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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'>Who’s root is that one off of? That’s a terrible cert. Such a completely misissued cert should probably be discussed at the Mozilla forum since it impacts their root store program, right? <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><a name="_MailEndCompose"><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></a></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> public-bounces@cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Peter Bowen<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 2, 2016 12:02 PM<br><b>To:</b> Ryan Sleevi<br><b>Cc:</b> CABFPub<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Defining BR scope<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>On Feb 2, 2016, at 10:06 AM, Ryan Sleevi <<a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com">sleevi@google.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Tue, Feb 2, 2016 at 4:20 AM, Peter Bowen <<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target="_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=MsoNormal><br>Do they do this in the presence of a SAN extension or just the absence?<o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Modern browsers: Only when the SAN is bereft of DNS/IP addresses<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Most every other software library: In addition to, and generally as the first match. I have seen code (and filed bugs) against implementations in PHP, Python, Ruby, and C that all opted to check CN, and if CN didn't match, check SAN. I've pointed them to RFC 6125 and explained the risks.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=MsoNormal>>> If so, are we anywhere near the point where<br>>> they could stop doing this?<br>><br>> Well, we mandated that SANs should mirror CN quite a while back, so<br>> there may be scope for this soon for publicly-trusted certs. I believe<br>> Ryan had some views here...<o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Modern browsers: If they're willing to break the certs issued by some CAs that had 5-10 year validities right before the BRs came into effect, it should be reasonably accomplishable. However, this can *only* be accomplished if browsers recognize the distinction between "Chains to a BR compliant CA" and "Chains to a non-BR compliant CA" (e.g. enterprise CA). The former category should be mostly safe for CNs, save for the long-lived zombie certs. The latter category is dominated by CNs w/o SANs.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Other software: It will be a decade+ before such applications stop checking CNs.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'>And it is certs like <a href="https://crt.sh/?id=11880495"><span style='color:#1F497D'>https://crt.sh/?id=11880495</span></a> that prove that this is true. That certificate was issued in the last month, has no SAN or EKU, has a FQDN in the CN, and chains back to one or more roots trusted by every browser (<a href="https://gist.github.com/pzb/c55a802c283c7b44002d"><span style='color:#1F497D'>https://gist.github.com/pzb/c55a802c283c7b44002d</span></a>). <a href="https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=aflsa.jag.af.mil"><span style='color:#1F497D'>https://</span><span style='color:#1F497D;text-decoration:none'>www</span><span style='color:#1F497D'>.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=aflsa.jag.af.mil</span></a> shows that the certificate is in use at the FQDN in the CN.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>According to the ssllabs analysis, the chain should fail due to policy constraints, but I’m not sure if anything enforces such constraints.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Peter<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></body></html>