<div dir="ltr">Right, my goal in raising this issue was to make sure that there's a consistent understanding - between Subscribers, Root Stores, Relying Parties, and CAs - as to what Misuse is.<div><br></div><div>The proposal in the meeting had been "Treat misuse as defined in the CA's CP/CPS", and the question that came from that was whether or not that requirement was already captured in our existing reasons for revocation.</div><div><br></div><div>It sounds like there's a thin sliver that is distinct - since our Subscriber Agreement/TOU requirements don't actually require that the Subscriber use it in the CP/CPS-dictated way - so we can alternatively word that requirement as:</div><div><br></div><div>4.9.1.1 (currently)</div><div>"4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;"<br></div><div><br></div><div>4.9.1.1 (future)</div><div>"4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused, as defined by Section 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 of the CA's CP/CPS;"<br></div><div><br></div><div>This makes it clear what misuse is, and where CAs should specify what misuse is.</div><div><br></div><div>Similarly, we'd want to make sure that the Agreement/TOU was also updated to reflect what "misuse" is to more accurately capture it, namely</div><div>9.6.3 (future)</div><div>"8. Acknowledgment and Acceptance: An acknowledgment and acceptance that the CA is entitled to revoke the certificate immediately if the Applicant were to violate the terms of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use or if the CA is required to revoke the certificate for one of the reasons described in Section 4.9.1.1"</div><div><br></div><div>That above change would cover all CA-initiated revocation indemnification, which CAs should appreciate.</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Adriano Santoni via Public <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p><font face="Calibri">IMO, a CA can describe in their CPS what
"misuse" is, and the BRs should allow CAs to revoke certificates
that are "misused" according to their respective CPSes. The CPS
is a contract, in essence, and it's up to the Applicant to
decide whether they like it or not. If a CPS provides for
revocation of the SSL certificate in case it is used on a web
site that (just for example, I am not suggesting anything to
anyone) sells weapons ... the Applicant may not say they did not
know, and I do not think that this need to be expressly covered
in the BR (nor should it be forbidden).</font><br>
</p><div><div class="h5">
<br>
<div class="m_-9157181830328910296moz-cite-prefix">Il 08/06/2018 11:52, Ryan Sleevi via
Public ha scritto:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">I'm not sure. Misuse defines what it's not, while
allowing for a whole host of things which it is. If it's defined
as the antonym, and we defined that particular function or use,
then that would forbid any uses not covered - probably not what
is intended.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 5:36 AM,
Moudrick M. Dadashov via Public <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Would it
help if we define its antonym e.g. "designed for or capable
of a particular function or use"?<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
M.D.
<div>
<div class="m_-9157181830328910296h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
On 2018-06-07 17:32, Ryan Sleevi via Public wrote:<br>
</div>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div class="m_-9157181830328910296h5">
On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Geoff Keating <<a href="mailto:geoffk@apple.com" target="_blank">geoffk@apple.com</a>><br>
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On Jun 7, 2018, at 1:40 PM, Ryan Sleevi via Public<br>
</blockquote>
<<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
In the pursuit of a definition, we tried to work
backwards - what<br>
</blockquote>
are situations we think are misuse.<br>
<br>
The dictionary definition of ‘misuse’ is:<br>
<br>
use (something) in the wrong way or for the wrong
purpose<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I'm not sure how this helps us move forward - were you
suggesting that<br>
4.9.1.1 would read:<br>
<br>
4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was
used for the wrong<br>
way or for the wrong purpose;<br>
<br>
With such a definition, this supposes there's a right
way or right<br>
purpose.<br>
<br>
1) Do you believe the right purpose is wholly
reflecting in the<br>
Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use?<br>
2) Do you believe the right way is wholly reflected in
the definition<br>
I provided (from 1.1), that the right way is "used for
authenticating<br>
servers accessible through the Internet"<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Another suggestion was that it involved scenarios
where the<br>
</blockquote>
Subscriber private key was in an HSM, and itself was
not<br>
compromised, but had signed things it was not
expected to. This<br>
wasn't elaborated on further - so I'm uncertain if
this meant things<br>
other than the TLS handshake transcript - but this
is already met by<br>
our definition of Key Compromise in 1.6.1, that is:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
""A Private Key is said to be compromised if its
value has been<br>
</blockquote>
disclosed to an<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
unauthorized person, an unauthorized person
has had access<br>
</blockquote>
to it, or there exists a<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
practical technique by which an unauthorized
person may<br>
</blockquote>
discover its value. “""<br>
<br>
If a key is in a HSM and not exportable, then its
value is not<br>
disclosed, nor does an unauthorized person have
access *to the<br>
key*. Dictionary definition of ‘access’ is 'obtain,
examine,<br>
or retrieve’ none of which apply here. So it is not
covered by<br>
Key Compromise.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I'm not sure - what are you providing an example of? I
would think<br>
that, say, generating a signed message that was not
authorized, then<br>
"an unauthorized person has access to it". Perhaps you
could help me<br>
understand this misuse - is it that the signature was
authorized and<br>
was directed to sign something that they didn't want
to do?<br>
</div>
</div>
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