<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><br class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On Feb 24, 2017, at 11:14 AM, Ryan Sleevi <<a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com" class="">sleevi@google.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=""><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" class=""><div dir="ltr" class=""><br class=""><div class="gmail_extra"><br class=""><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 9:58 AM, <a href="mailto:philliph@comodo.com" class="">philliph@comodo.com</a> <span dir="ltr" class=""><<a href="mailto:philliph@comodo.com" target="_blank" class="">philliph@comodo.com</a>></span> wrote:<br class=""><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word" class=""><div class=""><span class="gmail-"><div class=""><br class=""></div></span><div class="">Well as it happens, that is not a problem. </div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">* There is a set of FIPS requirements and testing regimes etc. for SHA-3</div><div class="">* There are HSMs that have met those requirements. </div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">What is a concern related to HSMs is that the transition is widely supported so CAs do not have to make major changes to their infrastructure or change suppliers or use different hardware for SHA-3 certificates.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">The availability of HSMs is a concern but it is actually the very last but one on the critical path which is at present</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">* NIST issues FIPS (done)</div><div class="">* IETF publishes specification (started on this)</div><div class="">* CABForum amends guidelines to permit use</div><div class="">* Browsers add support</div><div class="">* HSM vendors ship product</div><div class="">* CAs issue certificates.</div></div></div></blockquote><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">As indicated before, I believe you have critically misordered these requirements, which may be the source of our disagreement. I do not expect you to agree, but I hope you can understand why, from my perspective, the order is:</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class=""><div class="">* NIST issues FIPS (done)</div><div class="">* IETF publishes specification (started on this)</div><div class=""><div class=""> * HSM vendors ship product</div></div><div class=""> * CABForum amends guidelines to permit use<br class=""></div><div class="">* Browsers add support</div><div class="">* CAs issue certificates.<br class=""></div></div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">That is, I see the HSM discussion happening in parallel to permitting, but I see both as blocking for browsers adding support.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><br class=""></div><div>I don’t see why Browsers are blocked from adding support before CABF permits use or HSM vendors ship product.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>I think the correct dependencies are as follows:</div><div><br class=""></div><div>(1) IETF (or other standards org) publishes specification</div><div>(2) HSM vendors ship product (depends on 1)</div><div>(3) CABForum permits use (depends on 1 + may depend on 2, assuming HSM req needs to change)</div><div>(4) Browsers add support (depends on 1)</div><div>(5) Private CAs issue certificates (depends on 1)</div><div>(6) Public CAs issue certificates (depends on 2 + 3)</div><div>(7) Customers can use certificates (depends on 4 + (5 or 6))</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Why do you think browsers are blocked on anything other than #1?</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Peter</div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div></body></html>