 65537 are outside the SHOULD-level exponent range since BR v1.1.3 (now in section 6.1.6) so perhaps it’s time to consider strengthening the SHOULD to a MUST. Probably such a change would be outside the scope of this ballot, though.</div>

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><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">The "openssl-vulnkey" tool that Debian used to ship only provided blocklists for keys with public exponents of 65537, so should we take that as a sign that CAs needn't perform a

 Debian weak key check when the public exponent is anything other than 65537 ?</span></div>

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While the precedent set by accepted remediations for incidents surrounding Debian weak keys has been for CAs to check the lists distributed in the openssl-blacklist Debian package, my opinion is that we should introduce a new requirement such that CAs must

 check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept. CAs are uniquely positioned to prevent the usage of these weak keys in the web PKI, so there is a security benefit in mandating such universal checks.</div>

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Thanks,</div>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

Corey</div>

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[1]<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_crypto_rsa_rsa-5Fgen.c-23L78&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=BZt9wGuErHLlj4PgA-Q_BWX-TmBE7NrL_QZcjyFCmLs&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c#L78</a></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Rob Stradling <<a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">rob@sectigo.com</a>><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Tuesday, October 19, 2021 11:31 AM<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Christopher Kemmerer <<a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">chris@ssl.com</a>>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>>;

 Corey Bonnell <<a href="mailto:Corey.Bonnell@digicert.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">Corey.Bonnell@digicert.com</a>><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Hi Corey.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">AFAICT, in the affected Debian OpenSSL versions:</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">  - "openssl req -newkey" had a hardcoded public exponent of 65537 (see </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_apps_req.c-23L768&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=Vu5UXlPv7euZNJXCO15ReMLK_k5MyC3YaUliVn6DQcU&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/apps/req.c#L768</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">).</span></div>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">  - "openssl genrsa" defaulted to 65537, but provided a "-3" command-line option to use a public exponent of 3 instead (see </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_apps_genrsa.c&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=MXbwubefERoNQfWd4kC0f7rxRrBl5yB1YZ2Y3OmPQoo&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/apps/genrsa.c</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">).</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Are there any good reasons to continue to permit the public exponent 3 ?</span></div>

</div><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">The "openssl-vulnkey" tool that Debian used to ship only provided blocklists for keys with public exponents of 65537, so should we take that as a sign that CAs needn't perform a Debian weak key check when the public exponent is

 anything other than 65537 ?</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<div id="m_-5641879633787292213m_-1239830060004810024x_x_x_divRplyFwdMsg" class="">

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org</a>> on behalf of Corey Bonnell

 via Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>19 October 2021 15:31<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Christopher Kemmerer <<a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">chris@ssl.com</a>>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span></div>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

Hi Chris,</div>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

Apologies for the late reply. I noticed that the current proposed language has no guidance regarding RSA exponents. I think it would be useful to specify the expectations in this regard (whether the CA must check for weak keys for all key lengths and exponent

 combinations accepted/supported by the CA, or if checking weak key lists for only exponents 3 and 65537 is sufficient, etc.).</div>

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 <br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div>

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Thanks,</div>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

Corey</div>

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 <br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Servercert-wg <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org</a>><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">On

 Behalf Of<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></b>Christopher Kemmerer via Servercert-wg<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Friday, October 15, 2021 10:33 AM<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Rob Stradling <<a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">rob@sectigo.com</a>>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <<a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">dzacharo@harica.gr</a>>;

 CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <<a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">servercert-wg@cabforum.org</a>>; Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <<a href="mailto:jsha@letsencrypt.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">jsha@letsencrypt.org</a>><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:9pt;font-family:Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">Thank you, Rob, and shall watch for that update. Meanwhile we are doing a final-final pass through our draft language for clarity and will send it early next week.</span></p><p style="margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

<span style="font-size:9pt;font-family:Helvetica,sans-serif" class="">Chris K<br class="">

