<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
I've said in the past that I believe any non-critical change should
have a 6 month lead time by default. I stand by that statement and
submit it again. And yes, Ryan, that goes whether the change
toughens or relaxes the requirements. CAs are of course free and
encouraged to bring themselves into compliance sooner if they are
able to do so without turning their existing dev cycle on it's head,
but I don't think 6 months is unreasonable for a non-critical change
either way.<br>
<br>
-Rich<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 7/21/2016 11:02 PM, Ryan Sleevi
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CACvaWvY=FqcR6X0w+1YCrd90H-u+ceKd8MsB17gkWhLVDOtk2A@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">Dean,</p>
<p dir="ltr">In the past, when CAs have had concerns, there's been
a suggestion of a timeframe that might be reasonable to make
changes.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Is thirty days sufficient? Why or why not?</p>
<p dir="ltr">When the proposed changes relax, rather than toughen,
a requirement, do you share the same concerns?</p>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Jul 21, 2016 7:32 PM, "Dean Coclin"
<<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:Dean_Coclin@symantec.com">Dean_Coclin@symantec.com</a>>
wrote:<br type="attribution">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Josh,<br>
<br>
This is not a criticism of this specific ballot; I have no
comment on its merit. However, in reviewing several recent
ballots, I think it's problematic to have a ballot state
that it is effective as of the date of passage.<br>
<br>
If a CA has to make technical or policy changes, it's going
to take some time to do so. If the ballot takes effect on
the day of passage, then the CA has to make immediate
changes, lest they be technically out of compliance as of
that day.<br>
<br>
For example, this ballot will require CAs to make CPS
changes. How are they supposed to do this in one day? Am I
reading this correctly?<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Dean<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
[mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Josh Aas<br>
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2016 10:18 AM<br>
To: CABFPub <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a>><br>
Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to
cease use of private key due to incorrect certificate info<br>
<br>
Ballot 173 - Removal of requirement to cease use of private
key due to incorrect certificate info<br>
<br>
The following motion has been proposed by Josh Aas of ISRG /
Let's Encrypt. Ben Wilson of Digicert and Chris Bailey of
Entrust endorse.<br>
<br>
Background:<br>
<br>
BR Section 9.6.3 point 5 says:<br>
<br>
"Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to
promptly cease using a Certificate and its associated
Private Key, and promptly request the CA to revoke the
Certificate, in the event that: (a) any information in the
Certificate is, or becomes, incorrect or inaccurate, or (b)
there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the
Subscriber’s Private Key associated with the Public Key
included in the Certificate;"<br>
<br>
There is a problem here, which is that this requires a
subscriber to stop using a private key just because
information in a certificate is inaccurate or incorrect.
People should stop using a cert with inaccurate or incorrect
information, but they shouldn't be required to stop using a
key pair unless there is known or suspected compromise.<br>
<br>
This is particularly problematic for HPKP.<br>
<br>
--Motion Begins--<br>
<br>
Effective upon the date of passage, the following
modifications are made to the Baseline Requirements:<br>
<br>
Change the following text in Section 9.6.3:<br>
=======================<br>
Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to
promptly cease using a Certificate and its associated
Private Key, and promptly request the CA to revoke the
Certificate, in the event that: (a) any information in the
Certificate is, or becomes, incorrect or inaccurate, or (b)
there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the
Subscriber’s Private Key associated with the Public Key
included in the Certificate; =======================<br>
<br>
To:<br>
=======================<br>
Reporting and Revocation: An obligation and warranty to: (a)
promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease
using it and its associated Private Key, if there is any
actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Subscriber’s
Private Key associated with the Public Key included in the
Certificate; and (b) promptly request revocation of the
Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the
Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate.<br>
=======================<br>
<br>
--Motion Ends--<br>
<br>
The review period for this ballot shall commence at 2200 UTC
on 14 July 2016, and will close at 2200 UTC on 21 July 2016.
Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the
voting period will start immediately thereafter and will
close at 2200 UTC on 28 July 2016. Votes must be cast by
posting an on-list reply to this thread.<br>
<br>
A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in
the response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in
the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear
'abstain' in the response.<br>
Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote
received from any representative of a voting member before
the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting
members are listed here:<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://cabforum.org/members/" rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/members/</a><br>
<br>
In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of
the votes cast by members in the CA category and greater
than 50% of the votes cast by members in the browser
category must be in favor. Quorum is currently ten (10)
members– at least ten members must participate in the
ballot, either by voting in favor, voting against, or
abstaining.<br>
<br>
--<br>
Josh Aas<br>
Executive Director<br>
Internet Security Research Group<br>
Let's Encrypt: A Free, Automated, and Open CA
_______________________________________________<br>
Public mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Public@cabforum.org">Public@cabforum.org</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Public mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Public@cabforum.org">Public@cabforum.org</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Public mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Public@cabforum.org">Public@cabforum.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public">https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>