<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"><html><head><meta content="text/html;charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"></head><body ><div style='font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;'>I am an interested party but I intended to send to the list. Adding the list again now.<div id="message"></div><br id="br3"><div id="signature"></div><div id="content"><blockquote><br> ---- On Do, 01 Mär 2018 17:44:17 +0100 <b> sleevi@google.com </b> wrote ----<br><br><div><div dir="ltr">I'm not sure if you meant to (if you're an interested party or not), but you only sent to me.<br><div><br><div>On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Matthias Merkel <span><<a href="mailto:moritz30@moritz30.de" target="_blank">moritz30@moritz30.de</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote style="margin: 0 0 0 0.8ex; border-left: 1px rgb(204, 204, 204) solid; padding-left: 1ex">We can't generalize it like that. </blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, we can.</div><div> </div><blockquote style="margin: 0 0 0 0.8ex; border-left: 1px rgb(204, 204, 204) solid; padding-left: 1ex">There are cases where the reseller may have good reasons to save the key permanently (for example if they are a webhost and the customer intends to use them for their hosting it wouldn't make much sense to not save the key and have the customer reenter it).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sure, but that's not relevant to "Reseller" models - that's authorized parties with the private key. They are conceptually very different threat models. Anyone with your private key can request revocation (that's a non-negotiable MUST HAVE requirement), so you should ensure your private key is only with parties who will act in your interest.</div><div><br></div><div>Resellers who induce or coerce sharing of private keys are bad resellers.</div><div> </div><blockquote style="margin: 0 0 0 0.8ex; border-left: 1px rgb(204, 204, 204) solid; padding-left: 1ex"> Also there should be a way for a domain owner to revoke a certificate no matter if they are the subscriber or not. This may be used in a scenario like if you are using Cloudflare as a proxy or in other situations where the reseller is the subscriber.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There are not models where the reseller is the subscriber. And the problem of domain-holder revocation is already discussed in mozilla.dev.security.policy (which at least permits public participation)</div><div> </div><blockquote style="margin: 0 0 0 0.8ex; border-left: 1px rgb(204, 204, 204) solid; padding-left: 1ex"> <br> <br>  ---- On Do, 01 Mär 2018 16:40:58 +0100 Ryan Sleevi via Public <<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>> wrote ----<br> <div><div> ><br>  ><br>  > On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:34 AM, LeaderTelecom B.V. via Public <<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:<br>  > Dear Phillip,<br>  ><br>  >  > I don’t understand the reasoning.<br>  >  > If a cert is bad, it is bad and we need to revoke it. Period, end of story.<br>  ><br>  >  I afraid cases when it can affect clients. For example, reseller revoked certificate without permission of client. In this case, client do not have any new certificate and old one. May be they revoked bad certificates, but bulk revocation looks strange.  Another case: Reseller was hacked and someone revoked all certificates of reseller. Limitations for resellers can protect end users.<br>  ><br>  > Resellers don't have the ability to revoke certificates if they're not the Subscriber (and have not compromised the Subscriber).  Resellers also should not save private keys of clients.<br>  > Yes, this is obvious - and no CA should work with a reseller that does do this, especially without consent.<br>  >     ---<br>  >  Kind regards,  Aleksei Ivanov<br>  ><br>  >  01/03/2018 16:01 - Phillip wrote:  I don’t understand the reasoning.<br>  ><br>  >  If a cert is bad, it is bad and we need to revoke it. Period, end of story.