<br class="">

Meanwhile, we've cycled our draft language through  another review and have made IIRC only one or two minor edits for clarity (h/t BenW).</span></p>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

On 10/14/2021 9:49 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:</div>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Today I rediscovered that I'd previously generated the RSA-8192 blocklists back in December 2009, and that they're still available at<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fsecure.sectigo.com-252Fdebian-5Fweak-5Fkeys-252F-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987811664-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DBknvgeWEnZ4pvV0PZHrsqaYgYgzgs4wad1Y3lmy1FWk-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=zzVoaIwOBGmJbK59JUU8ZW6-rpOfDM9LW4-DOaggMQQ&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://secure.sectigo.com/debian_weak_keys/</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">. 

 When I compared the old and new RSA-8192 blocklists, I found that ~0.8% of the "rnd" keys are different.  It looks like, for reasons unknown, the "OpenSSL random file state" misbehaved occasionally over the 8 month run that ended recently.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">I'll report back once I've regenerated and verified the problematic keys.</span></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Rob Stradling<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><rob@sectigo.com></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>23 September 2021 19:17<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Christopher Kemmerer<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><chris@ssl.com></a>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos

 (HARICA)<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><dzacharo@harica.gr></a>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg@cabforum.org></a>;

 Jacob Hoffman-Andrews<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:jsha@letsencrypt.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><jsha@letsencrypt.org></a>; Rob Stradling<a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><rob@sectigo.com></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">> BTW, in case it helps, I'm about half way through generating a full set of RSA-8192 Debian weak keys, which (when complete) I'll add to the<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987811664-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DhEYtpXP81bOYFl0bdDSzbg8zxn7gozJ2bXAzE3ZPLwQ-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=CZuzMqYs2tJKnr9PUCkV8xEr-EQLZuEnpygT0nUUNYQ&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166</span></a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">repositories.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">It took nearly 8 months (using just a single core of a fairly modest CPU), but it finally finished!  Repositories updated.</span></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Servercert-wg<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org></a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>on

 behalf of Rob Stradling via Servercert-wg<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg@cabforum.org></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>13 May 2021 15:42<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Christopher Kemmerer<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><chris@ssl.com></a>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos

 (HARICA)<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><dzacharo@harica.gr></a>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg@cabforum.org></a>;

 Jacob Hoffman-Andrews<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:jsha@letsencrypt.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><jsha@letsencrypt.org></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">> iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA up to and including 4096 bits;</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">> For Debian weak keys not covered above, the CA SHALL take actions to minimize the probability of certificate issuance.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Hi Christopher.  What sort of "actions" are envisaged here?  If a CA is processing a certificate request that contains a (for example) RSA-4088 public key (i.e., a key size not covered by an available Debian weak list), either

 the CA is going to issue the cert or they're not.  What, concretely, does "minimize the probability of certificate issuance" actually mean?</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Why not remove that "SHALL" sentence and change point iii to: "<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;background-color:white;color:black" class="">iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA." ?</span></span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">BTW, in case it helps, I'm about half way through generating a full set of RSA-8192 Debian weak keys, which (when complete) I'll add to the<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987821618-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D34YXT3egxh7Xtc5k5gqy8idcbz9cgokAIz7o8Xwbh94-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=taqinDAOLRdSvETy9ob78hR_-KPxttqWcUNY_M86mTY&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> repositories.</span></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Christopher Kemmerer<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><chris@ssl.com></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>13 May 2021 15:12<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Rob Stradling<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><rob@sectigo.com></a>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos

 (HARICA)<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><dzacharo@harica.gr></a>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg@cabforum.org></a>;

