<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/2/2021 6:58 μ.μ., Ryan Sleevi
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CACvaWvaCzcAf7+UbHAS=--7fTi5-sXVBmjQHJTeCm+GwRbJwgg@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 11:55
AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <<a
href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr" moz-do-not-send="true">dzacharo@harica.gr</a>>
wrote:</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div> I thought about this a bit differently, not for the
"delegation" as you frame it but contacting the chain of
authority to the "owner" of the IP address. The "owner" of
the IP address would be easily contacted if the "owner"
was to request a Certificate using validation per
3.2.2.5.2. While I understand the call to "TLS Certificate
issuance" delegation scope, as has been baked into the CAA
DNS records, this change I proposed has the same security
properties as the forward name lookups for a Domain Name
which is currently allowed and no security risks have been
documented or concerns raised. The same delegation scope
issue applies for existing WHOIS/RDAP queries for
Technical or Administrative Registrant contact email
addresses/phone numbers that is widely used for 3.2.2.4.2
and 3.2.2.4.15.<br>
<br>
I see no different security risks compared to the existing
requirement that applies to 3.2.2.4.2. Do others share the
same interpretation?<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>No, I think you're missing something very important.
Perhaps we should take it up on the next validation call,
because the security properties are meaningfully different.</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
Sounds good.<br>
<br>
Thanks.<br>
<br>
</body>
</html>