<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"><meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 15 (filtered medium)"><style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
{font-family:"Cambria Math";
panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
{font-family:Calibri;
panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
{margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:blue;
text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:purple;
text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
color:#44546A;
font-weight:normal;
font-style:normal;
text-decoration:none none;}
span.EmailStyle18
{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
color:windowtext;
font-weight:normal;
font-style:normal;
text-decoration:none none;}
.MsoChpDefault
{mso-style-type:export-only;
font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
{size:8.5in 11.0in;
margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext="edit">
<o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#44546A'>Thanks, Erwann. I now understand, and agree with you. I don’t know why Marc Stevens used the original certs and not the TBSCertificates derived from them. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#44546A'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#44546A'>Thanks also to Peter for running the analysis on the TBSCertificates. I’m going to respond on mozilla dev.security.policy.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#44546A'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#44546A'>-Rick<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#44546A'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> Erwann Abalea [mailto:Erwann.Abalea@docusign.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:34 AM<br><b>To:</b> Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com><br><b>Cc:</b> Dean Coclin <Dean_Coclin@symantec.com>; public@cabforum.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Application for SHA-1 Issuance<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>Bonjour Rick,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>As said, in the first set of 8 tested objects, these are really the tbsCertificate first proposed (with the magical dust in OU).<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:.5in'>But in the second set of 7 tested objects, these are in fact the complete certificates (the original ones), and not the tbsCertificate proposed to replace them (with the same key and name, but different serial number and dates).<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>—<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#222222;background:white'>[…]</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#222222;background:white'>[stevens TSYS2]$ time ../detectcoll_allDVs *.der </span><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#222222'><br><span style='background:white'>sha1 f75716390925b752b403a7bbf6acb349de9d8d09 ssl1.tsys.1.txt.der</span></span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>[…]<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>—<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>The displayed SHA1 hash is identical with the one of the certificate found at <a href="https://crt.sh/?id=12924024">https://crt.sh/?id=12924024</a>, on which the proposed tbsCertificate is based.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>A perfectly understandable mistake.<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>Cordialement,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>Erwann Abalea<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>Le 28 juil. 2016 à 00:08, Rick Andrews <<a href="mailto:Rick_Andrews@symantec.com">Rick_Andrews@symantec.com</a>> a écrit :<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>Erwann,<br><br>Marc Stevens said "certs" but he meant "TBSCertificates". We didn't sign<br>certificates; we published TBSCertificates.<br><br>-Rick<br><br>--------------------------<br><br>From: Erwann Abalea <<a href="mailto:eabalea@gmail.com">eabalea@gmail.com</a>><br>Date: July 27, 2016 at 12:41:27 PM GMT-5<br>To: Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:Dean_Coclin@symantec.com">Dean_Coclin@symantec.com</a>><br>Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Application for SHA-1 Issuance<br>He tested the full certificates of the second set, not their tbs, in fact. <br><br>Le mercredi 27 juillet 2016, Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:Dean_Coclin@symantec.com">Dean_Coclin@symantec.com</a>> a<br>écrit :<br>I saw an email from Marc Stevens on the Mozilla list a few days ago which<br>indicated he tested both the original set of TBS certs and the 2nd set and<br>did not see any issues. <br>(See:<br><a href="https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/sku5NYXd">https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/sku5NYXd</a><br>pOM)<br> <br>Are there other questions that folks would like to ask or concerns that can<br>be addressed?<br> <br>Symantec is awaiting approval from browsers to schedule the signing ceremony<br>this weekend if possible.<br> <br>Thanks,<br>Dean<br> <br>From: <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] On<br>Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi<br>Sent: Monday, July 25, 2016 4:26 PM<br>To: Rob Stradling <<a href="mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com">rob.stradling@comodo.com</a>><br>Cc: Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:Dean_Coclin@symantec.com">Dean_Coclin@symantec.com</a>>; CABFPub <<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a>><br>Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Application for SHA-1 Issuance<br> <br> <br> <br>On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Rob Stradling <<a href="mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com">rob.stradling@comodo.com</a>><br>wrote:<br>IINM, both Gerv and Ryan indicated (or at least strongly implied) that<br>rigid construction was a prerequisite for their (Mozilla's and Google's)<br>approval of TSYS's request. Did I misread something?<br> <br>From <a href="https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-July/008096.html">https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-July/008096.html</a><br> <br>"Certificates whose contents are entirely predictable or in line with<br>precedent would also be acceptable; but it seemed like there were<br>several questions about that floating around, and doing the serial<br>numbers by strict construction makes them all moot. If you want to try<br>dealing with all the questions about the contents instead, you are<br>welcome to try."<br> <br>Also, I don't see the relevance of "strong consensus". AIUI, there must<br>be unanimous agreement. If just one root program operator rejects<br>TSYS's request, then you can't issue the SHA-1 certs. Similarly, if<br>just one root program operator says rigidly constructed serial numbers<br>are required, then you can't use random serial numbers.<br><br><br>-- <br>Erwann.<o:p></o:p></p></div></blockquote></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div></body></html>