 Jacob Hoffman-Andrews<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:jsha@letsencrypt.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><jsha@letsencrypt.org></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Hello,</span></p>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">We deeply appreciate the useful discussion in this thread regarding this issue. We especially applaud the efforts of HARICA and Sectigo to independently generate more comprehensive lists of potentially affected Debian weak

 keys. As Rob Stradling observed through his crt.sh research (20210107,</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgist.github.com-252Frobstradling-252Fa5590b6a13218fe561dcb5d5c67932c5-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987821618-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DQXz4cOmARv-252Fg8-252FJF2NNEW2-252BSbjHJu1pv8X6vjLCx7io-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=EARvfcpJ6O_cJ0KioLW9U0gNj00u2-_njjGSKcTRtE8&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://gist.github.com/robstradling/a5590b6a13218fe561dcb5d5c67932c5</a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">)

 of the five most utilized algorithm/key size populations, two are ECC (so not impacted by the Debian weak key issue) and three are RSA (2048, 4096, and 3072 bit length, in that order).</span></p>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">As of their most recent messages it appears that these two organizations have independently generated comprehensive lists identifying all RSA-2048 and -4096 bit length keys. (We understand RSA-3072 length keys are also available.)

 This offers the possibility that complete lists, if accepted as authoritative, could be accessed by the community to help prevent exploitation of this vulnerability.</span></p>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">It was also noted (by the representative from Let's Encrypt) that the ROCA vulnerability is presently identified through use of a tool supported externally. It was suggested that this resource be archived in a manner that

 ensures availability. (Our proposed language points to "</span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252Fcrocs-2Dmuni-252F-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987831575-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DZQMlATqs-252BM7Vr3aIgjdrH06gaOrkgAPTbMkM4gcSROs-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=goTnhfES-zV16ifNjJ90Y_GUk39wftGwqMJiZKuw5aY&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://github.com/crocs-muni/</a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">roca

 or equivalent.")</span></p>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">We think our present ballot language (reproduced at the end of this message) provides appropriately focused guidance to CAs. If available, we'd certainly like to also see the HARICA/Sectigo lists (which CAs could use for

 the majority of Debian weak key use cases) captured somewhere in this ballot language. We are agnostic as to 1) where exactly these resources might be maintained and 2) where this ballot places directions to these resources - an annex to the current requirements,

 a separate CA/BF guidance document or within Sections <a href="http://4.9.1.1/6.1.1.3" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">4.9.1.1/6.1.1.3</a>.</span></p>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Our intent is to ensure that 1) clear, accurate guidance on CA expectations is provided and 2) any resources assisting CAs in meeting these expectations are fully described, publicly available (somewhere) and with reliable

 links provided. The language below, we feel, meets the first requirement. We'd appreciate input on how to best meet the second. (Note that</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__ssl.com_&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=j-4qIhXvNMe9dfS8B8CWq0sSP-IOQRNSRmpjiPXIFZw&m=JnxStoHpP62BM2-15Vtby3qBQbCdQrSyCNPjVNH_IS8&s=SGnteTNpPS1X4ickvt5qbC2WDrpValWXK42R9uvwO04&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">SSL.com</a></span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">would

 be happy to support the community by hosting any of these as publicly accessible resources, whether solo or alongside other organizations.)</span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Chris K</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__ssl.com_&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=j-4qIhXvNMe9dfS8B8CWq0sSP-IOQRNSRmpjiPXIFZw&m=JnxStoHpP62BM2-15Vtby3qBQbCdQrSyCNPjVNH_IS8&s=SGnteTNpPS1X4ickvt5qbC2WDrpValWXK42R9uvwO04&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">SSL.com</a></span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">=====</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">--- Motion Begins ---</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version 1.7.4:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Proposed ballot language:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""><b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate</b></span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Replace:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber’s Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fwiki.debian.org-252FSSLkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987831575-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DpXeTXYoS8oYMQteThIRSdhISQokGG4nL-252BHSymGxAwPg-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=ZtytHt-KbbrRxo2oN_oCa2ihhQEPcupL52pOSa3xs9U&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys</a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">)</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">With:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber’s Private Key (such as those identified in 6.1.1.3(4)).</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">---</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""><b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">6.1.1.3. Subscriber Key Pair Generation</b></span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Replace:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more of the following conditions are met:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">1. The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth in Section 6.1.5 and/or Section 6.1.6;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">2. There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">3. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Applicant's Private Key to compromise;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">4. The CA has previously been made aware that the Applicant's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of Section 4.9.1.1;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">5. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method to easily compute the Applicant's Private Key based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fwiki.debian.org-252FSSLkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987831575-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DpXeTXYoS8oYMQteThIRSdhISQokGG4nL-252BHSymGxAwPg-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=ZtytHt-KbbrRxo2oN_oCa2ihhQEPcupL52pOSa3xs9U&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys</a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">).</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