<br>  ><br>  >  This looks like punishing resellers for behavior we want to encourage.<br>  ><br>  >      From: Public [mailto:<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] On Behalf Of LeaderTelecom B.V. via Public<br>  >  Sent: Thursday, March 1, 2018 8:06 AM<br>  >  To: <a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com" target="_blank">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a><br>  >  Subject: Re: [cabfpub] [Ticket#2018022801003595] How do you handle mass revocation requests?<br>  >  It will be great to have daily / monthly limit for revocation for each reseller. For example, daily limit 1% from all active certificates (minimum 10 pcs). Monthly limit can be 20% from all active certificates of partner (minimum 100 pcs, maximum: 1000 pcs.).<br>  ><br>  >       ---  Kind regards,<br>  >  Aleksei Ivanov<br>  ><br>  ><br>  >  28/02/2018 22:34 - Jeremy Rowley via Public wrote:    Here’s 10 CSRs that people can correlate with the CT logs. I’ll create another 100 or so to dispel any doubt.<br>  ><br>  >  -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  MIICwDCCAagCAQAwezELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxDTALBgNVBAgTBFV0YWgxEDAOBgNV<br>  >  BAcTB05ld2J1cnkxDzANBgNVBAoTBkplcmVteTEgMB4GA1UECxMXUHJvb2Ygb2Yg<br>  >  a2V5IGNvbXByb21pc2UxGDAWBgNVBAMTD3d3dy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCASIwDQYJ<br>  >  KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMamagziY67jAV1XWBT2UBudz8leqPeZ<br>  >  nMGCP9Sct2qc5tDDLz34QIMFO9mv4eDRduMOTG7rwQygKPvI0mAKzKDJCxUvKLYJ<br>  >  Th/IALgkHfSvv7UzXUxF2kxviuvTCoP0Oee3DUJl4V614R2BnEtEpjEC4WNZglIU<br>  >  ytQiX36u4WQEbU1LGxp16+Rqz55TOnqRaUNlCCVjB99A3dvxYxpa+6qUHt2aeEyW<br>  >  WBguBq4sDzOeeLCcnfiCywbDKD4YeqQxvn1EJGBrCQnOf5UdHidJB3ZKKngYWKaZ<br>  >  48nYK2CqM1dq44vIH6EezGq+0Xs8EFJfi2mjDghfziiX1UtpUt2/vUcCAwEAAaAA<br>  >  MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQA/HM907Hc/rV+olpHW8n1N0UkhfbVHjSegFhQZ<br>  >  2Wn4jFKAargvOCGDChThcnUbquptKpTFVaKJap0JB2T+fCI3WAMPG8CJKakcOjG/<br>  >  ZKheN3fNGUiaNk/Wyh/f6XnhWbchIK2OpcsSUAA5ju14bqs2epWl17c0MBPVY5sJ<br>  >  wFIBrNVjqji3Zkf7aE9GSMx36d8swfhqwomvFvO5SGKspPm2eRpBPwi8lRORDxz3<br>  >  cAoG4TU3/7xs2XAyTE27UQwdrUo7jkVUlCFoWf6DySHEy7CKTz3Vwu9ABtNdBtG9<br>  >  oEnWxhIhBPcYOwCrGkiJGuRImFAfLifHWvLUNqGKpz/nEr+c<br>  >  -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  MIICvDCCAaQCAQAwdzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxDTALBgNVBAgTBFV0YWgxEDAOBgNV<br>  >  BAcTB05ld2J1cnkxDzANBgNVBAoTBkplcmVteTEcMBoGA1UECxMTUHJvb2Ygb2Yg<br>  >  Y29tcHJvbWlzZTEYMBYGA1UEAxMPd3d3LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG<br>  >  9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqS0TSQbsGiJdAYfhuNrGzvXX4XvwToLBq+Hx<br>  >  trxKq8zoWIRtimRuH66uRmVy0I/lR78u4FEewAjblaS+v1jTLNopik+taBiFHudn<br>  >  /RGliOcKFohp4BYZuSZRRt3uLN5z8Jr5VbRMzZy6SNp3wX3f+Ie/XsAV04TXmbSv<br>  >  +V8ZUjxzj1448DsCFL1NNDUcoic/MUcW+fsu9VuxhdETOwrf7CgJ91FgzwHHSMKL<br>  >  Mq6DwY6xF90KQ5vInhYhRQ447zoSW1ABnmF+gPxDjXXb5pCh4aua8wOv3AmiZbbn<br>  >  Nnkv9y1YXIeBJ1o1zbTt51v62Qu4LeRYVfWjhI1sn8k96DH8mQIDAQABoAAwDQYJ<br>  >  KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBADgA4tGSyIpAA9uXooQivo9NH7lZH+M4bXpn+nOmNxn/<br>  >  aRzmbg9NksRKrQoN0/CkWpiu6vwp31gAG2eIpnvNX9ltzPD2/yHAQCLUZmiGZnUP<br>  >  fUdV1t7Z1EZ9Mj7YmlAN5NuQPAu7SL5fZ8UJSzzY1H7AuECU29j81dK2jLxRR1p6<br>  >  PaajUGPAvraVTZND4JGQJpIazrF+mVDADdt1aOntr6lj+CC92E5oQxCWtU8uUX7Y<br>  >  k5OJdewmNlVIk7wtcuVA2ju3jFlNtHP66DE/UDlcx5X5vE2qFq3aZFAqUAf0XXWW<br>  >  bagqqjxfHSQaNVGlWBkJb0eCdD+DW8IK0nuw5GP2rzY=<br>  >  -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  MIICwDCCAagCAQAwezELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxDTALBgNVBAgTBFV0YWgxEDAOBgNV<br>  >  BAcTB05ld2J1cnkxDzANBgNVBAoTBkplcmVteTEgMB4GA1UECxMXUHJvb2Ygb2Yg<br>  >  a2V5IGNvbXByb21pc2UxGDAWBgNVBAMTD3d3dy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCASIwDQYJ<br>  >  KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMfZnCmYERBmZPEMdK5yvvC0QXjB1FQo<br>  >  bu4IC9W1ThdFySkJL6t2MeoxbaTW8hwdATf8JHlRnrpevXStUsYDZShxpsQePZk8<br>  >  