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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/30/2015 07:35 PM,
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a> wrote:<br>
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Trend Micro opposes Ballot 153 – Short-Lived Certificates for
the following reasons. The ballot is a major step backward
for user security.<o:p></o:p></p>
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<br>
I think the solution for "short-lived" certificates lies with the
browser vendors and them only - they may decide if and when they
want to check revocation information and may ignore OCSP for
certificates that will expire within X time. And of course take the
necessary risks on behalf of their users.<br>
<br>
For the record, this ballot improves previous proposals as it offers
CRL DP in the certificates, it could be fine-tuned further by
requiring that the CRL must be as well short-lived. Such
certificates could use a different CRL DP than others with a longer
validity, but it would have to be better defined in the ballot. <br>
<br>
And obviously CRLs will not help in case a CA has lost control over
current and future certificates (which may have been issued with
future dates), basically we would be back to the same scenario as
with OCSP without "unknown" responses.<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
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<td colspan="2">Regards </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"> </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signer: </td>
<td>Eddy Nigg, COO/CTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td> </td>
<td><a href="http://www.startcom.org">StartCom Ltd.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XMPP: </td>
<td><a href="xmpp:startcom@startcom.org">startcom@startcom.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blog: </td>
<td><a href="http://blog.startcom.org">Join the Revolution!</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter: </td>
<td><a href="http://twitter.com/eddy_nigg">Follow Me</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"> </td>
</tr>
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