</div>

</div>

<div class=""><p style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

</div>

<div class="">

<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;" class="">

<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">With:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more of the following occurs:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">1) The requested Public Key does not meet the requirements set forth in Sections 6.1.5 and/or 6.1.6;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">2) The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">3) The CA has previously been made aware that the Subscriber's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of Section 4.9.1.1;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">4) The Public Key corresponds to an industry demonstrated weak Private Key, in particular:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">a) In the case of ROCA vulnerability, the CA SHALL reject keys identified by the tools available at</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252Fcrocs-2Dmuni-252Froca-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987841531-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DpVWa4-252Fu9mO6gfEAN2FHOMx83i-252FGSUcG-252BfzyDoHm1xKs-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=6j9rei_kmtaqpNr-93i7Jp1C7q5YNaJtJJ2z3Rn5FzE&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://github.com/crocs-muni/roca</a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">or

 equivalent.</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">b) In the case of Debian weak keys (</span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fwiki.debian.org-252FSSLkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987841531-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DfJSWwzvoeepBzwSexsg-252FFSKZKusdynxlt-252F1gItUiii0-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=7VJmjfUviaQVQ3rIxm7xE-dFcYL1TLUk2yNWY4hFx0U&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys</a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">),

 the CA SHALL reject at least keys generated by the flawed OpenSSL version with the combination of the following parameters:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">i) Big-endian 32-bit, little-endian 32-bit, and little-endian 64-bit architecture;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">ii) Process ID of 0 to 32767, inclusive;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA up to and including 4096 bits;</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">iv) rnd, nornd, and noreadrnd OpenSSL random file state.</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">For Debian weak keys not covered above, the CA SHALL take actions to minimize the probability of certificate issuance.</span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></div>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">--- Motion Ends ---</span></div>

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On 1/18/2021 3:34 PM, Rob Stradling wrote:</div>

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<blockquote style="margin-top:5pt;margin-bottom:5pt" class="">

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">> I'm mid-way through generating the RSA-4096 keys.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">The RSA-4096 private keys and blocklists are now in<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fprivate-5Fkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987851488-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3Dt2XnHbMAXRIJHGzz-252BLi4gptSfi957l-252Fkz5fcaUc4PxA-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=iSbz-XCr-uFk_7Y8gJ0DA2ii9QYdRcBI5WcrvGeE55Q&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> and</span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fopenssl-5Fblocklists-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987851488-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D-252B-252Fmznq3F0GbWZjrE1G08DqSXBOxYTLtIF1l7pLatjoU-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=-tHYY-qeEG6kULte0FSWXNcttvh6n3BUnjh8PTDXi-c&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/openssl_blocklists</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">The RSA-2048 and RSA-4096 private keys in </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FHARICA-2Dofficial-252Fdebian-2Dweak-2Dkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987861437-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DFb5kG1Ob413KX19BP-252B37xpIahSiKi2FIZ5NfuZ-252FkuPU-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=_lfhBqavAtNpmBCedDWRhR5JY_praNbAngJx0m7i14E&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/HARICA-official/debian-weak-keys</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> (which

 only covers 2 of the 3 word size / endianness combinations) are identical to the equivalents in </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fprivate-5Fkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987861437-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DoDDkulWGG70BklQLLMR0GsX-252FRIy20y-252FKtw9gGijGyhE-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=yAkqXLZo2IvXlCZvKvbFvweWp1zicZGNjpQ-S6gHQbY&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">.</span></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><dzacharo@harica.gr></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>14 January 2021 18:39<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Rob Stradling<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><rob@sectigo.com></a>; CA/B Forum Server

