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I'd just like to also point out that given Microsoft's apparent lack
of interest in back porting any of these changes to their PKI
handling to anything older than Windows 10, and based upon this:<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/lifecycle">http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/lifecycle</a><br>
Any exception made will be with us until at least January 10, 2023.
I don't really see that as something this group should endorse.<br>
<br>
-Rich<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/22/2016 3:44 PM, Ryan Sleevi
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CACvaWvZ6EtEhHfOdbMwdAHx6ciRFyAgwS9cfkOV0cdSS0Wd-2Q@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:45 PM,
Peter Bowen <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com" target="_blank">pzb@amzn.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">So it
would seem that this solution might not be the best
option.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>"Not the best" isn't the goal. It's "Don't violate
RFC5280" that should be the goal.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Multiple SANs is a complete red-herring as to the
issue. There's no requirement that such certificates have
them.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Common name deprecation is equally a red-herring. If it
offers a viable path for these clients, without the
attendant security issues and *fundamental violation of
RFC5280*, it's worth exploring.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>That there's been no further explanation other than
"Meh" is, unquestionably, not a position we can endorse,
but even moreso, a policy of "Oh well, we'll violate them
anyways" is just grossly irresponsible.</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
The best solution would be for clients to be updated to
follow RFC 2818 and check iPAddress entries in the SAN.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Indeed, and Microsoft can solve this very easily,
without the same risks and compatibility issues of
nameConstraints.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>We considered the RFC5280 non-criticality of
nameConstraints because it offered significant positive
security value for a majority of clients, without
compatibility risks. The iPAddresses provide no positive
security value - other than allowing CAs to sell to users
with buggy software that their vendor doesn't want to fix
- and come with significant compatibility and security
risks.</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
To me, it seems that allowing string-ified IP address in
dNSName entries in the SAN when the same IP address is
included as an iPAddress entry in the SAN is a reasonable
tradeoff. It is no worse than including the same in the
common name. As you have pointed out, a string-ified IP
address can never match a hostname, so there is no chance
of confusion </blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I've already explained to you why this is incorrect.
It's unfortunate that you continue to suggest this line of
thinking. A string-ified IP address is not a valid
hostname.</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> If you
have a client that properly conforms to RFC 2818, then
this is a no-op for you — you will look at the IPaddress
entry and never try to match on DNSname. You had
expressed concern that Mozilla would need to update its
code, but Gerv had indicated back in August that this was
not necessary (<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-August/005850.html"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-August/005850.html</a>).<br>
</blockquote>
<div> </div>
<div>That's not what is in the ballot. What is in the ballot
can and will cause compatibility issues. It also suggests
that Chrome would need to adopt Firefox's peculiar
behaviour (only validating presented identifiers as
they're encountered, rather than at parse time). That's
not something we are comfortable with implementing, and
especially not foisting upon the ecosystem to know about
the "special" rules the CA/B Forum embraces. There's
already enough magic in the WebPKI - we shouldn't
knowingly introduce more.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
I appreciate that conformance is a great goal, but not
causing customer pain is also a laudable goal. In this
case it seems the risk is low and the customer value is
high.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There has yet to be a demonstration of the customer
value compared to the solution posed 8 months ago.
There's clearly a demonstration of CA value - they do less
work - and of browser value - Microsoft does less work -
but there has yet to be an articulation of why the
solution is non-viable. The closest comment is Jeremy
saying they've investigated, it's not practical - but
provided zero evidence or technical detail that would
allow a reasoned weighing of the risk versus reward.
Instead, we see CAs eager to violate RFC5280, easy to
cause compatibility issues with clients, and w/o apparent
care for the long-term damage to the ecosystem they would
be doing.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
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