LUW5OHQ6W/XDbGo4tC69Q3XTYvLeX+3q971mbiyFpBondTKZaKZYAR5omV7e/Olt<br>  >  ZzN1yqyX551NsSwDGTrgBqCU2XQzYu9Tl9Nibjl4yCKCG9/JbgGa+gy8j1eKWxIt<br>  >  lW7jmJID8s0N2v0ed1lvxr7A3oCiYef4TSi2RjLyZThGw1a7j3QqlBeGIqo89XtG<br>  >  8GxA2nNSGx7gnIceMGGUd0q9iGQl1gc+FOI5oBbyjLcMCty2YInMQucCAwEAAaAA<br>  >  MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBQyDCiBYXRMOryHhVVW52kY6wvsgWsPXLR0piQ<br>  >  FJKP/drPdqgs/uxY6Nx163sNaiWPEI0tUWSmnuPe43qAyIqJXmnd/C6EqGy+ZI1Y<br>  >  lf0XAfqVzJ+tc9639pSkGfeGxU75qdPwWqbwzEEdNZCDR/4QqzhGgMLyvH7icoc0<br>  >  7ikxxwyUiKpP4h3nAV7Fg4EMKeEn/3m+vM0aGnZNx16WHpQF/VnyBM8NimADmO/u<br>  >  vywC2TbLNBYYYG7dlLUk7fYfoFY5okel4z2fjmaNhuQQEpffJ366DC41A3fWDgp8<br>  >  j1Ok8PfhiVySEwdSCNgpZbHnSwxodk4E3aZ22kCa2f7nOzDd<br>  >  -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  MIICwDCCAagCAQAwezELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxDTALBgNVBAgTBFV0YWgxEDAOBgNV<br>  >  BAcTB05ld2J1cnkxDzANBgNVBAoTBkplcmVteTEgMB4GA1UECxMXUHJvb2Ygb2Yg<br>  >  a2V5IGNvbXByb21pc2UxGDAWBgNVBAMTD3d3dy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCASIwDQYJ<br>  >  KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALjEWXaHdMifi0LbL0GrnYV6uoltTicU<br>  >  ywDOkSz/cReCI6gzxb1jpuQu1iVAkmiZUmPk4sPjc4e/OvAo0IyXgVEqBVcB4cmB<br>  >  JTdWFj4fde8G9/NWoKIHIRVS4envx4jjRFEh6uDI9o4pDcpfvjh59s1RCjqU9EqX<br>  >  DueUoKCk7eynjBxePNYZtZL5xBbBRIeqkjtBALtdnQdkbMTBAHJT4WvK2y9ExtWY<br>  >  aJAoAf0ZYmQOeqzXZC4w1FKs7/GEa1qaPjyxe596LvZvOMZbB49gUYou6lhmG+ga<br>  >  PaJIGm53/A4PgLnCisEjrVL46YB/k/EzTQtwq5jRg5usIL0/YCJlvCkCAwEAAaAA<br>  >  MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCgCziprbbD+aS22QHBMOnjy5r7iYiteKO1uB1o<br>  >  zdaKpNBg32+tNyYsNazijAb0rcyFLGAeTfjbWQ5YDbK44qGmKxhO5nyeUkb9/ulI<br>  >  scT94Trwu8j77DTxaFNTziETbw5KIBfiC7M5cD+vQ2UexJ8giv9s7ZchXY/hK8TA<br>  >  IPY1jfEzioEgjap2bXhZ7GGHhjNg/3DIHCy2dD+eDeTsHhZQ+4ndfMeydg9fn6se<br>  >  20A73X5rFGYKtp3z19stTDjXFDVyf/ngXtyti830ebQgmxRLJRAKV+MSHrdxW4Jj<br>  >  qkuW6fmTj2s3x8iTKecd5Q/NOKt2XjOMldc6eKA4VSi3QNuc<br>  >  -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----<br>  >  MIICwDCCAagCAQAwezELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxDTALBgNVBAgTBFV0YWgxEDAOBgNV<br>  >  BAcTB05ld2J1cnkxDzANBgNVBAoTBkplcmVteTEgMB4GA1UECxMXUHJvb2Ygb2Yg<br>  >  a2V5IGNvbXByb21pc2UxGDAWBgNVBAMTD3d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isfies these Requirements…” and under 9.6.3, "The CA SHALL implement a process to ensure that each Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use is legally enforceable against the Applicant."     Here's where I'm saying I've seen fuzziness, with respect to the Reseller being nominated as an Applicant Representative (effectively), thus binding the Agreement between the user (who is now the Subscriber) and <the CA>. We've left under-specified how the Applicant Representative is authorized (under than 'express authority') - other than the 3.2.5 case.     To be clear: I don't think this is a defensible position, but I'm saying that based on how some of the issuance practices (or, more aptly, based on complaints we've heard re: various API integrations, including those of former CAs no longer members), this does seem an interpretation that some have advanced. The CA has defined a process (the Applicant Representative agreed), but it's not a very ... good... process. The CA would be at fault, but this is where the messiness is.<br>  > _______________________________________________<br>  >  Public mailing list<br>  >  <a href="mailto:Public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Public@cabforum.org</a><br>  >  <a href="https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public</a><br>  ><br>  ><br>  >  _______________________________________________<br>  > Public mailing list<br>  > <a href="mailto:Public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Public@cabforum.org</a><br>  > <a href="https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public</a><br>  ><br> <br> <br> </div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div> </div></blockquote></div></div><br></body></html>