 Certificate WG Public Discussion List<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg@cabforum.org></a>; Jacob Hoffman-Andrews<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:jsha@letsencrypt.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><jsha@letsencrypt.org></a>;

 Christopher Kemmerer<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><chris@ssl.com></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span></div>

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On 14/1/2021 12:30 π.μ., Rob Stradling wrote:</div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Thanks Dmitris.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">So far I've generated the RSA-2048 and RSA-3072 keys using<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fkey-5Fgenerator-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987871399-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D4kKGwenlWGRmGjkIWofWWWnykgyNAgmJj1knMJ9PFz4-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=NAsWm8iu6UPJcqogRr7ZHylAINg9o87jFWyCbM_GxlE&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/key_generator</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> and

 uploaded them to<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fprivate-5Fkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987871399-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DDS2Fb707J-252BWD3UlBsOMtUWBl-252B5JkoU3S9twMJn8eSps-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=wLahGmkoShePVAd3354Vg-KIUIG_bUnevY1465It5Jk&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">,

 and I've generated the corresponding blocklists and uploaded them to<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fopenssl-5Fblocklists-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987871399-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DJtYLdAD8pwpvivoIfMXAeEjofoK0FqoijWEb4Sc9OV4-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=NrxlbUT4xWxoifiZhepNwMg-9wFwdQwvVmKKxNVBuk8&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/openssl_blocklists</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">. 

 My RSA-2048 blocklists exactly match the ones from the original Debian openssl-blacklist package.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">I'm mid-way through generating the RSA-4096 keys.</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Let's compare keys when we're both done. <span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif" class="">🙂</span></div>

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<div class=""><p style="margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

<br class="">

Certainly :-) the RSA-2048 keys already match the fingerprints from the openssl-blacklist Debian package.<br class="">

<br class="">

We did this work several months ago but never found the time to make it publicly available. We managed to break down the big task and run jobs in parallel which made things a bit more interesting.<br class="">

<br class="">

It's nice we did this independently, I guess it increases the accuracy level of the resulted keys :)<br class="">

<br class="">

<br class="">

Cheers,<br class="">

Dimitris.</p>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><dzacharo@harica.gr></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>13 January 2021 21:49<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Rob Stradling<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:rob@sectigo.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><rob@sectigo.com></a>; CA/B Forum Server

 Certificate WG Public Discussion List<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg@cabforum.org></a>; Jacob Hoffman-Andrews<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:jsha@letsencrypt.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><jsha@letsencrypt.org></a>;

 Christopher Kemmerer<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><chris@ssl.com></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span></div>

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Dear friends,<br class="">

<br class="">

HARICA has generated the weak keys (RSA 2048 and 4096 bit lengths) from the vulnerable openssl package. We will generate 3072 bit keys as well and add them soon. The methodology is described in the following GitHub repo along with the produced keys:</div>

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<ul type="disc" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-top:0in" class="">

<li style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">

<a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FHARICA-2Dofficial-252Fdebian-2Dweak-2Dkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987881346-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D61WsoKxsDa5-252FjBab75Y-252FZG4PbcoE3RVkCWg-252BsfY2Aww-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=dWL9G_dD07M3-kQ4faHXjdMzoGF9wF5hEGlN2IrPwiA&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class="">https://github.com/HARICA-official/debian-weak-keys</a></li></ul><p style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12pt;margin-left:0in" class="">

