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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 30/4/2021 6:46 μ.μ., Ryan Sleevi
wrote:<br>
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<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CACvaWvaOoX2hSMYGKnfVP03UNvi5b1Uvkd0z27_oH7NhWoWdSA@mail.gmail.com">
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0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div> <span style="font-family:sans-serif">I think the design
contains several components that need to be analyzed
independently to see where the Publicly Trusted Certificates
apply, for which components and for which functions.</span></div>
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<div>I'm not sure what you're referring to here? The proposal only
covers it in two scenarios (a server certificate and a client
certificate). Were you seeing other scenarios?</div>
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I'm sure you read the proposal and the various components. I just
wanted to see how different certificates are used in the design and
in various components. The design includes:<br>
<ul>
<li>Country Signing Certificate Authorities</li>
<li>Gateways</li>
<li>Trust Anchor certificates</li>
<li>NB CSCA certificates<br>
</li>
<li>TLS server certificates for DGCG <br>
</li>
<li>NB TLS client certificates<br>
</li>
</ul>
<p>IMHO we should first try to understand how this design is
supposed to work in order to propose changes. From a first look,
it looks like a closed system and PTCs are not justified. However,
we might be missing something like how the DGCs could be verified
by anyone through the public Internet.</p>
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