<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 12:39 PM, Gervase Markham via Public <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
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<div class="gmail-m_7568618688973124656WordSection1"><u></u><pre>1) In section 1.3.2 of the Baseline Requirements, replace the following sentence:
"The CA MAY delegate the performance of all, or any part, of Section 3.2 requirements to a Delegated Third Party, provided that the process as a whole fulfills all of the requirements of Section 3.2."
with:
"With the exception of sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5, the CA MAY delegate the performance of all, or any part, of Section 3.2 requirements to a Delegated Third Party, provided that the process as a whole fulfills all of the requirements of Section 3.2."</pre></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Based on our description, I believe your intent is also to cover Section 3.2.2.6, correct?</div><div><br></div><div>The concern raised in Raleigh that this introduces is that it effectively forbids Enterprise RAs from managing the validation of domains beneath the Domain Namespace that the CA has verified. This is because Enterprise RAs are Delegated Third Parties.</div><div><br></div><div>Is your intent to restrict such Enterprise RAs to only performing Subject Name validation?</div><div><br></div><div>At present, 3.2.2.4 (nor the proposed updates in Ballot 190) permit blanket authorizations by Domain Namespace. I suspect that if Section 3.2.2.4 were modified to permit the validation of such requests at the Domain Namespace level, and the corresponding reuse of such information permitted, then the meaningful benefit of an Enterprise RA could be met without the necessity of introducing the concept.</div><div><br></div><div>That is, if 3.2.2.4 were worded to somehow suggest that:</div><div>"The CA SHALL confirm that, as of the date the Certificate issues, the CA has validated each FullyâQualified Domain Name (FQDN) listed in the Certificate using at least one of the methods listed below, or is within the Domain Namespace of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) that has been validated using at least one of the methods listed below. "</div><div><br></div><div>Then this might be able to satisfy the concern over Enterprise RAs. It changes the relationship from permitting an Enterprise RA to have unconstrained issuance, but contractual restriction, to being one of technical restriction, by requiring that for every FQDN, the CA validate it is within the Domain Namespace of a (potentially previously) validated FQDN.</div></div></div></div>