Please review and let us know if you spot any issues or problems with our approach and methodology.<br class="">

<br class="">

As always, please use other people's work at your own risk.<br class="">

<br class="">

<br class="">

Dimitris.</p>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

On 7/1/2021 2:25 μ.μ., Rob Stradling via Servercert-wg wrote:</div>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">I've used crt.sh to produce a survey of key algorithms/sizes in currently unexpired, publicly-trusted server certificates:</span></div>

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<a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgist.github.com-252Frobstradling-252Fa5590b6a13218fe561dcb5d5c67932c5-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987881346-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D4qveGxYahVQ6FbihVosw69bsGUs7hG1ytgI6YLxqYbY-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=0JiuTeERFFPZRGiB5foBRJZ5kJjHk51DCLjQbBVwSxc&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://gist.github.com/robstradling/a5590b6a13218fe561dcb5d5c67932c5</span></a></div>

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<div class=""><p style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;margin:0in" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">The four most popular choices are no surprise: RSA-2048, P-256, RSA-4096, and P-384.  openssl-blacklist covers RSA-2048 and RSA-4096, and ECC keys are implicitly not Debian weak keys.</span></div>

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<div class=""><p style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;margin:0in" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Fifth most popular is RSA-3072, with over 3 million unexpired, publicly-trusted server certs.  openssl-blacklist doesn't cover RSA-3072, but ISTM that this is a key size that CAs will want to permit.</span></div>

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<div class=""><p style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;margin:0in" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<div class=""><div style="margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">

<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Some of the lesser used key sizes are mostly likely due to Subscriber typos (e.g., 2408 and 3048 were probably intended to be 2048, 4048 was probably intended to be either 2048 or 4096, etc), but some of the other ones look like

 they were deliberately chosen (e.g., 2432 is 2048+384).  Is it worth generating Debian weak keys/blocklists for any of these key sizes?</span></div>

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<span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span></p>

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<a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fnvlpubs.nist.gov-252Fnistpubs-252FSpecialPublications-252FNIST.SP.800-2D57pt1r5.pdf-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987891313-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DrG1bgcAgL7P3RtCaCJ0cZTcYPkcUhTlsR4J6ulGFgso-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=zehaaELHzHzxLDM3dCTeAYaSLMufH4svdbHT74RDcq0&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> (Table

 4, p59) permits RSA-2048 until the end of 2030, whereas </span><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fwww.sogis.eu-252Fdocuments-252Fcc-252Fcrypto-252FSOGIS-2DAgreed-2DCryptographic-2DMechanisms-2D1.2.pdf-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987891313-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DgCbutfTj362g-252BHqbrbYgcpm5etqbhCvUFpp8E2UYinE-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=2FZ19CpL6_a-dWd0zh1d-4HiMpn4pWyZ0lsH3f1k140&e=" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">https://www.sogis.eu/documents/cc/crypto/SOGIS-Agreed-Cryptographic-Mechanisms-1.2.pd

 f</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> permits RSA-2048 only until the end of 2025.  It is of course possible that quantum computing will render RSA obsolete before Subscribers need to think about which larger RSA keysize they want to migrate to; however,

 it seems prudent to also plan for the possibility that RSA will survive and that some other RSA keysize(s) might become popular.</span></div>

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<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">From:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Servercert-wg<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg-bounces@cabforum.org></a><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>on

 behalf of Rob Stradling via Servercert-wg<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg@cabforum.org></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Sent:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>06 January 2021 16:08<br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">To:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Jacob Hoffman-Andrews<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:jsha@letsencrypt.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><jsha@letsencrypt.org></a>;

 Christopher Kemmerer<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:chris@ssl.com" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><chris@ssl.com></a>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List<span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span><a href="mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" target="_blank" class=""><servercert-wg@cabforum.org></a><br class="">

<b style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class="">Subject:</b><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif" class=""> </span>Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys</div>

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<span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:black" class="">CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span></div>

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