<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><div class="">It is under the US Federal PKI which is cross-signed/subordinated by IdenTrust ACES/Public Sector. See <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1037590#c21" class="">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1037590#c21</a></div><br class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On Feb 2, 2016, at 11:07 AM, Jeremy Rowley <<a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com" class="">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=""><div class="WordSection1" style="page: WordSection1; font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class="">Who’s root is that one off of? That’s a terrible cert. Such a completely misissued cert should probably be discussed at the Mozilla forum since it impacts their root store program, right?<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><o:p class=""></o:p></span></div><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><a name="_MailEndCompose" class=""><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=""> </span></a></div><div class=""><div style="border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(225, 225, 225); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;" class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><b class=""><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">From:</span></b><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org" style="color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class="">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>[<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org" style="color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class="">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><b class="">On Behalf Of<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></b>Peter Bowen<br class=""><b class="">Sent:</b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Tuesday, February 2, 2016 12:02 PM<br class=""><b class="">To:</b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Ryan Sleevi<br class=""><b class="">Cc:</b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>CABFPub<br class=""><b class="">Subject:</b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Re: [cabfpub] Defining BR scope<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div></div></div><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><o:p class=""> </o:p></div><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">On Feb 2, 2016, at 10:06 AM, Ryan Sleevi <<a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com" style="color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class="">sleevi@google.com</a>> wrote:<o:p class=""></o:p></div><div class=""><blockquote style="margin-top: 5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=""><div class=""><div class=""><div class=""><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">On Tue, Feb 2, 2016 at 4:20 AM, Peter Bowen <<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target="_blank" style="color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class="">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<o:p class=""></o:p></div><blockquote style="border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-width: 1pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 6pt; margin-left: 4.8pt; margin-right: 0in;" class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><br class="">Do they do this in the presence of a SAN extension or just the absence?<o:p class=""></o:p></div></blockquote><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><o:p class=""> </o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">Modern browsers: Only when the SAN is bereft of DNS/IP addresses<o:p class=""></o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">Most every other software library: In addition to, and generally as the first match. I have seen code (and filed bugs) against implementations in PHP, Python, Ruby, and C that all opted to check CN, and if CN didn't match, check SAN. I've pointed them to RFC 6125 and explained the risks.<o:p class=""></o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""> <o:p class=""></o:p></div></div><blockquote style="border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-width: 1pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 6pt; margin-left: 4.8pt; margin-right: 0in;" class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">>> If so, are we anywhere near the point where<br class="">>> they could stop doing this?<br class="">><br class="">> Well, we mandated that SANs should mirror CN quite a while back, so<br class="">> there may be scope for this soon for publicly-trusted certs. I believe<br class="">> Ryan had some views here...<o:p class=""></o:p></div></blockquote><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><o:p class=""> </o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">Modern browsers: If they're willing to break the certs issued by some CAs that had 5-10 year validities right before the BRs came into effect, it should be reasonably accomplishable. However, this can *only* be accomplished if browsers recognize the distinction between "Chains to a BR compliant CA" and "Chains to a non-BR compliant CA" (e.g. enterprise CA). The former category should be mostly safe for CNs, save for the long-lived zombie certs. The latter category is dominated by CNs w/o SANs.<o:p class=""></o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><o:p class=""> </o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">Other software: It will be a decade+ before such applications stop checking CNs.<o:p class=""></o:p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><o:p class=""> </o:p></div></div><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class="">And it is certs like <a href="https://crt.sh/?id=11880495" style="color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=""><span style="color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class="">https://crt.sh/?id=11880495</span></a> that prove that this is true. That certificate was issued in the last month, has no SAN or EKU, has a FQDN in the CN, and chains back to one or more roots trusted by every browser (<a href="https://gist.github.com/pzb/c55a802c283c7b44002d" style="color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=""><span style="color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class="">https://gist.github.com/pzb/c55a802c283c7b44002d</span></a>). <a href="https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=aflsa.jag.af.mil" style="color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=""><span style="color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class="">https://</span><span style="color: rgb(31, 73, 125); text-decoration: none;" class="">www</span><span style="color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class="">.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=aflsa.jag.af.mil</span></a> shows that the certificate is in use at the FQDN in the CN.<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><o:p class=""> </o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">According to the ssllabs analysis, the chain should fail due to policy constraints, but I’m not sure if anything enforces such constraints.<o:p class=""></o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class=""><o:p class=""> </o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">Thanks,<o:p class=""></o:p></div></div><div class=""><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" class="">Peter</div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br class=""></body></html>