<div dir="ltr">I'm not sure - can you explain why you think putting it in 4.9 would be consistent with 3647?<div><br></div><div>I think the goal is to have a consistent place that all Subscribers and Relying Parties can expect things. 3647 provides for that in Section 1.4. I'm not sure why we'd want to permit and/or - that seems like it creates more work for everyone?</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 8:07 AM, Adriano Santoni <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:adriano.santoni@staff.aruba.it" target="_blank">adriano.santoni@staff.aruba.it</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<p><font face="Calibri">More explicitly, with reference to RFC 3647,
I'd suggest that a description of what the CA means by "misuse"
(or an equivalent term or expression) should be found in §1.4
and/or §4.9 of the CA's CPS.</font><br>
</p><div><div class="h5">
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<div class="m_2117719529880221145moz-cite-prefix">Il 08/06/2018 13:52, Ryan Sleevi ha
scritto:<br>
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<div dir="ltr">Could you expand a bit more?
<div><br>
</div>
<div>One of the concerns raised by multiple browsers, but
particularly articulated by Wayne, was that CAs are
documenting things all over, and so it's difficult for
consumers to know where it will be documented. Do you
currently document it, and in a different section?</div>
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<div>It was an explicit goal of Ballot 217 to ensure that CAs
are following the 3647 format, and as Moudrick highlighted,
that's already got a dedicated section for that purpose. If
you did want to place information in additional places, that's
certainly possible - but it means your example 1.4.2 would say
something like</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>"Certificates issued under this policy shall not be used
for hazardous environments requiring fail-safe controls,
including without limitation, the design, construction,
maintenance or operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft
navigation or communication systems, air traffic control, and
life support or weapons systems. Further, certificates issued
under this policy may not be used for the purposes defined in
Appendix A"</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Does that sound... reasonable?</div>
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<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 7:37 AM, Adriano
Santoni <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:adriano.santoni@staff.aruba.it" target="_blank">adriano.santoni@staff.aruba.<wbr>it</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
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<p><font face="Calibri">I'd prefer not to restrict the
sections of the CA's CP/CPS where the definition of
"misuse" (or "misused") is to be found:</font></p>
<p>4.9.1.1 (future)<br>
"4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was
misused, as defined by the CA's CP/CPS;"<br>
</p>
<span> <br>
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<div class="m_2117719529880221145m_-1831669406125017777moz-cite-prefix">Il
08/06/2018 12:54, Ryan Sleevi ha scritto:<br>
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<blockquote type="cite">
<div>4.9.1.1 (future)</div>
<div>"4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate
was misused, as defined by Section 1.4.1 and 1.4.2
of the CA's CP/CPS;"</div>
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